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l)CAPITAL STRUCTURE, STRATEGIC COMPETITION, AND GOVERNANCE
This thesis consists of four studies on the interactions of capital structure and product
market competition, and on several aspects of governance, firm financing and growth. The
first study investigates how competitive behavior and market uncertainty affect the
capital structure of a firm in the U.S. manufacturing. We show that demand uncertainty is
positively related to leverage for firms in both the Cournot and the Bertrand samples. Cost
uncertainty has a significantly positive impact on the leverage of Cournot firms, but plays a
negligible role for Bertrand firms. In the second study, we examine the joint determination
of capital structure and market share in U.S. manufacturing firms. We provide evidence
that in Cournot competition, leverage negatively affects market share, while in Bertrand
competition this effect is positive. Market share is shown to have a negative impact on
leverage in Cournot firms, but no impact on leverage in Bertrand firms. Both studies
highlight the role of firms’ competitive behavior in the product market in their capital
structure decisions. The third study analyzes the importance of firm-specific and country-
specific factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. We find
that firm-specific determinants of leverage differ across countries, while prior studies
implicitly assume equal impact of these determinants. Although we concur with the
conventional direct impact of country-specific factors on the capital structure of firms, we
show that there is an indirect impact because country-specific factors also influence the
roles of firm-specific determinants of leverage. Finally, in the forth study, we provide a
firm-level analysis of the relation between corruption, growth, and public governance in
Vietnam. Our results indicate that corruption significantly hinders the growth of Vietnam’s
private sector. However, corruption is not detrimental for the growth in state sector. Our
study emphasizes the role of local institutions and governance factors in affecting
corruption.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Leverage or capital structure, understood as the proportion of debt relative to 
equity in a firm’s total assets, is an indication of how firms finance their activities 
and investments, and also the long-term solvency of a firm. For already half of a 
century, the financing decision, its determination and its influence on the valuation 
of firms has been one of the major issues in the theory and empirics of corporate 
finance. Researchers have been seeking the answers for what is an optimal capital 
structure, what are the factors determining actual capital structures, and what is the 
impact of capital structure choice on other decisions within the firm. 
Corporate value is, from the viewpoint of corporate finance, the firm’s main 
objective. Modigliani and Miller (1958), in their seminal study on capital structure, 
demonstrate that under a certain set of assumptions, leverage does not matter as the 
total value of a firm is independent of leverage. By introducing corporate and 
personal taxes into Modigliani and Miller’s model, Miller (1977) shows that firms 
benefit from issuing more debt if the marginal personal tax rate is lower than the 
corporate tax rate. When bankruptcy costs and agency costs are also included into 
the model, it shows that optimal capital structure choice involves a trade-off 
between costs and benefits of debt (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kim, 1978; 
DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). From that point on, various firm-specific factors 
have been theoretically linked with capital structure, and empirically tested in 
different contexts. The conventional theories to explain leverage determinants 
include the static trade-off considerations, agency theory, signaling with debt and 
pecking order theory.1 The practical determinants of leverage have been widely 
examined. They range from taxation, non-debt tax shields, tangibility, firm size, 
growth opportunities, and profitability, to liquidity and stock returns. Yet, the 
literature keeps developing to incorporate new insights to the way a firm can 
optimize its value through organizing its leverage.  
 As for the convenience of following the next chapters of this book, this 
chapter reviews the major issues in the capital structure literature. The reviews not 
only serve as the background for the empirical studies presented in this book, but 
also open avenues for future research. 
 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Myers (2003) and Harris and Raviv (1991) for a detailed review. 
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1.2 Literature 
1.2.1 Conventional capital structure theories 
In this section, we summarize the key conventional theories of capital structure, 
including the static trade-off hypothesis, agency theory, theories on signaling with 
debt, and the pecking order hypothesis.  
In the static trade-off framework, the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-
to-value ratio and gradually moving towards it. In particular, capital structure is 
adjusted towards targets that reflect tax rates, asset type, business risk, profitability 
and bankruptcy costs. The general hypothesis of this research is that the firm’s 
optimal capital structure will involve the trade-off between the tax advantage of 
debt and various leverage-related costs. However, as pointed out by Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984), this kind of theoretical framework faces an upshot because 
of its recognition that the existence of an optimal capital structure is essentially an 
empirical issue as to whether or not the various leverage-related costs are 
economically significant enough to influence the costs of corporate borrowing. 
Although the static trade-off hypothesis incorporates the role of agency 
costs, there are important theories for agency costs associated with debts. Agency 
costs are related to principal-agent conflicts, where agents are the firm’s managers 
and principals refer to different stakeholders of the firm. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) integrate the principal-agent relationships into capital structure theory. 
Agency costs include the costs for both debt and equity issuance. The costs 
involved with equity may include: (i) the monitoring expenses of the principal; (ii) 
the bonding expenses of the agent; and (iii) the value of the reduction in welfare 
experienced by the principal due to the divergence between the agent’s decisions 
and those which maximize the welfare of the principal. On the other hand, the 
issue of debt also incurs agency costs, including the opportunity costs caused by 
the impact of debt on the investment decisions of the firm; the monitoring and 
bonding expenditures by both the bondholders and the owner-manager; and the 
costs associated with bankruptcy and reorganization. Since both equity and debt 
incur agency costs, the optimal debt-equity ratio involves a trade-off between the 
two types of costs. 
An important set of agency problems is caused by shareholder-manager 
conflicts. This type of conflict stems from the separation of ownership and control 
and takes several distinct forms. The first is that managers prefer to have greater 
perquisite levels and lower effort levels, provided that they do not have to pay for 
these through lower wages or by a lower market value of their personal equity 
holdings (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The second arises because managers may 
prefer short-term projects, which produce early results and enhance their reputation 
quickly, rather than more profitable long-term projects (Masulis, 1988). Third, 
managers may prefer less risky investments and lower leverage to lessen the 
13
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probability of bankruptcy (Hunsaker, 1999). Fourth, managers may wish to 
minimize the likelihood of employment termination (Garvey and Hanka, 1999). As 
this increases with changes in corporate control, management may resist takeovers, 
irrespective of their effect on shareholder value. Fifth, managers and shareholders 
may also disagree over a firm’s operating decisions. Harris and Raviv (1990) 
observe that managers typically wish to continue operating even if liquidation of 
the firm is preferred by shareholders; managers may also prefer to invest all 
available funds even if shareholders want to be paid dividends. 
The next set of agency problems concerns shareholder-bondholder conflicts. 
The typical manifestation of these conflicts is that the stockholders or their 
representatives make decisions transferring wealth from bondholders to 
shareholders. Certainly, the bondholders are aware of the situations in which this 
wealth expropriation may occur, therefore, will demand a higher return on their 
bonds or debts. Leverage aggravates agency conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders in three distinguished categories that have been theoretically 
analyzed: (i) the direct wealth-transfer through dividend payment and claim 
dilution (Smith and Warner, 1979); (ii) asset-substitution is another source of the 
conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979); (iii) the problem 
of underinvestment (Myers, 1977). One way to minimize these shareholder-
bondholder conflicts is that firms with high growth opportunities should have 
higher leverage and use a greater amount of long-term debt than firms in more 
mature industries. The conflicts can also be mitigated by adjusting the properties of 
debt contracts, for example, the adjustment can be done by including covenants as 
suggested by Smith and Warner (1979). Alternatively, debt can be secured by 
collateralization of tangible assets in debt contracts, as discussed in Stulz and 
Johnson (1985). Issuing convertible debt or debt with warrants can serve as another 
way of mitigating the conflicts as shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Green (1984).  
The conflict with outside stakeholders is another agency issue. The relative 
amount of debt can raise the costs of agency problems with stakeholders like 
customers and employees. Titman (1984) argues that the liquidation of a firm may 
impose costs on customers and employees. As a result they demand risk premia on 
products and wages, these costs are transferred to the shareholders. However, if the 
shareholders committed to liquidate only when the gains of liquidation exceed all 
costs, including those of customers and employees, this would decrease the cost of 
capital and increase the value of equity. Empirical evidence can be found in, for 
example, Titman (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Maksimovic and Titman 
(1991). 
The literature on signaling with debt is concerned with the ability of firms to 
signal their true quality to outsiders, by the capital structure that they choose. 
14
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Ross’s model (1977) implies that the level of bankruptcy risk rises as the amount 
of debt issued by the firm increases, and the value of the firm is positively related 
to its debt-equity ratio, i.e., higher quality firms issue more debt. On the contrary, 
the model of Heinkel (1982) argues that high quality firms will have low levels of 
debt. According to Poitevin (1989), the advantage of debt is that the capital market 
places a higher value on the debt-financed firm because it is perceived to be low-
cost; the disadvantage of debt is that it makes the entrant prone to be attacked by 
the all-equity incumbent via a price war, threatening the entrant with bankruptcy. 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) model shows that the equity price is more 
affected by information asymmetry than less risky securities, such as debt. The 
nature of the asymmetric information in this case is that managers – who aim to 
maximize value for existing shareholders – know more about their companies’ 
prospects, risks and values than outside investors do. The market reaction is, 
therefore, more negative for more risky securities. Managers will prefer to use 
internally generated funds for investments, and if external financing is necessary, 
less risky securities are preferred to more risky securities. This hierarchy in 
financing preference is referred to as the pecking order hypothesis or theory 
(Myers, 1984). 
Narayanan (1988) and Heinkel and Zechner (1990) obtain results similar to 
Myers and Majluf (1984) with conclusions: (i) the firm should issue less risky 
securities over more risky ones; (ii) debt should be used in preference to equity; 
(iii) internal finance should be used in preference to external finance; and (iv) if 
equity is used, the stock price falls since the market views the firm as a “lemon” – 
whose quality cannot be ascertained. The pecking order hypothesis, however, does 
not always hold. There are plenty of examples of firms issuing stock when they 
could issue investment-grade debt. But when one looks at aggregates, the heavy 
reliance on internal finance and debt is clear – a description of typical behavior. 
This can be interpreted as due to the separation of ownership and control: 
managers avoid relying on external finance because it would subject them to the 
discipline of the capital market. 
 
1.2.2 Capital structure and output market competition:  a zoom-in  
Product market related decisions are among the most crucial for firms, as finally 
firms’ products need to reach customers and generate firms’ income and profit as 
the outcome of all investments. The competition on product markets is closely 
related to corporate financing side. However, existing literature places relatively 
little emphasis on the strategic relationship between firm financial leverage and its 
competitive environment. A limited number of studies have so far theoretically 
discussed the strategic product market effect of leverage, typical examples include 
Brander and Lewis (1986, 1988), Maksimovic (1988), Bolton and Scharfstein 
15
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(1990), Showalter (1995), Dasgupta and Titman (1998), and Faure-Grimaud 
(2000). The predictions of competition-leverage models vary with the particular 
underlying assumptions, and there is an on-going debate on what the actual 
interactions should be.  
The branch of literature on competition-leverage interactions begins with the 
model of limited liability effect. This widely cited model is put forward by Brander 
and Lewis (1986), and further extended by, among others, Maksimovic (1988) and 
Showalter (1995). According to the model, increased debt causes a firm to behave 
aggressively, increasing output, and its rivals to behave passively. Brander and 
Lewis argue that with more debt, firms will pursue the output strategies that raise 
returns in good states, and lower returns in bad states. However, shareholders 
ignore the decreases in returns in bankrupt states since bondholders would be the 
residual claimants. Firms make output decisions (e.g., to increase output, market 
shares) that improve the chances of driving their rivals into insolvency. Showalter 
(1995) extends the limited liability effect model by arguing that the incentives to 
issue debt depend on type of uncertainty and mode of competition. Firms do not 
issue debt in case of cost uncertainty with price competition because they would 
risk setting unprofitably low prices. The author argues that the optimal strategic 
debt choice of Bertrand (price) competitors depends on the type of uncertainty that 
exists in the output market. In the case of Bertrand competition where costs are 
uncertain, price-competing firms, unlike Cournot firms, will use no strategic debt. 
In particular, Bertrand competitors that experience uncertain costs find that the use 
of debt causes industry prices and expected firm profit to fall, and firms in this case 
do not become leveraged. Thus, if firms compete in Bertrand competition, the use 
of strategic debt is advantageous only if demand conditions are uncertain. In the 
context of demand uncertainty, an increase in the firm's debt induces a rise in the 
firm's and rival's price, which raises both the debt and equity value of the firm. 
Consequently, firms will take on at least some debt to raise industry prices and 
expected profits. 
Another stream of literature, by contrast, suggests that product market 
competition becomes “softer” when leverage increases. The representatives of this 
stream include Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Dasgupta and Titman (1998), and 
Faure-Grimaud (2000). The authors basically argue that higher leverage 
encourages timidness. Debt financing provides an opportunity for rival firms to 
take advantage of the debt-laden firm’s periodic need for refinancing by making 
the firm appear unprofitable, thereby motivating its investors to deny its 
refinancing. A key result from this line of research is that higher levered firms will 
behave passively, or at least less aggressively, while the aggressive competitors are 
the firms that have lower leverage. In addition, Poitevin (1989) presents a model of 
predatory theory, in which shallow-pocket firms are prone to predation by deep-
16
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pocket competitors. This predation may force highly leveraged firms to lose their 
market share or even exit the industry, leading to a more concentrated market 
structure. This argument can be strengthened due to two reasons. First, the initial 
level of debt may negatively affect the firm's survival, because highly indebted 
firms may be unable to finance large new investments (Myers, 1977). This “debt 
overhang” might force leveraged firms to pass up profitable growth opportunities 
and, in the most extreme cases, even force them out of the market. Second, the 
initial level of debt may negatively affect survival because it directly affects a 
firm's ability to compete. This may also negatively affect survival, because it 
forces inefficient firms to liquidate (Harris and Raviv, 1990; and Stulz, 1990).  
Also on the empirical side of the literature strand on competition-leverage 
interactions, there is still no agreement on what effect of leverage on competition 
or vice versa would be prevailing. Yet, the reason can be partly due to the scarcity 
in empirical evidence. 
Several researchers who have empirically tested the link between a firm’s 
financial structure and a firm’s competitive environment show that competition 
becomes less tough – through lower quantities or higher prices – as leverage 
increases. These results may contradict the theoretical predictions of Brander and 
Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988). These papers mostly focus on a small 
number of industries in which some firms have experienced sharp changes in their 
capital structure. Chevalier (1995a, b) examines the competition of local 
supermarkets who undertook leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and their rivals. The 
author finds that when firms radically increase their leverage through an LBO, they 
are more vulnerable and less aggressive, leading to a softer product market 
competition. Rivals’ profits increase as they attempt to prey on the LBO firms, and 
the situation encourages local entry and rivals’ expansion. Thus, a gradual 
movement toward a decrease in the market structure concentration can be 
observed. The author finds evidence supporting Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and 
inconsistent with Brander and Lewis (1986). The event study of supermarket LBOs 
shows that the return responses of competing firms are positive, consistent with the 
expectation of softer competition. If an LBO leads to an increase in competition 
then rival firms would want to exit the local market. Chevalier also finds that 
supermarket chains are more likely to enter and expand if a large fraction of the 
incumbent firms in the local market undertake LBOs, again consistent with softer 
competition. Phillips (1995) and Kovenock and Phillips (1997) likewise find that 
highly levered firms tend to invest less aggressively. They also suggest that highly 
levered firms are likely to charge higher prices if they can. But competitors with 
deeper pockets may take advantage of their highly levered competitors by more 
intense price competition, which the competitors may have to follow accordingly. 
17
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Lyandres (2006), on the other hand, finds evidence to support the argument 
of stronger competition associated with debt by examining the competition-
leverage relations in manufacturing sector as a whole. The study shows that the 
extent of interaction among product market rivals has a strong positive relation 
with all leverage ratios, serving as one of the important determinants of leverage. 
Lyandres also adds that that aggressiveness of a firm’s operating strategy is 
increasing with debt; whereas one firm’s aggressiveness is decreasing (increasing) 
with its rival’s debt if the firms’ strategies are substitutes (complements).  
Empirical studies in this field, in general, point out the importance of 
including industry specific characteristics both on the supply and demand sides to 
understand the firms’ capital structure decisions. Showalter (1999) finds the 
importance of demand and cost uncertainty within industries in explaining leverage 
choice of individual firms. Kovenock and Phillips (1995), on the other hand, 
provides empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and 
product market behavior, in which firms with low-productivity plants in highly 
concentrated industries are more likely to recapitalize and increase debt financing. 
The findings suggest that debt plays a role in highly concentrated industries where 
agency costs are not significantly reduced by product market competition. More 
recently, MacKay and Phillips (2005) examine the importance of a firm’s position 
within its industry. They show that capital structure is subject to different types of 
market structure. In competitive industries, firms’ leverage depends on its natural 
hedge and the status as entrant, incumbent, or existing firm. In concentrated 
industries, leverage is higher and less dispersed, and strategic debt interactions are 
also stronger.  
A potential reason why most of the studies so far do not find conclusive 
results for theoretical predictions is that most empirical papers do not take into 
account the distinction between quantity and price competition. Evidently, the 
studies of Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988) are applicable for a 
Cournot setting, while Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Showalter (1995) are 
basically for a Bertrand setting. In addition, almost empirical work, except for 
MacKay and Phillips (2005) and Lyandres (2006), only focuses on a few specific 
industries where firms experience large increases in leverage through leveraged 
buy-outs and recapitalizations. These industries might not be representative for 
other industries. 
Various research questions are open for competition-leverage interactions. 
There are theoretical predictions that have not been empirically clarified yet. The 
strategic choice of debt may significantly depend on competitive behavior of firms, 
which can be Cournot competition (strategic substitutes) or Bertrand competition 
(strategic complements). Brander and Lewis (1986) predict that Cournot firms 
subject to demand and/or cost uncertainty have an incentive to commit to a large 
output by using a higher level of debt. For Bertrand competition, Showalter (1995) 
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shows that debt carries a strategic advantage only when demand is uncertain, and 
when costs are uncertain Bertrand firms have an incentive to reduce their debt 
level. Similarly, theories also imply different relations between leverage and 
market share under Cournot and Bertrand competition (Dasgupta and Titman, 
1998; Faure-Grimaud, 2000), but they are not empirically investigated. Other 
questions can be related to the strategic use of long-term or short-term debts 
(Glazer, 1994; Dasgupta and Titman, 1998; Erol, 2003); or the roles of different 
industry characteristics that have not been touched upon in the literature. Indeed, 
there is plenty of room for further research on the field. 
  
1.2.3 International capital structure: the role of institutional factors 
In this section, we zoom in another perspective of looking at capital structure 
issues, namely international evidence with the roles of institutional factors. 
Examining capital structure of firms in a single country, mostly the U.S., has 
received most attention in the literature. However, less attention has been paid to 
understanding how institutional and macro-economic differences across countries 
affect capital structure decisions. This branch of research potentially not only sheds 
light on the application and portability of conventional theories of capital structure 
across countries, but also brings in a new dimension to the literature – the role of 
institutional variables. This basically provides inter-country variations to identify 
the fundamental determinants of leverage.  
It is only during the last decade that international studies comparing 
differences in the capital structure between countries started to appear. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) break the path by investigating financial structures in seven 
advanced industrialized countries. They point out that although common firm-
specific factors significantly influence capital structure of firms across countries, 
country-specific factors may also play an important role and should be explored 
more extensively. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) compare capital 
structure data of firms from 19 developed countries and 11 developing countries. 
They find that institutional differences between developed and developing 
countries explain a large portion of the variation in the use of long-term debt. They 
also observe some institutional factors in developing countries to influence directly 
the average leverage of large and small firms differently. In contrast, Booth et al. 
(2001) analyze data of ten developing countries and find that capital structure 
decisions of firms in these countries are affected by the same factors as in 
developed countries. However, they also observe that there are systematic 
differences in the way capital structure is affected by country-specific factors, 
which require more research efforts for a better understanding.  
Recently, Giannetti (2003) argues that the lack of finding a significant 
impact of institutional variables may be due to the bias induced by inclusion of 
only large listed companies. She analyzes a large sample of unlisted firms from 
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eight European countries and finds a significant influence of a few institutional 
variables on cross-country leverages, such as creditor right protection and stock 
market development. She also advocates extending the analysis to a larger sample 
of countries. With a similar approach, Deesomsak et al. (2004) investigate the 
determinants of capital structure of firms in 4 Asia-Pacific countries. Their results 
suggest that the leverage decision of firms is influenced by the legal, financial and 
institutional environment in which they operate. In particular, the paper finds that 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997 had significant but diverse impact on capital 
structure decisions across the region. In addition, Fan et al. (2003) also empirically 
acknowledge the importance of institutional factors such as legal and tax systems, 
and banking sectors in determining capital structure choice across a sample of 39 
countries. The paper also finds significant results with the impacts of some other 
country-specific factors, such as the degree of development in the banking sector, 
equity and bond markets, which influence corporate financing decisions. Similarly, 
by investigating 30 OECD countries, Song and Philippatos (2004) report that most 
cross-sectional variations in international capital structure are caused by the 
heterogeneities of firm-, industry, and country-specific determinants. However, 
they do not find evidence to support the importance of cross-country legal 
institutional differences in affecting firms’ leverage. 
In general, recent studies on international capital structure highlight the 
sizeable impacts of various country-specific factors in determining corporate 
financial structure. In the meantime, most of the papers implicitly assume that 
firm-specific determinants of leverage work the same for all countries. This 
assumption is questionable and the channels of interactions between country-
specific variables and capital structure are not yet sufficiently examined. 
 
1.2.4 Financing, governance and firm growth 
In previous sections, we have reviewed the literature related to financial structure 
decisions and institutional factors. In this section, we place a focus on the studies 
of financing patterns, institutional factors as public governance mechanism, and 
firms’ growth. We specially focus on the literature for small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs).  
SMEs form a large part of private sector in many developed and developing 
countries. For example in the European Union, SMEs comprise approximately 
99% of all firms and employ about 65 million people. In many sectors, SMEs are 
also responsible for driving innovation and competition.  
The financing of small private firms has several distinctive features 
compared to publicly traded firms. Small businesses can observe the market rates, 
e.g., interest rates or required rates of returns, but they may not use the market rates 
for making financial decision. The decisions are often made subject to the 
entrepreneur’s personal wealth, interests, or risk-taking. Other reasons not to rely 
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on the market rate may include over-optimistic perception of opportunities, lack of 
external funding, and limited outside alternatives to invest excess funds. In 
addition, small private firms emphasize the importance of informal relationships. 
Besides family and friends as the first source of outside financing, small business 
owners have more intimate knowledge with their stakeholders, such as local 
bankers, suppliers, customers and employees. These relationships allow more 
flexibility in arranging and adjusting the terms of informal financing (Ang, 1992). 
Cross-country studies generally document the financing and growth 
constraints for small firms. Researchers also explore the effect of different policies 
on firms’ access to finance and growth. Beck et al. (2006a) show that institutional 
development is the most important factor that explains the cross-country variation 
in firms’ financing obstacles. Firms in countries with higher levels of institutional 
development report significantly lower financing obstacles than those in countries 
with less developed institutions. With a sample of 129 countries, Djankov et al. 
(2007) find that credit for firms rises after improvements in creditor rights and in 
information sharing mechanisms. Johnson et al. (2002), on the other hand, find 
evidence that weak property rights, in post-communist countries’ small private 
firms in this study, discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank 
loans are available. Beck et al. (2006b) show that firms can grow faster in 
countries with higher levels of financial intermediary development, more rapid 
judicial conflict resolution mechanisms and better property right protection. The 
results suggest that agency problems between outside investors and corporate 
insiders keep firms smaller in countries with weak legal and financial systems. 
Evidently, institutional factors play an important role in the financing and 
growth of firms in most of countries, especially in the case of small firms. Small 
firms tend to gain most from financial and institutional development, and the effect 
of financial and legal development is significantly stronger for small firms than for 
large firms (Beck et al. 2005).  
While cross-country studies in the field are numerous, research within a 
particular country is far more limited. Such a single-country setting is likely to help 
to verify the findings of cross-country investigation, and also to highlight the 
importance of the local governance systems on financing and growth of firms. 
Ayyagari et al. (2008) examine Chinese firms’ financing patterns and growth in 18 
provinces. Although the roles of local governance are not yet studied in depth, the 
authors show that firms in poor institutional environments have to rely on 
collateral to access bank finance rather than relying on credit histories and growth 
opportunities. In a well-established legal system like India, Allen et al. (2007) find 
that firms use non-legal methods based on reputation, trust and relationships to 
settle disputes and enforce contracts, and rely on alternative financing channels 
such as trade credits to finance their growth. The findings are stronger for small 
and medium sized Indian firms. The reasons can be attributed to the country’s poor 
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government institutions characterized by corruption and inefficiency. Using data 
across Mexican states, Laeven and Woodruff (2004) show that legal system 
efficiency is positively associated with firm size, an effect that is strongest in 
sectors where proprietorships dominate. Their findings suggest that more effective 
local governance systems can increase investment by firms by reducing the 
idiosyncratic risk that the proprietors face. 
As the literature reveals a gap in within-country investigation of financing, 
governance and firm growth, we find it potentially promising to further explore the 
issue in new settings. We expect that the financial and institutional development 
would help alleviate SMEs’ growth constraints and increase their access to external 
finance and thus level the playing field between firms of different sizes and 
sectors.  
 
1.3 Approach and focus 
In this dissertation, we contribute to the discipline of research in corporate finance 
by presenting four empirical studies. The studies focus on the corporate financing 
decision and its newly explored influential factors. We investigate firms’ choice of 
capital structure in several perspectives, which can be summed up in two main 
parts.  
In the first part of the dissertation (chapters 2 and 3), we specifically take 
into account the interactions of firms’ capital structure and their competitive 
behavior in the product markets. We test several empirical implications for 
competition-leverage links in Cournot and Bertrand firms, using a competitive 
strategy measure to distinguish the two types of competitive behavior. We 
specifically examine, across Cournot and Bertrand firms, the impact of demand 
and cost uncertainty on debt level, and the joint determination of market share and 
leverage. Strategic competition is of main interest because it brings about 
distinctive outcomes related to capital structure. This part of the book is closely 
related to the literature on product market considerations while controlling for 
conventional theories of capital structure. 
In the second part of the dissertation (chapters 4 and 5), we examine the 
roles of institutional and public governance factors that affect the firms’ capital 
structures and/or growth. In particular, we investigate firm-specific and country-
specific variables that influence firms’ decision in taking more debt, in both direct 
and indirect ways, for a large sample of countries. Finally, we zoom in an 
individual country setting (Vietnam) to study the impacts of corruption – a specific 
issue related to public governance mechanism – on small private firms’ growth. 
We conduct the analysis on private firms in contrast with larger and more 
established firms in the state sector. This second part of the dissertation adds to the 
literature of international capital structure and small firm financing. 
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1.4 Outline 
The core of this thesis consists of four empirical studies. In this subsection we 
briefly discuss the set-up of each of these studies. 
 The first two studies constitute chapters 2 and 3, in which we test different 
theories and implications on the links between capital structure and product market 
competition. Specially, we distinguish firms competing under Cournot and 
Bertrand frameworks, and then examine possible links and interactions between 
leverage and several industry characteristics and structures. 
Chapter 2 investigates how competitive behavior affects the capital structure 
of a firm. Theory predicts that the impact of different types of output market 
uncertainty (in particular, unanticipated shocks in demand and costs) on a firm’s 
leverage depends on the type of competition in an industry. We test these 
predictions in a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms by classifying firms into 
Cournot competition (strategic substitutes), and Bertrand competition (strategic 
complements). We show that demand uncertainty is positively related to leverage 
for firms in both the Cournot and the Bertrand sample. Cost uncertainty has a 
significantly positive impact on the leverage of Cournot firms, but plays a 
negligible role for Bertrand firms. Our results support the strategic use of debt and 
highlight the role of firms’ competitive behavior in the product market in their 
capital structure decisions. 
In Chapter 3, we examine the joint determination of capital structure and 
market share. Theory predicts that the relations between leverage and market share 
depend on firms’ strategic competition. Specifically, the effect of leverage on 
market share should be different for Cournot and Bertrand firms. Using a sample 
of U.S. manufacturing industries, we distinguish between Cournot and Bertrand 
firms based on an empirical measure of strategic substitutes and strategic 
complements, respectively. We jointly explain leverage and market share in a 
2SLS procedure with lagged explanatory and instrumental variables. We show that 
in Cournot (Bertrand) competition, leverage negatively (positively) affects market 
share. Market share is shown to have a negative impact on leverage in Cournot 
firms, but no impact on leverage in Bertrand firms. Our findings emphasize the 
role of competitive behavior in the joint determination of capital structure and 
market share. 
The last two empirical studies form chapters 4 and 5, in which we 
investigate the roles of institutional and governance factors. Apart from widely-
accepted conventional determinants of leverage, country characteristics and 
national governance systems are shown to have non-trivial roles in affecting firms’ 
financial structures. In addition, the conventional determinants also work variably 
across countries. 
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Chapter 4 analyzes the importance of firm-specific and country-specific 
factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. Our 
analysis yields two new results. First, we find that firm-specific determinants of 
leverage differ across countries, while prior studies implicitly assume equal impact 
of these determinants. Second, although we concur with the conventional direct 
impact of country-specific factors on the capital structure of firms, we show that 
there is an indirect impact because country-specific factors also influence the roles 
of firm-specific determinants of leverage. 
In Chapter 5, we provide a firm-level analysis of the relation between 
corruption, growth, and public governance in Vietnam. We examine how 
corruption affects growth in a comparative analysis of private firms and state-
owned enterprises, and how provincial governance factors influence corruption. 
Our results indicate that corruption significantly hinders the growth of Vietnam’s 
private sector. However, corruption is not detrimental for the growth in state 
sector. Our study highlights the role of local institutions and governance factors in 
affecting corruption. We present evidence that differences across provinces in 
regulatory entry costs, land access, the implementation and consistency of policies, 
and the private sector development policies can explain the severity of provincial 
corruption. Our findings underline the importance of within-country research to 
understand why and how corruption takes place, and suggest that the 
improvements in public governance quality should help to mitigate corruption and 
its adverse effects. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents a summary and conclusions of this dissertation. 
In this chapter, we also discuss potential avenues for future research. 
 
 
24
25
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Strategic debt – Evidence 
from Cournot and Bertrand 
competition2 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Financing and output decisions are closely linked. Several theoretical studies (e.g., 
Brander and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; 
Showalter, 1995; Dasgupta and Titman, 1998; Faure-Grimaud, 2000; Wanzenried, 
2003) emphasize the strategic role of debt in a firm’s competitive strategy in the 
output market. An important feature of these theoretical models is that the strategic 
role of debt depends on the firm’s competitive environment. In particular, the link 
between a firm’s capital structure and its output market decisions is different in 
Cournot and Bertrand competition.  
Brander and Lewis (1986) introduce a Cournot competition model to link 
the choice of debt level and output decisions. Because of limited liability, the 
equity holders of a firm that take on debt optimize their output strategy over non-
bankruptcy states of the world. When the firm faces uncertainty in the output 
market (e.g., uncertainty about future demand or costs), equity holders ignore the 
bad states of demand or costs in which debt holders would suffer. Therefore, they 
have an incentive to gain a strategic advantage in the output market by competing 
more aggressively. In short, Brander and Lewis (1986) predict that Cournot firms 
subject to demand and/or cost uncertainty have an incentive to commit to a large 
output by using a highly leveraged capital structure. In a model of Bertrand 
competition, Showalter (1995) shows that different sources of output market 
uncertainty have a different effect on a firm’s capital structure. When demand is 
uncertain, debt carries a strategic advantage. However, when costs are uncertain, 
Bertrand firms have an incentive to reduce their debt level. 
The models of Brander and Lewis (1986) and Showalter (1995) thus 
produce testable hypotheses that depend on the type of competition. In Cournot 
competition, higher demand uncertainty leads to higher debt levels, and cost 
uncertainty also encourages firms to have a high leverage. In Bertrand competition, 
higher demand uncertainty induces higher debt, while higher cost uncertainty 
induces firms to choose lower debt levels.  
                                                          
2
 This chapter is based on de Jong, A., Nguyen, T.T., van Dijk, M.A., 2007, “Strategic debt: Evidence from 
Cournot and Bertrand competition”, ERIM Working Paper Series. 
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Empirical research on the link between debt and product market competition 
is scarce. Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Phillips (1995), and Kovenock and Phillips 
(1997) focus on a small number of industries in which some firms experience sharp 
changes in their capital structure. Lyandres (2006) presents a model that describes 
how the extent of competitive interaction among firms influences the role of 
strategic debt. He tests the predictions of the model on a large sample of U.S. 
manufacturing companies.  
To our knowledge, Showalter (1999) is the only study that conducts an 
empirical test of the effect of demand and cost uncertainty on capital structure 
choice. Showalter shows that U.S. manufacturing firms increase debt as demand 
uncertainty becomes more important, but reduce debt as costs become more 
uncertain. He concludes that his findings are consistent with the predictions of 
models on Bertrand competition, and thus with the hypothesis that the firms in his 
sample engage in Bertrand competition. 
 Despite the clear distinction that theoretical models make between Cournot 
and Bertrand competition, empirical studies to date do not attempt to take the type 
of competitive behavior into account. Showalter (1999) appears too quick to assert 
that U.S. manufacturing firms are mostly competing in Bertrand. The aim of our 
study is to test the theoretical predictions of Brander and Lewis (1986) and 
Showalter (1995) and explicitly investigate the different implications these models 
have for firms in Bertrand and Cournot competition. We use the competitive 
strategy measure (CSM) of Sundaram, John and John (1996)3 to characterize the 
competitive behavior of firms in different industries. This approach allows us to 
identify industries in which the competitive environment can be categorized as 
either Cournot or Bertrand competition. For the samples of Cournot and Bertrand 
firms, we estimate a capital structure model with conventional determinants of 
leverage and measures of cost and demand uncertainty as explanatory variables. 
For Cournot firms, we find that both demand uncertainty and cost 
uncertainty are significantly positively associated with leverage. The effects are 
statistically significant across several different measures of leverage and proxies of 
uncertainty. For Bertrand firms, demand uncertainty has a significantly positive 
impact on leverage, but cost uncertainty does not have a significant effect on 
capital structure. The impact of different sources of uncertainty clearly differs in 
our two samples of Cournot and Bertrand firms. 
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Brander and 
Lewis (1986) that higher demand and cost uncertainty induce Cournot firms to 
increase debt levels. Our evidence also supports the positive impact of demand 
uncertainty on Bertrand firms’ leverage, as predicted by Showalter (1995), but 
                                                          
3
 Lyandres (2006) also follows Sundaram et al. approach, and both studies use annual data for the whole 
study period to estimate the CSM. We use quarterly data for every period of 5 consecutive years to 
estimate the CSM, allowing for the fact that firms’ competitive behavior may vary over time. 
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there is no evidence for the role of cost uncertainty among these firms. Our 
analysis underlines the role of strategic debt and shows that distinguishing firms 
according to their competitive behavior is important. Whether firms are competing 
in Cournot or Bertrand affects the way their capital structure choice is influenced 
by output market uncertainty. 
 
2.2 Literature 
In this section, we briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relation between leverage and product market competition.  
Brander and Lewis (1986) analyze a two-stage Cournot model. In Cournot 
competition, firms compete by setting the quantities they produce. With locally 
linear demand curves, Cournot firms compete as strategic substitutes (Bulow, 
Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985). In the first stage of the model, firms decide on 
the amount of debt. In the second stage, they compete in the output market. In this 
framework, debt commits the equity holders of a firm to pursue a more aggressive 
product market strategy by raising the quantity to produce. Because of the limited 
liability effect, the equity holders of firms that take on debt optimize only over 
non-bankruptcy states of the world. If the firm goes bankrupt, the equity holders’ 
losses are limited by the value of their initially contributed investment, which is 
assumed to be zero in this model. Debt holders suffer in the case of a shortage of 
the firm’s returns. A higher dispersion in anticipated levels of either demand or 
costs increases the uncertainty that the firm faces. And higher uncertainty induces 
equity holders in Cournot firms to compete more aggressively by producing more. 
As a result, higher uncertainty, regardless of whether the source is demand or 
costs, leads to higher levels of both output and debt. Debt is always of strategic 
advantage when Cournot firms face demand or cost uncertainty. 
Showalter (1995) modifies Brander and Lewis’ (1986) model to the case of 
Bertrand competition in which rival firms compete by setting prices. With non-
increasing marginal costs, Bertrand firms compete as strategic complements 
(Bulow et al., 1985). Showalter shows that in this type of competition, the source 
of output market uncertainty plays a crucial role in determining the optimal debt 
level. With Bertrand competition, debt brings about a strategic advantage only 
when demand is uncertain. When this type of uncertainty is large, high prices are 
encouraged through high debt levels. By increasing its debt, a firm optimizes over 
good states of the world (i.e., high demand states) and therefore chooses a higher 
equilibrium price. Rival firms react by raising their prices, thus increasing the 
expected profit of the leveraged firms. However, when costs are uncertain, firms 
that take on debt place emphasis on low cost states, and therefore choose a lower 
equilibrium price. The commitment to a lower price induces rival firms to decrease 
their price, reducing the expected profit of the leveraged firm. As a result, Bertrand 
firms facing high cost uncertainty have no incentive to hold debt. Showalter (1999) 
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argues that in a more general model where debt has other advantages, higher cost 
uncertainty induces Bertrand firms to reduce leverage below the optimal debt level 
that firms would hold in the absence of any strategic motive.  
Wanzenried (2003) shows that demand uncertainty (or volatility) also raises 
a firm’s optimal debt level in models of both Cournot and Bertrand competition in 
the presence of differentiated products. She does not take uncertainty on the cost 
side into account. Haan and Toolsema (2007) present a numerical analysis of 
strategic debt using Wanzenried’s (2003) two-stage differentiated goods model 
with a correction in solving the second stage of the model. In contrast to the result 
of Wanzenried, they find that the equilibrium debt level decreases for both 
Bertrand and Cournot firms as demand becomes more volatile.  
Showalter (1999) is the only empirical study we know that empirically 
investigates the role of demand and cost uncertainty in determining a firm’s capital 
structure. Showalter analyzes a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms over the period 
1975-1994 and examines the relation between leverage and the demand/cost 
uncertainty that firms face in product markets. To measure demand and cost 
uncertainty, Showalter (1999) proposes an approach that uses trend regressions. 
Demand (cost) uncertainty is calculated as the natural logarithm of the standard 
error of regressions of sales (costs of good sold over sales) on linear and non-linear 
trends. His empirical results are in line with Showalter (1995). There is a positive 
relation between leverage and demand uncertainty and a negative relation between 
leverage and cost uncertainty. Showalter (1999) concludes that price competition is 
the prevalent competitive behavior in U.S. manufacturing.  
The type of competitive behavior plays a crucial role in theoretical models 
of the link between competition and leverage. We are not aware of any studies that 
explicitly allow for the type of competition affecting this link. We contribute to the 
literature by directly testing the predictions of models of Cournot and Bertrand 
competition on the relation between output market uncertainty and capital 
structure. To that end, we classify firms in our empirical analysis into different 
types of strategic interaction in their industries. The hypotheses that we aim to test 
are as follows. Under Bertrand competition:  
(H1) firms use more debt when demand is more uncertain;  
(H2) firms use less debt when costs are more uncertain.  
Under Cournot competition:  
(H3) firms use more debt when demand is more uncertain;  
(H4) firms use more debt when costs are more uncertain. 
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2.3 Methodology and data 
2.3.1 Strategic competition measures: complements vs. substitutes 
Sundaram et al. (1996) argue that whether competition occurs in strategic 
substitutes (SS) or strategic complements (SC) depends on the effects of a firm’s 
moves on its competitor’s marginal profits. Suppose two duopolistic firms, A and 
B, are in an initial equilibrium, i.e., both firms have set marginal revenues equal to 
marginal costs. If firm A changes its strategy due to an exogenous shock, this 
change affects its own as well as firm B’s marginal profits. To reach a new 
equilibrium, both firms re-optimize based on the expected consequences for their 
marginal profits. If firm B re-optimizes by competing in SS, then its marginal 
profits must be decreasing. On the contrary, if firm B re-optimizes by competing in 
SC, then its marginal profits must be increasing. Thus, competition in SC and SS 
can be distinguished by examining the sign of the second derivative of firm A’s 
profits with respect to its own and firm B’s strategic variable. 
Sundaram et al. (1996) provide an empirical measure of the type of 
competition by constructing a proxy for the second derivative in the context of 
R&D competition. Their competitive strategy measure (CSM) is the coefficient of 
correlation between ǻʌf/ǻSf and ǻSc, where ǻʌf/ǻSf is the change in a firm’s profit 
margin (which is the change in net income over the change in net sales), and ǻSc is 
the change in the competitors’ output.4 If CSM is smaller than zero, then 
competition is in SS; if CSM is greater than zero, then competition is in SC. In the 
empirical implementation, Sundaram et al. use cutoff points of -0.05 and +0.05 to 
define the sample of SS and SC firms. Lyandres (2006) provides a mathematical 
proof for the validity of this CSM measure as a proxy for the nature of product 
market competition, under the assumption that the firm’s value function remains 
constant in the short-run. In the long-run, an industry-wide shock might change a 
firm’s value function and introduce noise in the relation between the firm’s 
marginal profit and its rivals’ sales. Lyandres (2006) develops a model in which a 
firm’s leverage is positively related to the extent of competitive interaction within 
its industry. He uses the absolute value of CSM as a measure of the extent of 
interaction. 
We follow the approach of Sundaram et al. (1996) to measure the type of 
strategic competition. We argue that competitive behavior may change over time 
when firms face industry shocks or changes in demand functions. Therefore, we 
estimate CSM based on quarterly data during a relatively short period of time: we 
require 20 consecutive quarters of sales (Compustat data ITEM#2, quarterly 
database) and profits (ITEM#8).5  
                                                          
4
 Sundaram et al. (1996) include all firms with the same 4-digit SIC except the firm in question in the 
set of competitors. 
5
 Sundaram et al. (1996) use 40 quarters in the empirical estimation of CSM. Lyandres (2006) uses 
annual data for 10 years or more to estimate the extent of strategic interaction. 
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We use a narrow definition of industries based on their 4-digit SIC. 
Therefore, we argue that it is reasonable to assume that competitive behavior is 
consistent across firms in each industry-year. We derive a measure representative 
for each industry-year’s competition type. After obtaining the CSM measures for 
each firm-year, we calculate the mean and the standard deviation of the CSM for 
each industry in each year. We use the following measures of competitive 
behavior: (i) SSDUM is a dummy that takes a value of one if the industry-year 
mean of CSM is significantly positive, and a value of zero otherwise; (ii) SCDUM 
takes a value of one if the industry-year mean of CSM is significantly negative, and 
a value of zero otherwise. We use a 10% significance level. This procedure is 
consistent with Lyandres (2006), although he does not take into account the 
statistical significance. Our approach results in the identification of three separate 
samples of firms: Cournot firms, Bertrand firms, and unidentified firms.6 
 
2.3.2 Measures of demand and cost uncertainty 
Following Showalter (1999), we define three demand uncertainty proxies (DEM1, 
DEM2, and DEM3) as the natural logarithm of the standard error of the following 
trend regressions: 
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where Yt is either sales or costs of goods sold divided by sales at time t. 
Showalter’s (1999) assumption behind this approach is that a firm’s sales and costs 
grow or decline in a fairly predictable pattern. Deviations from the anticipated 
trends represent unanticipated shocks to demand or costs. We scale the demand 
uncertainty proxies by sales to prevent larger firms from having a larger 
uncertainty measure by definition. Our three cost uncertainty proxies (COST1, 
COST2, and COST3) are taken from the same regressions, but with the costs of 
goods sold (ITEM#30) divided by sales in quarter t as dependent variable.  
Showalter (1999) assumes that demand and cost uncertainty are stable over 
a long period of time and he estimates the regressions over his whole sample 
period, from 1975 to 1994. We argue that a firm’s demand or cost uncertainty may 
exhibit important changes over time. Therefore, we use quarterly data for five 
consecutive years in estimating demand and cost uncertainty. In addition, we 
control for predictable seasonal effects in the estimation by adding three quarter 
dummies to regressions (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3).  
                                                          
6
 The unidentified firms have an industry-year CSM which is not significantly different from zero. The 
sample of unidentified firms is not further analyzed in our study. 
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2.3.3 Leverage measures  
To facilitate a comparison with Showalter’s (1999) study, we stay close to his 
choice of measures for capital structure and other variables. As CSM and the 
output market uncertainty measures are based on five consecutive years of data, we 
compute the average of a firm’s leverage and the firm-specific capital structure 
determinants over five consecutive years as well. We use four measures of 
leverage, two of which are based on book values and two on market values. The 
book value of the long-term debt ratio (LDEBTBV) is defined as the average of 
total long-term debt (Compustat data ITEM#9, annual database) over five 
consecutive years divided by the average of total assets (ITEM #6). The market 
value of the long-term debt ratio (LDEBTMV) is calculated as the average of total 
long-term debt divided by the average market value of total assets.7 The book value 
of the total debt ratio (TDEBTBV) is average total debt (ITEM #9 + ITEM #34) 
divided by average total assets. The market value of the total debt ratio 
(TDEBTMV) is defined as average total debt divided by the average market value 
of total assets.  
 
2.3.4 Capital structure determinants 
Empirical capital structure research uses variables related to static trade-off, 
agency, and information asymmetry considerations to explain leverage. In the 
static trade-off framework, the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-to-assets ratio 
and moving towards it. A firm’s capital structure is determined by the trade-off 
between tax advantages and bankruptcy-related costs. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) argue that the tax advantage of debt diminishes as other tax reductions, such 
as tax and investment tax credits, increase. Because these variables act as a tax 
shield substitute for debt, a negative relation between leverage and these non-debt 
tax shields is expected. The proxy for non-debt tax shields used in this study 
(NDTS) is defined as the ratio of average depreciation (ITEM#125) and investment 
tax credit (ITEM#208) to average total assets. With respect to bankruptcy costs, we 
use the following variables: asset tangibility (higher tangibility of assets indicates 
lower risk for the lender as well as reduced direct costs of bankruptcy), firm risk 
(higher risk indicates higher volatility of earnings and higher probability of 
bankruptcy), and firm size (an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy; 
larger firms are less likely to face financial distress). We measure tangibility 
(TANG) as the ratio of average net fixed assets (ITEM#8) to average total assets; 
firm risk (RISK) as the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before 
                                                          
7
 The measure market value of total assets is calculated as (Total debt + Market value of equity + 
Preferred stock – Deferred taxes and investment credits) = ITEM #9 + ITEM #34 + (ITEM #199*ITEM 
#54) + ITEM #10 – ITEM #35. 
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depreciation (ITEM#13) to total assets; and firm size (SIZE) as the natural 
logarithm of average total assets. 
Agency conflicts between equity holders and debt holders arise from asset-
substitution and underinvestment. To minimize these conflicts, firms with high 
growth opportunities have a preference for a low leverage, thus seeking equity 
financing for their new projects instead of debt financing. Agency theory predicts 
that growth opportunities are negatively associated with leverage. We use the 
market-to-book ratio (MTB), defined as the average market value of total assets 
over the average book value of total assets, as a proxy for growth opportunities. If 
debt is not collateralized, equity holders have incentives to expropriate wealth from 
debt holders (Myers, 1977). Creditors may also demand a higher interest rate, 
forcing firms to choose equity instead. Our measure of tangibility can be used as a 
proxy for collateralization, which is expected to be positively related to leverage.  
The pecking-order theory suggests that firms follow a specific hierarchy in 
financing: they prefer internal over external financing. If external financing is 
required, a firm issues the safest security first. That is, it first issues debt, then 
hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, and equity only as the last resort. It is 
common to use profitability to test the pecking-order theory: more profitable firms 
are likely to have less leverage as they make use of the internally generated fund 
first. We measure profitability (PROFIT) as the average operating income before 
depreciation divided by the average total assets.  
From the asymmetric information viewpoint, bigger firms are likely to 
provide better information to the market and are expected to have better access to 
credit. Hence, firm size is expected to be positively correlated with debt levels. 
Liquidity is another variable that determines the capital structure choice of firms. 
The agency theory and pecking-order theory both predict a negative relation 
between liquidity and leverage. We measure liquidity (LIQUID) as the ratio of 
average cash and short-term investments (ITEM#1) to average total assets. In 
addition, we use 2-digit SIC industry dummies in our regression models to capture 
the unobservable influences of industry characteristics on leverage choice of firms 
with common product lines.8
   
 
2.3.5 Data 
We obtain firm-level data from the COMPUSTAT North America database for the 
period 1985 to 2004. We collect data at two different frequencies: annually and 
quarterly. At the annual frequency, we take all manufacturing firms’ relevant 
                                                          
8
 We conduct robustness checks by using alternative measures of leverage and capital structure 
determinants. For example, we also measure LDEBTBV as the average ratio of long-term debt to the book 
value of total assets (instead of the ratio of the of average long-term debt to the average book value of total 
assets), LDEBTMV as the average ratio of long-term debt to the market value of assets, TANG as the 
average ratio of fixed assets to total assets, PROFIT as the average ratio of operating income to total assets, 
etc. The results are similar.  
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financial information such as total assets, tangible assets, profits, debt levels, etc. 
At the quarterly frequency, we collect sales, profits, and costs of goods sold, all of 
which are needed to estimate CSM and demand/cost uncertainty.  
We define competitors as all firms in the COMPUSTAT data base with the 
same 4-digit SIC code (ITEM#324) in each particular year. Therefore, we drop the 
observations that do not have records of 4-digit historical SIC. As we focus on U.S. 
manufacturing firms only, we omit observations with historical SIC below 2000 or 
above 3999. We exclude firms in industries concerned with miscellaneous items.9 
Competition within industries is the main focus of our study, so the identification 
of the relevant competitors within the same industry is essential. We require firms 
to have both total assets and sales greater than 1 million USD. We discard firms 
without quarterly data for sales, profits, and costs of goods sold. We follow 
MacKay and Phillips (2005) and drop observations with negative sales or assets for 
either annual or quarterly records.  
The data screens yield a final sample of 126 industries, consisting of 14,007 
firm-years and 2,660 distinct firms. We analyze data in three consecutive five-year 
periods to avoid that we use overlapping data for calculating CSM, demand and 
cost uncertainty, and the other variables. We present results that are based on the 
periods 1989-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004.10 After applying Sundaram et al.’s 
(1996) approach to measure strategic competition, we obtain a sample of Bertrand 
firms that includes 954 observations (the “Bertrand sample”), and a sample of 
Cournot firms that includes 633 observations (the “Cournot sample”). 
We estimate panel data models with firm random effects to investigate the 
relation between output market uncertainty and leverage.11 We use time dummies 
(for three different periods) and White standard errors to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. The basic regression model is as follows: 
++++++= ¦
=
itititit
i
iiit NDTSRISKSIZETANGINDUSTRYLEV 23222120
19
1
0 ββββββ  
itititititit COSTDEMLIQUIDMTBPROFIT εβββββ ++++++ 2827262524  (2.4) 
where LEV is the proxy for leverage; INDUSTRYi are the industry dummies for 2-
digit SIC industries; DEM and COST represent the demand and cost uncertainty 
proxies DEM1, DEM2, DEM3 and COST1, COST2, COST3, respectively. The 
other explanatory variables are described above. In a robustness check, we include 
                                                          
9
 We do not take these industries as the last 2 digits of the 4-digit SIC code ending with 99 as in 
MacKay and Phillips (2005), but check these industries manually to make sure of the correct definitions. 
This procedure is in line with Clarke (1989) and Campello (2006). 
10
 Other combinations of 3 consecutive periods are used for robustness checks: (i) 1987-1991, 1992-
1996, and 1997-2001; (ii) 1988-1992, 1993-1997, and 1998-2002; and (iii) 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 
1999-2003. We find similar results. 
11
 A Hausman test shows that the differences between the coefficients in the fixed and random effects 
panel models are not statistically significant. 
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a measure of competition intensity, the absolute value of industry-average CSM, as 
an additional explanatory variable as suggested by Lyandres (2006). 
 
 
2.4 Empirical analysis of the link between leverage 
and demand/cost uncertainty 
 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of firm characteristics in the Bertrand and 
Cournot samples. Many firm characteristics differ significantly across both 
samples. Generally, firms competing as strategic substitutes are smaller, less prone 
to business risk, and more profitable, and have smaller fixed assets, fewer growth 
opportunities, and less liquidity. Average demand and cost uncertainty are lower 
for firms in the Cournot sample compared to the Bertrand sample.  
Table 2.2 presents correlations between the variables in the Bertrand sample 
(Panel A) and the Cournot sample (Panel B). Similar to Showalter (1999), we 
observe that the highest correlations between the explanatory variables are those 
between PROFIT and DEM/COST in both samples. The relatively high and 
negative correlations between profitability and both sources of uncertainty indicate 
that firms that experience less cost and demand uncertainty on average have higher 
profits. A potential explanation is that under predictable output market conditions, 
firms are better able to anticipate optimal capacity and inventory levels. Liquidity 
has a large, positive correlation with both DEM and COST in the Bertrand sample, 
while in the Cournot sample only the correlation between LIQUID and COST is 
relatively high. This may be explained by the fact that firms facing high output 
market uncertainty have a greater need for liquid assets in order to be well 
prepared for poor states of the world. 
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In Table 2.3, we report the averages of the leverage and the demand and cost 
uncertainty measures for the industries included in the Bertrand and Cournot 
samples. The Bertrand (Cournot) sample consists of 24 (21) 4-digit SIC industries. 
Within each sample, industries are presented in order of descending long-term debt 
ratios based on book values. The table also shows the rank order for each of the 
variables, with 1 as the highest value.  
Within the Bertrand sample, the industries with the highest average leverage 
ratios correspond to those characterized by low demand and cost uncertainty. The 
low leverage industries generally have relatively high demand and cost uncertainty. 
The industries that we classify as Bertrand and that have the highest debt levels 
include plastics (SIC 3081, 3086), alcohol (SIC 2084), and fabrics (SIC 2211); the 
lowest average leverage is observed in the semiconductor service (SIC 3674), 
telegraph apparatus (SIC 3661), and biological diagnostics (SIC 2836) industries. 
Within the Cournot sample, we observe high average debt ratios in the 
paperboard (SIC 2631), aluminum (SIC 3334), steel works (SIC 3321), and 
insulating nonferrous wire (SIC 3357) industries; and low leverage in the electro-
medical apparatus (SIC 3845), lab analytical instruments (SIC 3826), and magnetic 
optical recording (SIC 3695) industries. The industries competing in Cournot with 
the highest leverage appear to have medium or relatively high levels of uncertainty 
in both demand and costs. Clearly, the association between DEM/COST and 
leverage varies systematically across the two samples with different competitive 
behavior. 
 Table 2.4 reports the estimation results of our capital structure regressions. 
For each sample, and for each of the four measures of leverage, we estimate three 
panel models with three different proxies of demand and cost uncertainty as 
independent variables (in addition to the conventional determinants of capital 
structure used in previous studies). The results are consistent across different 
leverage proxies, but the statistical significance is somewhat stronger when 
market-value measures of leverage are used. 
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The regressions based on the Bertrand sample (see Panel A) support 
hypothesis H1, which states that Bertrand firms facing higher demand uncertainty 
use more debt. The results show that demand uncertainty indeed has a positive 
impact on the debt ratio of Bertrand firms, consistent with the theoretical models of 
Showalter (1995) and Wanzenried (2003). Due to the limited liability effect, 
Bertrand firms (and also Cournot firms) tend to take in more debt when the 
demand uncertainty in the product market rises. The coefficient of the DEM 
measures is significantly positive for all leverage proxies, except for LDEBTBV. 
The economic impact of demand uncertainty is substantial. For example, a one 
standard deviation increase in DEM1 is associated with a 10.2%12 increase in the 
average TDEBTMV of Bertrand firms. Different proxies of demand uncertainty all 
confirm the results. 
Showalter (1995, 1999) contends that cost uncertainty is negatively 
associated with debt within Bertrand competition. However, the regressions for 
Bertrand firms indicate that none of the cost uncertainty proxies has a statistically 
significant effect on leverage. Coefficients are also not consistently negative across 
the panel models and they are generally very close to zero. We find no support for 
hypothesis H2. 
 With regard to the control variables in our Bertrand sample regressions, 
TANG, SIZE, PROFIT, MTB, and LIQUID show significant coefficients with the 
correct signs as predicted in the capital structure literature. Tangibility has a 
positive impact on leverage (especially debt ratios in book value) because higher 
tangibility helps to reduce the direct cost of bankruptcy. Bigger firms enjoy lower 
bankruptcy probability and information asymmetry, therefore can afford higher 
levels of debt. Higher profitability and liquidity limit the use of debt thanks to the 
availability of internal funds, especially in terms of liquid assets. Growth 
opportunities, in the regressions for debt ratios in market value, restrict the use of 
debt to avoid agency problems of underinvestment. The effect of the other control 
variables such as RISK and NDTS is not significant, although they have the 
expected sign in most cases.  
 In the Cournot sample, the results show a positive and statistically 
significant effect of both demand and cost uncertainty on leverage in all 12 
regression models (see Panel B). Hence, we find evidence that both demand 
uncertainty and cost uncertainty encourage Cournot firms to use strategic debt, 
consistent with hypotheses H3 and H4. These results are in line with the argument 
of Brander and Lewis (1986) that in the presence of output market uncertainty, 
firms have an incentive to have a high leverage to commit to aggressive 
competition. This aggressiveness induces their rival firms to reduce output, and 
                                                          
12
 The figure is derived from a straightforward calculation: one standard deviation of DEM1 (1.011) is 
multiplied with its estimated coefficient (0.016) in regression (10) of Table 2.4., and then divided by the 
average of TDEBMV (0.159). Similar calculations of economic significance are used in the other sections 
of this book. 
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raises the expected profit of the leveraged firms. These effects are also significant 
from an economic point of view. A one standard deviation increase in DEM1 
(COST1) is associated with a 14.3% (13.3%) increase in the average TDEBTMV of 
Cournot firms.  
For our Cournot sample regressions, the coefficients on the control variables 
are all in line with the capital structure literature. Different from Bertrand sample, 
all the conventional determinants of leverage, including RISK and NDTS, are 
significant. Higher business risk tends to make firms decrease their debt usage due 
to the higher probability of bankruptcy. Higher non-debt tax shield limits the tax 
advantage of debt, thus restricting firms’ debt levels. 
To investigate whether the coefficients of the demand and cost uncertainty 
measures and the control variables differ significantly across the Bertrand and 
Cournot samples, we run regressions with the same specification as in Table 2.4, 
but based on all observations in the two samples together and including interaction 
terms of all variables with SSDUM.13 The results indicate that the coefficients of 
the cost uncertainty measures are significantly larger for Cournot firms than for 
Bertrand firms. Demand uncertainty does not significantly differ in terms of its 
impact on leverage across these two types of firms. The results are consistent with 
our main finding that demand uncertainty affects the leverage of all firms, but cost 
uncertainty is important for Cournot firms and not for Bertrand firms.  
As a robustness check, we run all regressions in Table 2.4 with the absolute 
value of industry-average CSM as an additional explanatory variable. Lyandres 
(2006) suggests that there is a significantly positive relation between leverage and 
the extent of competitive interactions in the industry, regardless of the type of 
competitive behavior. The inclusion of the absolute value of industry-average CSM 
does not change our results. The demand and cost uncertainty proxies yield results 
that are consistent with Table 2.4: both DEM and COST measures have a 
significantly positive impact on the debt ratios of Cournot firms, while only 
demand uncertainty affects the leverage of Bertrand firms positively. The effect of 
the absolute value of industry-average CSM is statistically negligible in most of our 
regressions after controlling for demand and cost uncertainty. The exceptions are 
the three regressions with TDEBT as the dependent variable in the Cournot sample, 
in which the absolute value of CSM is positively associated with the debt ratio, 
consistent with Lyandres (2006). 
In short, our results indicate that the competitive behavior of firms affects 
the link between output market uncertainty and a firm’s capital structure choice. 
 
                                                          
13
 The results are available upon request. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
 
This study contributes to the limited empirical literature on the relation between a 
firm’s capital structure decisions and its behavior in the product market. We 
investigate whether the type of competitive behavior (i.e., strategic complements or 
substitutes) plays a role in determining the impact of demand and cost uncertainty 
on leverage. While theoretical models of strategic debt explicitly distinguish 
between Cournot and Bertrand competition, empirical studies neglect this 
distinction in their analysis of the relation between competition and leverage.  
By estimating a measure for competitive strategy developed by previous 
studies, we categorize firms into two samples: a sample with firms competing in 
Bertrand (strategic complements) and a sample with firms competing in Cournot 
(strategic substitutes). We find that the samples of Bertrand and Cournot firms 
differ systematically in terms of firm characteristics. The industries included in the 
Bertrand and Cournot samples show a different association between demand and 
cost uncertainty and average debt ratios. 
We estimate a conventional capital structure regression for each of the two 
samples and include proxies of demand and cost uncertainty to investigate the 
strategic use of debt in different competitive environments. We show that for firms 
that engage in Cournot competition, both demand and cost uncertainty are 
positively associated with leverage, consistent with Brander and Lewis (1986). 
This result supports the argument that under limited liability, Cournot firms facing 
output market uncertainty use debt to commit to a large output in an attempt to 
gain a strategic advantage in the product market. For firms that are characterized 
by Bertrand competition, cost uncertainty does not significantly affect leverage, 
but demand uncertainty induces a higher debt ratio. This latter finding is in line 
with the prediction of Showalter (1995) that higher demand uncertainty is 
associated with higher debt in Bertrand firms. 
Overall, we show that the strategic aspects of capital structure choice are 
important and that the type of competition matters for the role of output market 
uncertainty in the link between financing and output decisions. 
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Chapter 3: Strategic competition, 
capital structure, and market share14 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Since Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988), researchers have studied 
the strategic role of debt. Theory suggests that a firm’s capital structure affects 
pricing and output choices. Empirical evidence on the link between debt and 
competition is still limited. Recent papers test the relation between a firm’s capital 
structure and several aspects of product market competition, such as industry 
concentration (Kovenock and Phillips, 1997; MacKay and Phillips, 2005), the 
extent of competitive interaction (Lyandres, 2006), output market uncertainty 
(Showalter, 1999; de Jong, Nguyen, and van Dijk, 2007), and firms’ production 
and pricing decisions (Phillips, 1995). 
This chapter zooms in on another key variable related to a firm’s 
competitive position in the output market: its market share. We add to studies on 
industry concentration, competitive interaction, and output market uncertainty by 
studying the impact of capital structure choice on strategic competition at the level 
of the individual firm. We add to the detailed study of Phillips (1995) of four 
specific industries in which firms have sharply increased their leverage by 
providing a more general and more comprehensive analysis of the effect of 
leverage on market share in a large sample of U.S. manufacturing firms over the 
period 1985-2004. Furthermore, we recognize that not only is a firm’s capital 
structure likely to affect its strategic behavior in the output market, the competitive 
environment of a firm could also have an impact on its capital structure choice. 
Thus, we test the interaction between leverage and market share in a simultaneous-
equations system in which both variables are endogenous. 
In contrast to almost all previous empirical studies, our study takes into 
account that theoretical predictions about the relation between capital structure and 
competition depend on the type of strategic competition in an industry. We 
examine the interaction between leverage and market share separately for two 
samples of Cournot and Bertrand firms. We distinguish between Cournot and 
Bertrand firms based on an empirical measure of strategic substitutes and strategic 
complements and we show that this distinction matters for the estimated effect of 
leverage on market share. 
                                                          
14
 This chapter is based on de Jong, A., Nguyen, T.T., van Dijk, M.A., 2008, “Strategic competition, 
capital structure, and market share”, ERIM Working Paper Series. 
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Our focus on market share allows us to test the predictions of theoretical 
models that – to the best of our knowledge – have not been directly tested before. 
In the model of Dasgupta and Titman (1998), long-term debt induces firms to 
compete less aggressively in the output market, because it increases the rate at 
which future profits are discounted. In other words, higher debt induces a Bertrand 
firm to charge higher prices and a Cournot firm to produce less. The consequences 
of these actions for a firm’s market share differ across Cournot and Bertrand firms, 
because their rivals react with different strategic moves. The rival of a levered 
Cournot firm is likely to increase its own production, as Cournot firms compete as 
strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985). As a result, the 
levered firm’s market share decreases. The rival of a levered Bertrand firm reacts 
by also raising prices for its products, because Bertrand firms compete as strategic 
complements (Bulow et al., 1985). In the Bertrand case, the overall impact on 
market share is thus unclear as both firms raise their prices. 
In a different theoretical setting, Faure-Grimaud (2000) also finds that debt 
causes firms to compete less aggressively. In his model of debt contracting under 
Cournot competition, levered firms behave less aggressively in the output market 
because they aim to limit the size of the default and increase the probability of 
getting a good credit record. The reduced aggressiveness of the levered Cournot 
firm leads to lower output and a lower market share in the next period. 
We examine the joint determination of leverage and market share by 
estimating a simultaneous-equations system using two-stage least-squares. In line 
with theory, we investigate the interaction between leverage and market share 
separately for Cournot and Bertrand firms. In particular, we test the implication of 
the model of Dasgupta and Titman (1998) that under Cournot competition, 
leverage negatively affects market share, while under Bertrand competition, 
leverage has no effect on market share. We distinguish Cournot and Bertrand firms 
using the competitive strategy measure of Sundaram, John, and John (1996). 
For Cournot firms, we find that leverage has a significantly negative impact 
on market share and that market share, in turn, has a significantly negative effect 
on leverage. The former finding is consistent with Dasgupta and Titman (1998) 
and Faure-Grimaud (2000). For Bertrand firms, on the other hand, we provide 
evidence that higher debt induces Bertrand firms to increase their market share. For 
these firms, we find no significant impact of market share on leverage. Our 
findings for Bertrand firms do not fit specific theoretical predictions. We discuss a 
potential explanation for these findings and offer several avenues for further 
research. 
Our evidence indicates that competitive behavior has an influence on the 
interaction between capital structure and market share. Our results highlight the 
importance of incorporating the type of competitive behavior in studies of firms’ 
capital structure in connection with output market considerations.  
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3.2 Literature and hypotheses 
 
The model of Dasgupta and Titman (1998) is based on the argument of Klemperer 
(1987) that a firm can improve short-term profits at the expense of long-term 
profits by increasing its price today. Raising long-term debt increases a firm’s 
discount rate for future profits, because outstanding debt raises the cost of new 
borrowing. The increase in borrowing costs due to existing debt can be traced back 
to the debt overhang problem of Myers (1977), who argues that debt removes the 
incentive to invest in positive net present value projects, because when debt 
repayments are large enough, the benefits from profitable investments go straight 
to creditors. The higher discount rate decreases the relative importance of long-
term profits. Therefore, debt encourages Bertrand firms to raise prices to attempt to 
increase short-term profits. The argument carries over to Cournot firms, for which 
the model predicts a negative relation between output and debt. Dasgupta and 
Titman’s model is summarized as follows. 
 Consider a two-period model in which firms A and B are rivals competing 
in prices (Bertrand competition). First-period profits depend only on first-period 
prices: ),( 1111 BAii ppxx = . Second period-profits depend on firms’ market shares 
( Aσ and Bσ ) gained in the first period, i.e., the fraction of customers buying their 
products, and the second-period prices: )(22 iii xx σ= . The value of firm i is, 
therefore, equal:  
IIEppxppxV BAiiBAii −++= ~)),((),( 112111 σ     (3.1) 
in which IE~ is the expected value of liquidation and I is the investment. 
 The first-period prices are the solutions of the system of first-order 
conditions: 
0
1
2
1
1
=
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∂
∂
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i
i
i
i
i
i
i p
x
p
xV σ
σ
 BAi ,=       (3.2) 
Assuming that higher first-period market share results in higher second-
period profits 0)/( 2 >∂∂ iix σ , and higher first-period price, ceteris paribus, results 
in lower customer base 0)/( 1 <∂∂ ii pσ . The first-order conditions in (3.2) require: 
0)/( 11 >∂∂ ii px . As mentioned earlier, existing debt in capital structure places more 
emphasis on the first-period profit, the Bertrand levered firm would increase its 
first-period prices p1 to have higher x1. 
Similarly, in the case of Cournot competition, the value function of firm i 
that competes in quantities would be: 
IIEqqxqqxV BAiiBAii −++= ~)),((),( 112111 σ      (3.3) 
 The first-period quantities are the solutions of the system of first-order 
conditions: 
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Under the same assumptions, now with quantity increases, ceteris paribus, 
Cournot firms can improve the market share: 0)/( 1 >∂∂ ii qσ . The first-order 
conditions in (3.4) require: 0)/( 11 <∂∂ ii qx . In order to improve first-period profit 
x1, the Cournot levered firm would reduce first-period quantity q1. In short, 
Dasgupta and Titman’s model shows that levered firms behave less aggressively 
by raising prices (cutting quantities) in Bertrand (Cournot) competition 
From a different perspective, Faure-Grimaud (2000) argues that debt 
contracts are renegotiable at different stages (e.g., when the firm needs new 
financing, or the creditor rewards the well-performing firm after some time in 
operation). However, the debt contract is renegotiation-proof ex post, i.e., once 
profits are realized. Therefore, even though the debt contracts obtained are the best 
possible ones in an environment with asymmetric information on profits ex post, 
they are not first-best contracts. The adverse selection results in an increase in 
financing costs, which is higher as the default size (or output) increases. Under 
these circumstances, the firm’s competitive position is weakened, and debt makes 
the Cournot firm less aggressive. By decreasing output, Cournot firms aim to limit 
the size of the default, and also to increase the probability of getting a good credit 
record for further financing. Faure-Grimaud shows that the negative effect due to 
financing costs offsets the positive limited liability effect of Brander and Lewis 
(1986) for Cournot firms. 
In short, the models of Dasgupta and Titman (1998) and Faure-Grimaud 
(2000) predict that under both Cournot and Bertrand competition leverage induces 
a firm to engage in softer competition: a Cournot firm does so by reducing output, 
while a Bertrand firm raises the price. However, the implications of this strategic 
behavior for the market share of the firm are different for Cournot and Bertrand 
firms. Softer competition causes the rival of a Cournot firm to increase output 
because quantities are strategic substitutes, but the rival of a Bertrand firm 
increases its price because prices are strategic complements (Bulow et al., 1985). 
As a result, the levered Cournot firm experiences a reduction in market share, 
while the impact of debt on market share is undetermined for Bertrand firms. 
Accordingly, we aim to test the following hypotheses: (i) for Cournot firms, 
leverage has a negative effect on market share; and (ii) for Bertrand firms, leverage 
has no effect on market share.  
The interaction between leverage and market share is not a one-way 
relation. Previous studies have identified a significant impact of the market 
position of a firm on its capital structure choice (e.g., Kovenock and Phillips, 1997; 
MacKay and Phillips, 2005). A firm’s market share is an important indicator of its 
current market position and its market power within the industry. Therefore, we 
take into account both directional effects in our empirical analysis of the 
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interaction between leverage and market share. Although theory does not provide 
us with clear predictions on the signs of the effect of market share on leverage in 
Cournot or Bertrand firms, we will empirically explore this relation and proceed to 
do the analysis separately for our samples of Cournot and Bertrand firms. 
 
3.3 Data 
 
We collect firm-level data on U.S. manufacturing firms over the period 1985 to 
2004 from Compustat. We obtain data at both annual and quarterly frequencies. At 
the annual frequency, we take all manufacturing firms’ relevant financial 
information (such as total assets, tangible assets, profits, debt levels, etc.). At the 
quarterly frequency, we collect data on sales and profits, which are needed to 
estimate the measure of strategic competition within industries.  
We define competitors as all firms in the Compustat data base with the same 
4-digit SIC code (ITEM#324) in each particular year. We drop firms that do not 
have records of 4-digit historical SIC. As we focus on U.S. manufacturing firms 
only, we omit observations with historical SICs below 2000 or above 3999. We 
also exclude firms in industries concerned with miscellaneous items. We require 
firms to have both total assets and sales greater than 1 million USD. We discard 
firms without quarterly data for sales, profits, and costs of goods sold. We follow 
MacKay and Phillips (2005) and drop observations with negative sales or assets for 
either annual or quarterly records.  
The data screens yield a final sample of 126 industries, consisting of 14,007 
firm-years and 2,660 distinct firms. We use the competitive strategy measure 
(CSM) – developed by Sundaram, John, and John (1996) and used by, among 
others, Lyandres (2006) – to distinguish firms competing in Cournot and Bertrand. 
We estimate CSM as the coefficient of correlation between the change in a firm’s 
profit margin and the change in the competitors’ output, based on 20 consecutive 
quarters of sales (ITEM#2, quarterly database) and profits (ITEM#8). We estimate 
CSM based on quarterly data during a relatively short period of time, because 
competitive behavior may change over time.  
Sundaram et al. (1996) show that if CSM is smaller than zero, competition 
can be viewed to be in strategic substitutes (Cournot); if CSM is greater than zero, 
competition is in strategic complements (Bertrand). We use a narrow definition of 
industries based on their 4-digit SIC. Therefore, we argue that it is reasonable to 
assume that competitive behavior is consistent across firms in each industry-year. 
After obtaining the CSM measures for each firm-year, we calculate the mean and 
the standard deviation of the CSM for each industry in each year. If the industry-
year mean CSM is significantly positive at the 10% level, we group the firm-year 
observations into the “Bertrand sample.” If the industry-year mean CSM is 
significantly negative at the 10% level, we group the firm-year observations into 
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the “Cournot sample.” This procedure is consistent with Lyandres (2006), although 
he does not take into account the statistical significance. 
After measuring strategic competition and obtaining other key variables, our 
sample of Bertrand firms includes 3,513 observations and our sample of Cournot 
firms includes 2,504 observations. 
 
3.3.1 Dependent variables: Leverage and market share 
We consider four alternative definitions of leverage: (i) the book value of the long-
term debt ratio (LDBV) is defined as total long-term debt (Compustat data 
ITEM#9) divided by total assets (ITEM#6); (ii) the market value of the long-term 
debt ratio (LDMV) is defined as total long-term debt divided by the market value of 
total assets15; (iii) the book value of the total debt ratio (TDBV) is calculated as 
total debt (which are long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities (ITEM#34)) 
over total assets; (iv) the market value of the total debt ratio (TDMV) is calculated 
as total debt over market value of total assets. 
We compute the market share (MKTSH) of each firm as the annual sales of 
the firm divided by total industry sales. For the total sales of the 4-digit SIC 
industry, we add up the sales of all firms with the relevant historical SIC in each 
industry-year. 
 
3.3.2 Determinants of leverage 
Empirical capital structure research uses variables related to static trade-off, 
agency, and information asymmetry considerations to explain leverage (see, e.g., 
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Frank and Goyal, 2003). In the static trade-off 
framework, the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-to-assets ratio and moving 
towards it. The firm’s target capital structure is then determined by the trade-off 
between tax advantages and bankruptcy-related costs. With respect to bankruptcy 
costs, we use the following variables: asset tangibility (higher tangibility of assets 
indicates lower risk for the lender as well as lower direct costs of bankruptcy), firm 
risk (higher risk indicates higher volatility of earnings and a higher probability of 
bankruptcy), and firm size (an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy; 
larger firms are less likely to face financial distress). We measure tangibility 
(TANG) as the ratio of net fixed assets (ITEM#8) to total assets; firm risk (RISK) as 
the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation 
(ITEM#13) to total assets during a 5-year period which consists of the current year 
plus four prior years; and firm size (SIZE) as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that the tax advantage of debt 
diminishes as other tax reductions, such as tax and investment tax credits, increase. 
                                                          
15
 The market value of total assets is calculated as (Total debt + Market value of equity + Preferred stock – 
Deferred taxes and investment credits) = ITEM#9 + ITEM#34 + (ITEM#199*ITEM#54) + ITEM#10 – 
ITEM#35. 
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Because these variables act as a tax shield substitute for debt, a negative relation 
between leverage and these non-debt tax shields is expected. The proxy for non-
debt tax shields we use (NDTS) is defined as the ratio of depreciation (ITEM#125) 
and investment tax credit (ITEM#208) to total assets.  
Agency conflicts between equity holders and debt holders arise from asset-
substitution and underinvestment. To minimize these conflicts, firms with high 
growth opportunities have a preference for a low leverage, thus seeking equity 
financing for their new projects instead of debt financing. Agency theory predicts 
that growth opportunities are negatively associated with leverage. We use the 
market-to-book ratio (MTB), defined as the market value of total assets over the 
book value of total assets, as a proxy for growth opportunities. If debt is not 
collateralized, equity holders have incentives to expropriate wealth from debt 
holders. Creditors may also demand a higher interest rate, forcing firms to choose 
equity instead. Our measure of tangibility can be used as a proxy for 
collateralization, which is expected to be positively related to leverage.  
The pecking-order theory suggests that firms follow a specific hierarchy in 
financing: they prefer internal over external financing. If external financing is 
required, a firm issues the safest security first. That is, it first issues debt, then 
hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, and equity only as the last resort. We 
use profitability to test the pecking-order theory: more profitable firms are likely to 
have less leverage as they make use of the internally generated fund first. We 
measure profitability (PROFIT) as operating income before depreciation 
(ITEM#13) divided by the total assets. Similarly, we expect liquidity to have a 
negative relation with leverage as accumulated cash and other liquid assets serve as 
internal sources of funding, which will be used first instead of debt. We measure 
liquidity (LIQUID) as the ratio of cash and short-term investments (ITEM#1) to 
total assets. Bigger firms are likely to exhibit less asymmetric information and are 
expected to have better access to credit. Hence, firm size is expected to be 
positively correlated with debt levels. 
 
3.3.3 Determinants of market share 
We expect firm size to be positively associated with market share as larger firms 
have more financing power in the competition for market share. We use our 
measure of firm size (SIZE) as discussed in section 3.2. R&D expenses, advertising 
and selling expenses are made in an attempt to gain a better position in the market, 
improving the firm’s market share in the near future. Therefore, we include these 
as explanatory variables of market shares in our analysis: (i) the research and 
development expenditure ratio (R&D) is R&D expenses (ITEM#46) scaled by total 
sales (ITEM#12); (ii) the advertisement expense ratio (ADVERT) is advertisement 
expenses (ITEM#45) scaled by sales; and (iii) the selling, general and 
administration expense ratio (SGA) is selling, general and administration expenses 
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(ITEM#189) scaled by sales. We follow Frank and Goyal (2003) in recoding 
missing values of R&D expenditure, advertisement expenses, selling, general and 
administration expenses as zero. In addition to the sales-related variables, growth 
opportunity is another variable to take into account. Firms with high growth 
opportunities, proxied by market-to-book ratio, can gradually increase their 
positions and market shares in the product market.  
As argued by Davies and Geroski (1997), concentration tends to have a 
positive relation with market share. If firms are faced with less competition, or 
some rivals leave the market (the industry becomes more concentrated), they are 
more likely to have opportunities to gain higher market shares. To measure the 
industry concentration, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, taking into 
account both the number of firms and the inequality of market shares. 
¦
=
=++++=
K
i
iK SSSSSHHI
1
222
3
2
2
2
1 ... , in which K is the number of firms in the 
industry and Si denotes the market share of firm i. HHI is measured by industry (4-
digit SIC) and by year. Similar to our market share measure, we calculate HHI by 
using all firms available in Compustat in the particular industry-year. 
Firms often have to make a trade-off between their markup and market 
share. Other things equal, if firms want to have higher margins they tend to 
increase their prices and lose a portion of their market share to rivals. We expect a 
negative relation between markup and market share. We measure the annual 
markup of firms (MARKUP) using the approach of Phillips (1995), who computes 
markups as (Sales – costs of good sold + change in inventories) / (Sales + change 
in inventories) = (ITEM#12 – ITEM#41 + ǻITEM#3) / (ITEM#12 + ǻITEM#3). 
 
3.4 Methodology 
 
We conduct a panel data analysis by using firm fixed effect models with time 
dummies. Leverage and market share are both persistent over time, creating a link 
between different periods. Therefore, endogeneity is expected to be a coherent 
issue in analyzing these two variables. To overcome the endogeneity problem, we 
estimate the following system of simultaneous equations using two-stage least 
squares (2SLS): 
63
Strategic competition, capital structure, and market share 
 
53 
+++++=
−−−−
=
¦ 1,41,31,21,1
1
0, & titititi
N
j
ijjti ADVSGADRSIZEdMKTSH γγλγγ  
  
+++++
−−−− 1,81,71,61,5 titititi LEVMARKUPHHIMTB γγγγ   
ti
k
k uYEARDUM ,
21
9
++¦
=
γ       (3.5) 
+++++=
−−−−
=
¦ 1,41,31,21,1
1
0, titititi
N
j
ijjti RISKSIZETANGNDTSdLEV βββββ   
+++++
−−−− 1,81,71,61,5 titititi MKTSHLIQUIDPROFITMTB ββββ  
ti
k
kYEARDUM ,
21
9
εβ ++¦
=
       (3.6) 
where i denotes the ith firm in the sample and i = 1, 2, …, N; dij is a firm dummy 
which equals 1 if i = j and 0 elsewhere; MKTSH is a firm’s market share; and SIZE 
(firm size), R&D (R&D expenditure ratio), SGA (selling, general and 
administration expense ratio), ADV (advertisement expense ratio), MTB (market-
to-book ratio), HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), and MARKUP (price-cost 
markup) are determinants of market shares; LEV is the leverage measure, which 
can be one of our four proxies: LDBV (book value of the long-term debt ratio), 
LDMV (market value of the long-term debt ratio), TDBV (book value of the total 
debt ratio), or TDMV (market value of the total debt ratio); NDTS (non-debt tax 
shields), TANG (tangibility), RISK (business risk), SIZE (firm size), MTB (market-
to-book ratio), PROFIT (profitability), and LIQUID (liquidity) are the conventional 
determinants of leverage. We add year dummies in every equation to account for 
year fixed effects.  
We use lagged explanatory variables as well as instrumental-variable (IV) 
estimation to overcome the possibility of endogeneity of our dependent variables. 
The instrumental variables for LEVi,t-1 in Equation (3.5) are: NDTSi,t-2, TANGi,t-2, 
RISKi,t-2, PROFITi,t-2, LIQUIDi,t-2. The instrumental variables for MKTSHi,t-1 in 
Equation (3.6) are: R&Di,t-2, SGAi,t-2, ADVi,t-2, HHIi,t-2, and MARKUPi,t-2. To 
examine the validity of our instruments we measure the between-R2 in the first-
stage regressions. For the market share and leverage regressions we find R2-values 
of 12% and 30%, respectively. In the first-stage regression for leverage, all 
instruments have significant coefficients (at the 1% level), while in the market 
share model only the coefficient on HHI is significant at the 1% level. We 
perform a robustness check with HHI as the only instrument for market share in 
Equation (3.6), and find qualitatively similar results16. In addition, we run the joint 
                                                          
16
 Available upon request. In addition, without using instrumental variables, our OLS regressions also yield 
non-conflicting results in all regression models. 
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F-tests (Verbeek, 2004, p. 147-148) to check for the problem of weak instruments. 
The results yield values of the F-statistic of between 8.2 and 16.4, which are good 
enough to overcome the weak instrument problem.   
Our initial analysis concentrates on the estimation results of the 
simultaneous-equations system for the Cournot and Bertrand sample separately. As 
a further step in the analysis, we combine the Cournot and Bertrand firms into one 
sample and re-estimate the model with interactions of two dummy variables (the 
strategic substitutes, or SS, dummy to indicate a Cournot firm, and the strategic 
complements, or SC, dummy to indicate a Bertrand firm) with all explanatory 
variables in both equations. We use a Ȥ2-test to investigate whether the right-hand-
side variables (notably, leverage and market share) have identical coefficients in 
the samples of Cournot and Bertrand firms.  
 
3.5 Empirical results 
 
We start our discussion with the summary statistics of all the variables in our 
analysis, presented in Table 3.1. The mean value of our leverage proxies ranges 
from 0.136 to 0.224, similar to previous studies on U.S. firms (see e.g., Frank and 
Goyal, 2003; MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Lyandres, 2006). Cournot firms have a 
higher leverage in market value terms, but a lower leverage in book value terms. 
This is consistent with the fact that Cournot firms have considerably lower market-
to-book ratios compared to Bertrand firms. The distribution of market shares is 
remarkably similar for Cournot and Bertrand firms. Generally, Cournot firms are 
smaller, less prone to business risk, and more profitable than Bertrand firms. 
Cournot firms also have higher markups, but smaller fixed assets, fewer growth 
opportunities, and fewer liquid assets. The Cournot firms in our sample tend to 
spend more on selling and administration activities, while the Bertrand firms spend 
more on R&D and advertisement.  
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3.5.1 Results – Cournot sample 
Table 3.2 presents the 2SLS estimation results of the system of Equations (3.5) and 
(3.6) for the Cournot sample. We find clear evidence in favor of the hypothesis that 
leverage has a negative impact on market share for Cournot firms. All four 
measures of leverage have negative coefficients, three of which are statistically 
significant. The effect of leverage on market share is also economically significant. 
A one standard deviation increase in previous year LDBV, TDBV, or TDMV leads 
to a 5.31%, 8.38%, or 8.31% decrease, respectively, in the firms’ average market 
share in the following year. We note that because we estimate the model with firm 
fixed effects, the dependent variables are essentially measured as the deviation 
from their long-term average, which implies that we can indeed interpret the 
coefficients as measuring the impact of the explanatory variables in terms of 
changes in a firm’s market share. Our estimation results of the market share model 
support the prediction of Dasgupta and Titman (1998) and Faure-Grimaud (2000) 
that leverage induces Cournot firms to behave less aggressively in the output 
market. 
 
 The signs of the coefficients on the other determinants of market share are 
generally in line with expectations. In particular, we find evidence that firm size, 
selling expenses, and industry concentration have a significantly positive effect on 
the market share. Other explanatory variables do not have a coefficient that is 
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. 
Estimation results of Equation (3.6) show a negative impact of lagged 
market shares on leverage choice. This relation is statistically significant for both 
book value measures of leverage. The effects are non-trivial from an economic 
point of view. A one standard deviation increase in the one-year lagged market 
share is associated with a 9.62% (7.04%) decrease in the average LDBV (TDBV) of 
Cournot firms. Apparently, Cournot firms with a high market share tend to restrict 
the use of debt. A potential explanation is that these firms have lower leverage to 
maintain their strong position in the output market.   
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Several of the conventional determinants of leverage also have significant 
coefficients. The sign of these coefficients is in line with capital structure theories. 
Tangibility, firm size, and liquidity consistently show significant coefficients with 
signs as predicted in the capital structure literature. The coefficients on the market-
to-book ratio and on profitability have the correct sign, but are only significant in 
two of the specifications. The coefficients on non-debt tax shields and business risk 
are not significant, although they do have the expected signs in most cases. For the 
business risk variable, we find one (out of four) significantly positive coefficient, 
which is inconsistent with the argument that higher risk should induce firms to 
restrict their debt usage.17  
 
 
3.5.2 Results – Bertrand sample 
Table 3.3 shows the estimated coefficients in the simultaneous-equations system of 
leverage and market share for the Bertrand sample. Interestingly, the estimation 
results of the market share equation show positive coefficients for all four 
measures of leverage, all of which are significant at the 1% level. Theory does not 
offer a clear prediction about the impact of the debt level of a Bertrand firms on its 
market share, but our empirical analysis indicates that more highly levered 
Bertrand firms enjoy higher market shares in the output market. These effects are 
substantial, even larger than the magnitude found for Cournot firms. A one 
standard deviation increase in lagged LDBV, TDBV, LDMV, or TDMV is associated 
with a 12.26%, 8.79%, 18.70%, or 14.57% decrease, respectively, in the average 
market share of Bertrand firms. This result is robust to excluding or including 
different control variables.  
Why is the effect of leverage on market share for Bertrand firms opposite to 
what we find for Cournot firms? A specific aspect of the paper of Dasgupta and 
Titman (1998) can potentially explain this finding. Their main prediction that debt 
induces firms to compete less aggressively in the output market is based on a 
theoretical result derived within the context of a Nash model. However, Dasgupta 
and Titman argue that when firms do not determine their output market strategies 
simultaneously, but one firm (the Stackelberg follower) selects its strategy after 
observing the actions of the other firm (the Stackelberg leader), this result does not 
necessarily hold. In other words, in the Stackelberg case debt can induce firms to 
compete more aggressively. Dasgupta and Titman (1998) do not investigate 
exactly under which conditions this result obtains. This argument could potentially 
explain our empirical results if competition in our Bertrand sample is more 
accurately characterized by a Stackelberg model, while Cournot competition 
resembles a Nash model. We are not aware of studies that support this view, but 
                                                          
17
 Considering that the risk variable might have a measurement error, we run all the regressions again 
without RISK as a robustness check. The regressions yield similar results. 
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intuitively it makes sense, since prices are easier to observe than output. In any 
case, our results highlight the need for a theory that describes in more detail the 
interaction of Bertrand firms’ capital structure with various aspects of industry 
competition.  
Another plausible explanation of our empirical results is the possibly partial 
reaction18 of rival firms, which can be true in both cases of Cournot and Bertrand 
competition. When a Bertrand levered firm behaves less aggressively by raising its 
price, the rivals as strategic complements may not fully react by increasing their 
prices in the short run. As a result, the sales of the Bertrand levered firm increases 
while rivals’ sales may not change much. The market share of the levered firm is 
thus improved accordingly. The same mechanism may also hold for Cournot firms. 
The levered firm behaves less aggressively by reducing its production, while the 
rivals as strategic substitutes increase their output. Even if the rivals partially react 
to the levered firm’s behavior, still the final outcome is a decline in Cournot 
levered firm’s market share. 
 
                                                          
18
 We thank Robert Lensink for suggesting this point. 
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The coefficients on the other variables in the market share equation exhibit a 
similar pattern for Bertrand firms as for Cournot firms. Consistent with 
expectations, we again find that firm size, selling expenses, and industry 
concentration have a significantly positive effect on the market share.  
The estimation results for the leverage equations show no discernible effect 
of a firm’s market share on its future choice of leverage. This finding suggests that 
the impact of a firm’s market position within the industry on capital structure 
decisions is different under Cournot and Bertrand competition. Consistent with de 
Jong, Nguyen, and van Dijk (2007), we find that output market considerations are 
less important for Bertrand firms than for Cournot firms in determining their 
capital structure choice. We invite future theoretical and empirical work to shed 
more light on the rationale for these findings. 
Similarly to what we observe for Cournot firms, the traditional capital 
structure variables perform well in Equation (3.6) for Bertrand firms. Tangibility, 
firm size, market-to-book ratio, profitability, and liquidity have significant 
explanatory power for the leverage choice of Bertrand firms. However, in general 
the overall-R2 values for Bertrand firms are lower than those for Cournot firms. 
Specifically, the overall-R2 in the market share models for Bertrand firms falls 
between 18.8% and 19.6%, and the overall-R2 in the leverage models ranges from 
8% to 12.4%.  
It is remarkable that the estimated effects of leverage on market share and 
market share on leverage exhibit considerable differences across our Cournot and 
Bertrand samples, while the coefficients on the other variables are very similar. In 
section 3.5.3, we present formal tests for the equality of the leverage and market 
share coefficients across the Cournot and Bertrand samples. 
 
3.5.3 Results – Tests for equality of coefficients across Cournot and 
Bertrand firms 
In this section, we estimate the simultaneous-equations model of leverage and 
market share for the combined sample of Cournot and Bertrand samples and test 
whether the coefficients of the leverage and market share variables are the same for 
the two types of competitive behavior. We do so by interacting all explanatory 
variables with two dummy variables (SS and SC) to indicate a Cournot and a 
Bertrand firm. We compute a Ȥ2-statistic to test the hypothesis that the leverage 
effect on market share and the market share effect on leverage are equal across the 
samples of Cournot and Bertrand firms. 
Table 3.4 presents the results of these tests. The test results confirm our 
conclusions from Tables 3.2 and 3.3 with respect to the impact of leverage on 
market share. For three out of the four measures of leverage, we detect a 
statistically significant difference between the estimated coefficients for the 
Cournot and Bertrand samples. Again, the impact of leverage on market share is 
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negative for Cournot firms and positive for Bertrand firms. For LDBVt-1, the 
estimated coefficients on leverage interacted with SS and SC are similar, but the 
difference is not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.163. With respect to the 
leverage equation, the results in Table 3.4 are in line with the estimation results for 
the two separate samples, but the difference in the estimated coefficients across the 
Cournot and Bertrand samples is not statistically significant at conventional 
significance levels.  
Table 3.5 summarizes our findings. The table gives an overview of the 
hypotheses – derived from theoretical models – and our empirical results. Overall, 
we find empirical support for our main hypothesis that leverage has a negative 
effect on market share for Cournot firms, while leverage has no effect on market 
share for Bertrand firms. Our results are particularly strong for our measure of 
long-term debt, which accords well with the debt overhang channel that plays a 
central role in the model of Dasgupta and Titman (1998). The results for Cournot 
firms are also consistent with Faure-Grimaud’s (2000) prediction that debt causes 
firms to compete less aggressively. Our analysis indicates that models of the 
strategic role of debt in firms’ output market decisions provide us with important 
insights into their competitive behavior. Conversely, we support previous empirical 
research that suggests that product market competition affects a firm’s capital 
structure. We still lack a full theoretical understanding of how these mechanisms 
work, and why and how they work differently under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition. 
Table 3.5 
Summary of hypotheses and empirical evidence 
This table summarizes the testable hypotheses for firms competing in Cournot and Bertrand, and the 
relevant empirical results with different proxies for leverage (long-term debt and total debt ratio’s 
measured on the basis of book values and market values, see the definitions in Table 3.1). 
Cournot firms Bertrand firms 
Impact of 
 
Hypothesis Empirical 
result 
 
Hypothesis Empirical 
result 
Leverage on market share  –   0  
Leverage = LDBV   –   + 
Leverage = LDMV   –   + 
Leverage = TDBV   0   + 
Leverage = TDMV   –   + 
Market share on leverage  ?   ?  
Leverage = LDBV   –   0 
Leverage = LDMV   –   0 
Leverage = TDBV   0   0 
Leverage = TDMV   0   0 
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3.5.4 Robustness checks 
We conduct various robustness checks. First, we introduce 2-digit SIC industry 
dummies into our regression models to explain leverage. The purpose is to capture 
the unobservable effects of industry characteristics on the capital structure choice 
of firms with common product lines. We obtain similar results. Second, our risk 
variable might suffer from measurement error, so we re-estimate all models 
without the RISK variable. Estimation results are virtually identical. Third, we drop 
MARKUP from the market share model because of its fairly high correlation with 
HHI, and we still arrive at similar conclusions. Fourth, as mentioned in section 3.4, 
we use HHI as the only instrument for MKTSH in Equation (3.6) that explains 
leverage, and we obtain almost the same results. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
This study contributes to the limited empirical literature on the interaction between 
a firm’s financing decisions and its competitive behavior and position in the output 
market. In contrast to most of the previous papers, we analyze the impact of capital 
structure on the position of individual firms in the output market, as measured by 
their market share. We test the implications of the models of Dasgupta and 
Titman’s (1998) and Faure-Grimaud (2000) on the interaction between leverage 
and market share. Because these implications depend on the type of strategic 
competition, we empirically distinguish between Cournot and Bertrand firms using 
the competitive strategy measure of Sundaram, John, and John (1996). 
Our study focuses on testing hypotheses regarding the influence of leverage 
on market share, but we take into account possible feedback effects of a firm’s 
competitive position on its capital structure choice by estimating a system of 
simultaneous equations in which capital structure and market share are jointly 
determined. We present evidence that under Cournot competition, levered firms 
tend to have a lower future market share. This finding is consistent with Dasgupta 
and Titman’s (1998) argument that due to a higher discount rate for future profits 
debt causes firms to produce less, and with Faure-Grimaud’s (2000) proposition 
that non-optimal debt contracting leads to restricted production. Conversely, we 
find that a higher market share induces Cournot firms to restrict their use of debt.  
For Bertrand firms, we find a markedly different pattern of interactions. 
Market share has no significant impact on leverage, while a higher debt level 
induces substantially greater market shares for Bertrand firms in the next period. 
Theory provides us with little guidance about the expected interaction between 
leverage and market share under Bertrand competition. We hope that our empirical 
findings will encourage future theoretical work in this area. 
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Our research highlights the importance of strategic aspects of capital 
structure choice. The use of debt influences the future competitive position of a 
firm. We emphasize that competitive behavior has an important impact on the 
interaction between a firm’s market share and its leverage. Cournot and Bertrand 
firms are different in the way their financial structure affects their output market 
position and vice versa.  
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Chapter 4: The roles of firm- and 
country-specific determinants of 
capital structure19 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Prior research (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Claessens, Djankov and Nenova, 2001; Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004) finds that a firm’s capital structure is not only influenced by firm-
specific factors but also by country-specific factors. In this study, we demonstrate 
that country-specific factors can affect corporate leverage in two ways. On the one 
hand, these factors can influence leverage directly. For example, a more developed 
bond market facilitating issue and trading of public bonds may lead to the use of 
higher leverage in a country, while a developed stock market has the opposite 
effect. On the other hand, we show that country-specific factors can also influence 
corporate leverage indirectly through their impact on the effect of firm-specific 
factors. For example, although the developed bond market of a country stimulates 
the use of debt, the role of asset tangibility as collateral in borrowing will be rather 
limited for firms in the same country. In other words, country characteristics may 
explain why in one country a firm’s tangibility affects leverage, but not in another 
country. Previous studies have not systematically investigated these indirect 
effects. 
International studies comparing differences in the capital structure between 
countries started to appear only during the last decade. An early investigation of 
seven advanced industrialized countries is performed by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995). They argue that although common firm-specific factors significantly 
influence the capital structure of firms across countries, several country-specific 
factors also play an important role. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
compare capital structure of firms from 19 developed countries and 11 developing 
countries. They find that institutional differences between developed and 
developing countries explain a large portion of the variation in the use of long-term 
debt. They also observe that some institutional factors in developing countries 
influence the leverage of large and small firms differently. Several recent studies 
on the field have indicated that even among developed economies like the U.S. and 
                                                          
19
 This chapter is based on de Jong, A., Kabir, R., Nguyen, T.T., 2008, “Capital structure around the world: 
The roles of firm- and country-specific determinants”, Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 1954-1969. 
82
Chapter 4 
 
72
European countries, the financing policies and managers’ behavior are influenced 
by the institutional environment and international operations (see, for example, 
Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; and Brounen, De Jong and 
Koedijk, 2006). 
The literature specifically examines only the direct impact of country 
characteristics on leverage. In an analysis of ten developing countries, Booth et al. 
(2001) find that capital structure decisions of firms in these countries are affected 
by the same firm-specific factors as in developed countries. However, they find 
that there are differences in the way leverage is affected by country-specific factors 
such as GDP growth and capital market development. They conclude that more 
research needs to be done to understand the impact of institutional factors on firms’ 
capital structure choices. The importance of country-specific factors in determining 
cross-country capital structure choice of firms is also acknowledged by Fan et al. 
(2006) who analyze a larger sample of 39 countries. They find a significant impact 
of a few additional country-specific factors such as the degree of development in 
the banking sector, and equity and bond markets. In another study of 30 OECD 
countries, Song and Philippatos (2004) report that most cross-sectional variation in 
international capital structure is caused by the heterogeneity of firm-specific, 
industry-specific, and country-specific determinants. However, they do not find 
evidence to support the importance of cross-country legal institutional differences 
in affecting corporate leverage. Giannetti (2003) argues that the failure to find a 
significant impact of country-specific variables may be due to the bias induced in 
many studies by including only large listed companies. She analyzes a large 
sample of unlisted firms from eight European countries and finds a significant 
influence on the leverage of individual firms of a few institutional variables such as 
creditor protection, stock market development and legal enforcement. Similarly, 
Hall et al. (2004) analyze a large sample of unlisted firms from eight European 
countries. They observe cross-country variation in the determinants of capital 
structure and suggest that this variation could be due to different country-specific 
variables. 
A remarkable feature of most existing studies on international capital 
structure is the implicit assumption that the impact of firm-specific factors on 
leverage is equal across countries (see for example Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 
2003; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Song and Philippatos, 2004; and Fan et al., 2006). 
By reporting the estimated coefficients for firm-specific determinants of leverage 
per country, these papers, on the one hand, acknowledge that the impact of firm-
level determinants does differ in terms of signs, magnitudes and significance 
levels. On the other hand, in the analysis of country-specific determinants of 
corporate leverage, these papers also make use of country dummies in pooled firm-
year regressions, thus forcing the firm-specific coefficients to have the same value. 
With an extremely large number of firm-year observations, it is more likely for this 
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procedure to produce statistically significant results for many country-specific 
variables. But, utilizing an alternative regression framework where a single 
average capital structure for each country is used as an observation, one hardly 
finds strong evidence on this issue (e.g., Booth et al., 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999). As an additional contribution of our study, we show the 
invalidity of this implicit assumption. Our analysis without imposing such 
restriction thus provides a more reliable analysis on the importance of country-
specific variables. 
This study encompasses a large number of countries (42 in total) from every 
continent for the period 1997-2001. We construct a database of nearly 12,000 
firms. All types of firms – large and small – are included as long as a reasonable 
amount of data is available. We analyze the standard firm-specific determinants of 
leverage like firm size, asset tangibility, profitability, firm risk and growth 
opportunities. Besides, we incorporate a large number of country-specific variables 
in our analysis, including legal enforcement, shareholder/creditor right protection, 
market/bank-based financial system, stock/bond market development and growth 
rate in a country’s gross domestic product (GDP). 
We first make a detailed comparative analysis of the impact of various firm-
specific factors. We find that the impact of some factors like tangibility, firm size, 
risk, profitability and growth opportunities is strong and consistent with standard 
capital structure theories across a large number of countries. Using a model with 
several firm-specific explanatory variables, we find a relatively large explanatory 
power of leverage regressions in most countries. However, a few determinants 
remain insignificant, and in some countries one or two coefficients are significant 
with an unexpected sign. Performing a simple statistical test, we reject the 
hypothesis that firm-specific coefficients across countries are equal. It indicates 
that the often-made implicit assumption of equal firm-level determinants of 
leverage across countries does not hold. 
In the analysis of the direct impact of country-specific factors, we observe 
that certain factors like GDP growth rate, bond market development and creditor 
right protection significantly explain the variation in capital structure across 
countries. Moreover, we find considerable explanatory power of country-specific 
variables beyond firm-specific factors. We then proceed to measure the indirect 
impact of country-specific variables. The results consistently show the importance 
of country factors as we document significant effects of these via firm-specific 
determinants. For example, we observe that in countries with a better law 
enforcement system and a more healthy economy, firms are not only likely to take 
more debt, but the effects of some firm-level determinants of leverage such as 
growth opportunities, profitability and liquidity are also reinforced. Overall, our 
findings indicate that the conventional theories on capital structure, developed 
using listed firms in the United States as a role model, work well in similar 
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economies with developed legal environment and high level of economic 
development.  
 
4.2 Data  
 
Firm-specific and country-specific determinants are the two major types of 
variables that we take into account in analyzing the impacts on firms’ leverage 
choice. 
The firms in our sample cover 42 countries that are equally divided between 
developed and developing countries.20 Data for leverage and firm-specific variables 
are collected from COMPUSTAT Global database. We exclude financial firms and 
utilities. Data on country-specific variables are collected from a variety of sources, 
mainly World Development Indicators and Financial Structure Database of the 
World Bank. Additional country-specific variables are taken from previous studies 
including La Porta et al. (1998), Claessens and Klapper (2002) and Berkowitz et 
al. (2003). 
Our sample period covers the years 1997-2001. We require that the firms in 
our sample have at least 3 years of available data over the study period. The 
selection of a time-period involves a trade-off between the number of countries 
that can be included in the study and the availability of enough firm-specific data. 
Whenever needed, we resort to some other sources to collect any missing data. It is 
still impossible to obtain data for each and every variable from all 42 countries 
during this time period. The final sample consists of 11,845 firms. Even though we 
aim to keep the number of countries high enough and also maintain a reasonable 
number of firms, our dataset has unavoidably a limited number of firms in a few 
countries.21  
In order to calculate the leverage (LEV) ratio of a firm, we adopt the 
following widely-used measure: the book value of long-term debt (item#106, 
COMPUSTAT Global database) over market value of total assets which is 
calculated as book value of total assets (item#89) minus book value of equity 
(item#146) plus market value of equity (item#MKVAL). We use the long-term 
debt ratio following Titman and Wessels (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999), Booth et al. (2001), and Hall et al. (2004).22 Since the short-term debt 
                                                          
20
 The choice of countries in the sample depends on the availability of firm-level financial data in 
Compustat Global. We take countries that have the highest numbers of observations in the period of study 
and exclude those with less than 10 firms per year. The categorization of a country into developing and 
emerging economy is based on Bekaert and Harvey (2003) and S&P emerging market indices. 
21
 The inclusion of countries with relatively fewer numbers of firms yields similar results in terms of firm-
specific effects. However, due to the unavailability of country-specific data, we are unable to conduct 
further analysis. 
22
 Papers that use total debt ratios are Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Deesomsak et al. (2004). However, 
studies that investigate both long-term and total debt ratio (e.g., Wald, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; Fan et al., 
2006) generally find similar results for both measures. We also perform robustness checks by defining 
long-term debt in terms of book value of total assets and find almost no contradictory results. We try 
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consists largely of trade credit which is under the influence of completely different 
determinants, the examination of total debt ratio is likely to generate results which 
are difficult to interpret. 
The firm-specific determinants of leverage we use are also selected from 
prior studies and are defined as follows. TANG: Tangibility is defined as net fixed 
assets (item#76) over book value of total assets. RISK: Business risk is defined as 
the standard deviation of operating income (item#14) over book value of total 
assets during the sample period. SIZE: Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm 
of total sales (item#1). TAX: Tax rate of firms is the average tax rate of the year 
directly extracted from COMPUSTAT Global (item#TR).23 GROWTH: Growth 
opportunity is defined as the market value of total assets over book value of total 
assets. PROFIT: Profitability is defined as operating income over book value of 
total assets. LIQUID: Liquidity is defined as total current assets (item#75) divided 
by total current liabilities (item#104).24 Several industry dummies are included as 
additional control variables to check the robustness of our results.25 All firm-
specific variables, except for RISK, are averaged over the sample period. 
Table 4.1 presents mean and median values of leverage and other firm-
specific factors from all 42 countries during 1997-2001. For the sample of 42 
countries, the mean long-term debt ratio is 12.9%, while the median is 11.9%. 
Previous studies analyze long-term leverage ratios across a limited number 
of countries for the period of 1980s and 1990s and tend to observe a lower leverage 
in emerging economies. In this study, we observe a wide-ranging pattern of 
leverage around the world. Many industrialized countries have a median leverage 
ratio of less than 10% (e.g. Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK). With respect to emerging 
economies, we also observe very low leverage in some economies, such as China, 
Malaysia, Poland and Turkey. However, there are some developing countries with 
high long-term debt ratio (above 15%), such as Argentina, India and Korea. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
another robustness test with total debt ratio in market value, and find almost consistent results. The only 
discrepancy is the pattern of direct impact of country-specific variables, whereby the total debt ratio tends 
to be more affected by country factors. 
23
 Tax rate in COMPUSTAT Global is defined as total income taxes divided by pre-tax income. We use 
this measure instead of marginal tax rates, because our explanatory variable concerns levels of debt, 
whereas the simulated marginal tax rates serve to explain incremental change in debt rather than the debt 
level itself.” 
24
 Potential measurement errors in calculating firm-specific variables can be expected as we assume that 
the countries in our sample apply similar accounting standards. 
25
 The following industry groups are considered in our analysis: Agriculture, forestry, fishing and resources (SIC 
code 0100 – 1499); Construction (SIC code 1500 – 1799); Food (SIC code 2000 – 2099); Tobacco, textiles, 
wood and furniture (SIC code 2100 – 2599); Paper, printing and publishing (SIC code 2600 – 2799); Chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, and petroleum (SIC code 2800 – 2999); Rubber, leather, and stone (SIC code 3000 – 3299); 
Metal, machinery and other manufacturing (SIC code 3300 – 3599 and 3700 – 3999); Electronics (SIC code 
3600 – 3699); and Transportation, trade and services (SIC code 4000 – 5999 and 6500 – 8999). Inclusion of 
these industry dummies does not yield a materially different result. 
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Table 4.1 also presents summary statistics of firm characteristics per 
country. For example, we observe that countries with low median tax rates are 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Thailand; those with high rates include France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, New Zealand and the US. Countries with the lowest values of asset 
tangibility are France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and US, while those with the 
highest values are Argentina, Chile, Croatia, Mexico and Pakistan. Among all 
firm-specific variables, the values of profitability exhibit the lowest variation. 
We make use of an array of country-specific variables in our analysis of 
international capital structure. We consider a number of variables characterizing 
the macro-economic, legal and financial development of countries. The variables 
are also averaged, where applicable, over the study period. The selection of some 
other country-specific variables related to corporate governance is mainly based on 
La Porta et al. (1998) and Claessens et al. (1999)26, proxying a country’s legal 
enforcement, shareholder/creditor right protection and market/bank-based financial 
system. Other variables, such as bond and stock market development, capital 
formation, GDP growth, come from World Development Indicators and World 
Bank Financial Structure Database. Table 2.2 provides details on definitions, data 
sources and summary statistics of all country-specific variables. 
There may a problem of multi-collinearity arising from high correlations 
between several country-specific variables.27 Therefore, we construct two new 
variables to use as alternatives in the regression analysis. These new variables are: 
(1) STDMKTSTOCK, describing the level of stock market orientation of countries, 
calculated as the average of normalized values of MKTBASE and STOCK; and (2) 
STDENFOR, indicating the development of countries’ legal enforcement system, 
calculated as the average of normalized values of JUDICIAL, RULE, LEGAL and 
CORRUP. The details on these variables are also presented in Table 4.2. 
 
                                                          
26
 These variables, associated with 1982-1995 (La Porta et al., 1998) and 1996-1999 (Claessens et al., 
1999), usually remain relatively stable enough over different years. 
27
 The correlation between MKTBASE and STOCK is 0.40. The pair-wise correlations between JUDICIAL, 
RULE, LEGAL and CORRUP are 0.73, 0.86, 0.86, 0.96 and 0.97, respectively. 
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We, hereinafter, refer to the country-specific variables in four groupings. 
Creditor right protection (CREDITOR), bond market development (BOND) and 
legal enforcement (STDENFOR) tend to strengthen the role of the bond market in 
the economy; thus, we group these three country-specific variables as “bond 
market structure”. Shareholder right protection (SHAREHOLDER) and the level of 
stock market orientation (STDMKTSTOCK) together represent the importance of 
the stock market in a country, and thus we refer to this group of variables as “stock 
market structure”. In addition, we take into account the role of capital formation 
(CAPITAL), i.e. the level of gross domestic capital mobilization, which can have 
an impact on corporate financial decisions. Finally, we control for the impact of 
general economic conditions represented by GDP growth rate (GDP). 
 
4.3 Impact of firm-specific factors 
 
4.3.1 Hypotheses 
Table 4.3 summarizes the hypotheses for the firm-specific effects. The table also 
includes the hypotheses for the equal firm-specific coefficient tests, which will be 
described in Section 4.3.2, and the hypotheses for the country-specific effects, 
which will be discussed in Section 4.4.1. 
Booth et al. (2001) observe that capital structures of firms are usually 
explained by several variables arising out of static trade-off, agency and 
information asymmetry considerations. In a static trade-off framework, the firm is 
viewed as setting a target debt-to-assets ratio and moving towards it. In particular, 
the firm’s capital structure moves towards targets that involve the trade-off 
between bankruptcy-related costs and tax advantages. With respect to the 
bankruptcy costs, we expect that these costs have a negative impact on leverage, 
and one can use the following proxy variables: asset tangibility (higher tangibility 
of assets indicates lower risk for the lender as well as reduced direct costs of 
bankruptcy – see hypothesis F1 in Table 4.3), firm risk (higher risk indicates 
higher volatility of earnings and higher probability of bankruptcy – hypothesis F2), 
and firm size (an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy whereby larger 
firms are less likely to face financial distress and bankruptcy – hypothesis F3). In 
order to examine the influence of taxation on leverage, which is expected to be 
positive, Fan et al. (2006) suggest using the effective tax rate as a proxy 
(hypothesis F4).  
Agency conflicts between stockholders and bondholders arise from asset-
substitution and underinvestment. In order to minimize these conflicts firms with 
high growth opportunities go for lower leverage, thus seeking equity financing for 
their new projects instead of debt financing. Growth opportunities are thus 
expected to be negatively associated with firms’ leverage (hypothesis F5). 
According to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) framework, if a firm has a high 
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fraction of tangible assets, then these assets can be used as collateral, mitigating the 
lender’s risk. Hence, a large fraction of tangible assets is expected to be associated 
with high leverage, and in case of bankruptcy, the value of tangible assets should 
be higher than that of intangibles. Tangibility can be used as a proxy for 
collateralization which is expected to be positively related to leverage (hypothesis 
F1).  
The asymmetric information or pecking-order view suggests that firms 
follow a specific hierarchy in financing: firms prefer internal to external financing. 
If external finance is required, a firm issues the safest security first. That is, it first 
issues debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, and equity 
only as a last resort. For testing the firm-specific determinants using information 
asymmetry considerations, it is common to use variables like profitability (more 
profitable firms will have less leverage – hypothesis F6), firm size (smaller firms 
are expected to be financed less by debt because of the relatively larger 
information asymmetry problem – hypothesis F3), and liquidity (accumulated cash 
and other liquid assets serve as internal source of fund and will be used first instead 
of debt – hypothesis F7). 
 
Table 4.3 
Hypotheses 
The table summarizes the hypotheses for the firm- and country-specific effects, and the hypotheses for 
equal firm-specific coefficient tests.  
 
Firm-specific effects 
Hypothesis F1:   Tangibility has a positive effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F2:   Business risk has a negative effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F3:   Firm size has a positive effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F4:   Tax has a positive effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F5:   Growth opportunities have a negative effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F6:   Profitability has a negative effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F7:   Liquidity has a negative effect on leverage 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Equal firm-specific coefficients 
Hypothesis EC1: Tangibility coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC2: Risk coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC3: Size coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC4: Tax coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC5: Growth opportunity coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC6: Profitability coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC7: Liquidity coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC8: All firm-specific variables’ coefficients are simultaneously equal across all 
countries 
 
Direct country-specific effects 
Hypothesis D1:  Bond market structure (i.e. standardized enforcement, creditor right protection 
and bond market development) has a positive effect on leverage 
Hypothesis D2:  Stock market structure (i.e. standardized stock market and shareholder right 
protection) has a negative effect on leverage 
Hypothesis D3:   Capital formation has a negative effect on leverage 
 
Indirect country-specific effects 
Hypothesis I1:  Bond market structure mitigates the effect of bankruptcy costs (tangibility, risk 
and size) on leverage 
Hypothesis I2:  Capital formation mitigates the effect of bankruptcy costs (tangibility, risk and 
size) on leverage 
Hypothesis I3:  Bond market structure mitigates the effect of agency costs (growth opportunities 
and tangibility) on leverage 
Hypothesis I4:  Stock market structure mitigates the effect of agency costs (growth opportunities 
and tangibility) on leverage 
Hypothesis I5:  Capital formation strengthens the effect of pecking order financing (profitability 
and liquidity) on leverage 
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4.3.2 Methodology 
In the analysis of firm-specific determinants of leverage we test the conventional 
theoretical framework on capital structure choice of firms. We run firm-level 
ordinary-least-squares regressions with leverage as the dependent variable and 
country’s firm-specific factors as explanatory variables for each of the 42 countries 
in our data set as follows: 
++++++= ijjijjijjijjijjjij GROWTHTAXSIZERISKTANGLEV 543210 ββββββ
 ijijjijj LIQUIDPROFIT εββ +++ 76      (4.1) 
where i denotes an individual firm and j denotes a country.  
Next, we conduct a few statistical tests. First, we test the null hypothesis that 
each firm-specific coefficient is equal across countries. The procedure includes 
seven different tests to examine whether one or more of the seven firm-specific 
coefficients, namely tangibility (hypothesis EC1), business risk (EC2), firm size 
(EC3), taxation (EC4), growth opportunities (EC5), profitability (EC6) and 
liquidity (EC7), have the same value for all countries in the sample.28 To conduct 
these tests, we make use of an unrestricted regression model (where all coefficients 
are allowed to vary across countries), and seven restricted models (e.g. for 
tangibility null hypothesis, we restrict that the tangibility coefficients are the same 
for all countries, but other coefficients of business risk, firm size, etc. can vary). 
Second, using a similar approach, we test the null hypothesis that all firm-
specific coefficients of 42 countries have the same value (hypothesis EC8). In this 
case, our single restricted model of regression imposes that all seven firm-specific 
coefficients do not vary at all. This particular test is more important because it 
allows one to decide whether it is acceptable to use a single model for firms in all 
countries. In other words, only if EC8 is not rejected, one can assume that firm-
specific coefficients are the same across countries. The former tests (from EC1 to 
EC7) provide additional evidence to further confirm the rejection or acceptance of 
EC8, and in case of EC8 rejection, they help to point out which firm-specific 
factors may largely influence such a rejection. 
The tests are related to the joint test of significance of regression 
coefficients described in Verbeek (2004, p.27). The test statistic is defined as: 
)/(
/)(
KNS
JSSf
UR
URR
−
−
=   
where N is the number of observations, J is the number of regressors omitted in the 
restricted models, K is the number of regressors remaining in the restricted models 
including the intercept, and SR and SUR denote the sum-squared-residuals of the 
restricted and unrestricted models, respectively. For each measure of leverage, 
using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation method, we get SUR 
                                                          
28
 These hypotheses are summarized in Table 4.3. 
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by adding all sum-squared-residuals (SSR) from all the equations for firm-specific 
determinants of leverage (as specified in Equation 4.1). For SR in each test (still 
using SUR), we add the SSR from the restricted equations in the system with 
respective assumptions that the relevant coefficients are the same across countries. 
The values of f-statistic provide evidence whether to reject or not the hypotheses. 
 
4.3.3 Results 
We start our discussion of the results with a country-by-country analysis of firm-
specific determinants of leverage. We run regressions to explain leverage from 
firm-specific factors as shown in Equation (4.1). The results are reported in Table 
4.4.  
We find that almost all coefficients of tangibility are statistically significant 
and consistent with theoretical proposition (hypothesis F1). The cross-sectional 
regressions yield as many as 36 significant positive coefficients for tangibility. In 
general, firm-level data in our sample serve the framework put forward by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) on the shareholder-bondholder conflict.  
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Similar to tangibility results, we find 21 positively significant coefficients 
for firm size. The finding in half of the countries in our sample is in line with the 
hypothesis that larger firms have more debt (hypothesis F3). Since these firms are 
usually more diversified and have more stable cash flows, they can afford higher 
levels of leverage. Firm size can also be interpreted as a reverse proxy for 
bankruptcy costs. With respect to firm risk, there are only 14 significantly negative 
regression coefficients (hypothesis F2). Mixed results on this variable are also 
found in previous studies (e.g., Wald, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 
2004).  
 We observe that the impact of corporate taxation on leverage choice of 
firms yields statistically significant coefficients in ten countries. However, only 
two out of ten significant coefficients are positive (hypothesis F4). MacKie-Mason 
(1990) notes that the reason why most studies fail to find plausible or significant 
tax effects on financing behavior is that the debt/equity ratios are the cumulative 
result of years of separate decisions and tax shields have a negligible effect on the 
marginal tax rate for most firms. In this study using global data, this observation 
seems to have a high relevance. 
Growth opportunities yield 24 negative and significant coefficients. This 
negative relationship between growth opportunities and corporate leverage tends to 
support the agency theory (hypothesis F5). Firms with brighter growth 
opportunities in the future prefer to keep leverage low so they will not give up 
profitable investments because of the wealth transfer from shareholders to 
creditors.  
As for the impact of profitability, our findings are consistent with the 
asymmetric information theory which suggests that firms first use retained 
earnings for new investments and then move to debt and equity, if necessary 
(hypothesis F6). The expected negative relation between profitability and leverage 
is found in 25 countries. Finally, there are limited significant results for liquidity 
although conventional theories suggest a negative relation between liquidity and 
leverage (hypothesis F7). Most of significant negative coefficients belong to 
advanced economies. Overall, the general finding from Table 4.4 is in favor of the 
view that the corporate sector’s conditions in more developed countries are likely 
to meet the hypothetical requirements needed for the conventional theories in 
capital structure.29 
An important question then arises: are firm-specific determinants of 
leverage different across countries? As argued earlier, it is meaningful to conduct 
additional analysis on the impact of country-specific determinants only after 
answering this question. If the firm-specific coefficients do not differ significantly 
across countries, we can apply one model for all firms in the world, similar to prior 
                                                          
29
 We also conduct panel data estimation using firm and year fixed effects. The results are broadly 
consistent with those presented here and therefore not reported for reasons of brevity.  
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studies (Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Song and Philippatos, 2004; 
and Fan et al, 2006). Otherwise, the usually-adopted procedure of pooling firms 
from different countries into one regression model wrongly forces different firm-
specific coefficients to be equal. 
In order to test the hypotheses that each of these seven firm-specific 
coefficients is equal across countries and that all firm-specific coefficients across 
countries are equal, we utilize an f-test of the set-up described earlier in the 
methodology section. The estimates for seven firm-specific determinants per 
country are already provided in Table 4.4. The test results are presented in Table 
4.5.  
For the tests involving each firm-specific coefficient (EC1, EC2, …, EC7), 
we can reject the null hypotheses, except for RISK coefficients. For the relatively 
more important test (EC8), the calculated value of the f-statistic is 5.38. It provides 
a strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis that all firm-specific 
coefficients are simultaneously equal for 42 countries in our sample.30 The result 
implies that it is not valid to construct a model with a single pool of all companies 
in the world and test the impact of country-specific factors assuming that cross-
country firm-specific determinants are equal. The result also suggests that the use 
of country dummies can be a potential solution in the analysis of country-specific 
influences on leverage, in which case each country should serve as a particular 
observation in the analysis, rather than using a pooled sample of all firms in all 
countries. 
 
 
                                                          
30
 The finding that regression coefficients differ across countries may be driven by the fact that there are 
countries in our sample which have very low number of firms. Therefore, we conduct a robustness check. 
We take two sub-samples of countries with more than 100 firms and countries with less than 100 firms and 
then perform the same f-tests within the two sub-samples. The results also reject all hypotheses.  
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4.4 Direct and indirect impact of country-specific 
factors 
 
4.4.1 Hypotheses 
Several studies document that a firm’s capital structure is also affected by country-
specific factors (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Claessens, Djankov and Nenova, 2001; Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004). The country characteristics may influence leverage choice through 
two channels. The first channel is the direct impact, meaning that country-specific 
factors directly influence the debt levels of firms. We expect that corporate 
leverage is positively influenced by the bond market development, because firms 
have more options of borrowings and creditors are more willing to provide debts 
(see hypothesis D1 in Table 4.3). Conversely, with the development of the stock 
market firms face more supply of funding and thus lower costs of equity. We, 
therefore, expect that firms are induced to restrict their leverage (hypothesis D2). 
Finally, we hypothesize that an increase in capital formation implies more retained 
earnings to be accumulated. The usage of this source of equity negatively affects 
leverage (hypothesis D3). 
The second channel of country characteristics’ impact on leverage is the 
indirect impact, meaning that country-specific variables influence the way in which 
firm-specific factors determine firms’ capital structure. The conventional theories 
of capital structure provide us with four sets of firm-specific determinants of 
leverage, namely (i) bankruptcy cost variables, including tangibility, business risk 
and firm size, (ii) tax variable, (iii) agency cost variables, including growth 
opportunities and tangibility, and (iv) pecking order financing variables, including 
profitability and liquidity. We expect different indirect-impact relations across our 
three key groups of country factors, other than the control variable GDP, and four 
sets of firm factors. 
With a better bond market structure, i.e., higher bond market development, 
better protection of creditors and better legal enforcement, the roles of bankruptcy 
cost variables (namely tangibility, business risk and firm size) can be mitigated as 
the structure provides protection for both creditors and borrowers. Thus, we expect 
a negative indirect impact of bond market related variables on leverage via this set 
of firm-specific factors (hypothesis I1). As for the impact of capital formation, we 
expect that the role of bankruptcy cost variables is mitigated because with more 
available internal funds, firms face less dependence on debt usage and therefore, 
bankruptcy costs are less of an issue (hypothesis I2). 
With respect to taxation, we do not expect any significant relationship with 
the country-specific variables. In each country, the effect of taxation on leverage is 
the outcome of a complex set of tax rules, which make leverage more or less 
valuable. For a country’s domestically active firms only national rules apply, while 
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international rules apply for importing and exporting firms and multinationals. Our 
country-level variables measure macro-economic effects, but cannot capture the 
subtleties of (inter)national tax effects. 
Considering the agency cost variables, namely growth opportunities and 
tangibility, we expect that when bond and stock markets are further developed, 
agency problems among different stakeholders can be mitigated as security laws 
better protect both shareholders and creditors (La Porta et al., 1998). Consequently, 
the role of agency cost variables is reduced. We, therefore, hypothesize a negative 
relationship between bond and stock market structure variables and the impact of 
growth opportunities and tangibility on leverage (hypotheses I3 and I4).  
Finally, country variables can have an indirect impact on pecking order 
financing variables, namely profitability and liquidity. We expect that capital 
formation has an impact of strengthening the roles of pecking order financing 
variables (hypothesis I5). With a higher level of available funds from capital 
formation, high profitability and liquidity further reduce the use of debt among 
domestic firms. 
 
4.4.2 Methodology 
We adopt the following methodology to analyze the direct impact of country-
specific variables on leverage. In the first step, we run a simple pooled OLS 
regression for all firms in all countries, taking into account cross-country 
differences via country dummies31: 
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in which ,,,,,,, ijijijijijijij PROFITGROWTHTAXSIZERISKTANGLEV and ijLIQUID  
respectively are the leverage and firm-specific characteristics of firm i in country j; 
dj are the country dummies. The single Equation (4.2) yields exactly the same 
results as in Equation (4.1) which is run for each of 42 countries in our sample.  
In the second step, we explore the role of country-specific variables in 
explaining the estimators of country dummy coefficients jα  (which are the 
countries’ leverages after correcting for impacts of firm-specific determinants). 
Because unobserved heterogeneity in the estimations of the country dummy 
coefficients would bias estimations in the second stage we need to adjust for 
                                                          
31
 By construction, this regression yields the same coefficients as provided by Equation (4.1) in which the 
estimates of country dummies are equal to the intercepts. 
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measurement error in the first stage.32 Therefore, we apply Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS) regression, where the weights are the inverse standard errors of the 
corresponding country dummies ( jα ). These weights allow us to take into account 
the statistical significance of related variables. 
+++++= jjjjj KSTDMKTSTOCBONDCREDITORSTDENFOR 43210ˆ γγγγγα  
jjjj wGDPCAPITALRSHAREHOLDE ++++ 765 γγγ    (4.3) 
in which STDENFORj, CREDITORj, BONDj, STDMKTSTOCKj, SHAREHOLDERj, 
CAPITALj, and GDPj are country characteristics defined in Table 4.2. The 
observations for the dependent variable are the estimators of jα  in Equation (4.2). 
Equation (4.3) explains estimated country dummy coefficients against a set of 
country-specific variables explicitly allowing for the fact that the estimated 
coefficients of firm-specific determinants are different across countries. 
Having established the direct impact of country-specific variables on 
corporate leverage, we proceed to examine the indirect impact of country-specific 
variables by estimating the effect on firm-specific determinants. In order to do this, 
we first estimate the regression coefficients of all firm-specific variables TANG, 
RISK, SIZE, TAX, GROWTH, PROFIT, and LIQUID ( jjjjjj 654321 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ ββββββ , 
and j7ˆβ , respectively) from Equation (4.1) for each country. We then regress the 
values of coefficients on the country-specific variables, again using the WLS 
estimation as mentioned earlier. The weights used in Equation (4.4) are inverse 
standard errors of the corresponding estimated betas ( ,kjβ  j = 1, 2, …, 7). The 
regression specification is written as follows:  
+++++= jjjjkj KSTDMKTSTOCBONDCREDITORSTDENFOR 43210ˆ λλλλλβ
 
kjjj eGDPCAPITALRSHAREHOLDE ++++ 765 λλλ
 
      (4.4) 
in which k denotes the coefficients of firm-specific factors estimated in Equation 
(4.1) and j denotes a country. We also test various reduced forms of this equation.33 
 
4.4.3 Results:  direct impact of country-specific factors 
The results examining the direct impact of country-specific variables on leverage 
are presented in Table 4.6. The estimated regression coefficients of explanatory 
variables are shown in different columns. We observe that notwithstanding the 
limited number of countries in the sample, the adjusted-R2 of all regressions is 
above 50%. It indicates that the model specification we use captures a good part of 
the variations in country dummy coefficients. Country-specific determinants, 
                                                          
32
 We thank two anonymous referees for pointing out the necessity of this adjustment. 
33
 The analyses of both direct and indirect impacts of country-specific variables are the second stages of a 
two-stage procedure. As we estimate the regressions in independent runs, we implicitly assume that the 
residuals of the regressions in the first stage are not correlated with the country-specific variables. 
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therefore, should not be neglected in capital structure studies since they have a 
sizeable explanatory power. 
 The regression results show that corporate leverage is directly related to a 
number of country-specific factors. Factors like creditor right protection, bond 
market development and GDP growth rate consistently show statistically 
significant impact on capital structure. We find that the level of bond market 
development has a positive impact on capital structure, which is consistent with 
hypothesis D1. When a country’s bond market is further developed, firms have 
more choice for borrowing and are willing to take in more debt. Next, creditor 
right protection has a significantly negative impact on the leverage level of 
corporate sector, which does not support hypothesis D1. A possible explanation for 
this effect is that higher creditor right protection implies that debt is more risky for 
firms in general since firms are likely to be forced into bankruptcy in times of 
financial distress. Firms, therefore, are more reluctant to borrow as they become 
concerned with relatively stringent debt contracts that the creditors may impose on 
them. 
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We do not find any significant support for hypotheses D2 and D3. Finally, 
as we control for the general economic conditions of the countries, GDP growth 
rate variable yields a positive impact and the coefficients are significant at 1% 
level across all model specifications. The finding indicates that in countries with 
relatively higher rate of economic growth, firms are more willing to use higher 
levels of debt to finance new investments.  
 
4.4.4 Results: indirect impact of country-specific factors 
The novel argument in this study is that country-characteristics have the potential 
to influence the importance of firm-specific determinants of corporate leverage. 
Therefore, we now examine to what extent institutional differences across 
countries affect the impact of firm-specific factors. As discussed earlier, the 
estimated coefficient of each of the firm-specific determinants for each country 
(Equation 4.1) is used as the dependent variable. The results on the indirect impact 
of country factors (Equation 4.4) are presented in Table 4.7. The regression 
coefficients of country-specific factors used as explanatory variables are presented 
in various columns. As robustness checks, we also run many other regressions with 
different combinations of explanatory variables; none of the results are found to be 
conflicting (therefore not reported here). We do not report the regressions for TAX 
because no specification yields a statistically significant coefficient, as predicted. 
The overall results indicate that country-specific factors also have an impact 
on the roles of firm-specific determinants of capital structure. We find a 
significantly negative effect of the variable representing market/bank-based 
financial system and stock market development (STDMKTSTOCK) on the 
estimated coefficient of asset tangibility, supporting a part of hypothesis I4. A 
developed stock market, for example, tends to mitigate the use of debt as it instead 
promotes the use of equity. As a result, the role of tangibility as collateral in 
borrowing is limited. We also find a strong evidence for hypothesis I5 as all the 
coefficients of CAPITAL are significantly negative for the case of profitability and 
liquidity. The negative impact of these two firm-specific variables on leverage is 
further strengthened when more domestic capital funds are accumulated. 
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We also observe that a country’ legal system of enforcement (STDENFOR) 
indirectly influences capital structure in several ways. Firstly, a negative impact on 
firm size coefficients indicates that firm size is relatively less important for 
leverage choice of firms. As firm size is a reverse proxy of bankruptcy cost/risk, 
better law enforcement is likely to force borrowers to abide by their debt contracts. 
The result is consistent with our hypothesis I1. On the other hand, in countries with 
lower enforcement, the role of firm size as a proxy for information asymmetry 
alleviation is further enhanced. Secondly, firms operating in an environment with 
effective enforcement have to consider more carefully about their leverage choice 
because bankruptcy risk becomes more important. Higher law enforcement also 
makes the impact of profitability more important. Debt is used as a bonding or 
disciplinary device to ensure that the management pays out profits, rather than 
engages in empire-building activities (Jensen, 1986). Better law enforcement, 
including reduced level of corruption, further strengthens the role of profitability in 
making debt more aligned with its disciplinary role. 
Although we do not find any evidence for hypotheses I2 and I3, we do 
observe several significant relationships which are not hypothesized but can be 
explained. Shareholder right protection has a significant positive effect on firm size 
coefficient and a significant negative effect on profitability coefficient. Firm size 
can be a proxy for information asymmetry: larger firms are expected to have less 
information asymmetry. When shareholders are better protected, firms are more 
likely to be operated in alignment with shareholders’ interest, thereby 
strengthening the influence of firm size. On the other hand, shareholder right 
protection strengthens the negative impact of profitability on leverage, as firms 
have to care more about their performance to fit with shareholders’ interests. The 
control variable, GDP, shows up with a significantly strengthening impact on the 
role of growth opportunities. 
Taken as a whole, the results presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 suggest 
significant roles of various country-specific factors, not only directly determining 
corporate leverage, but also affecting the way firm-specific factors influence firms’ 
choice of capital structure. We find that legal enforcement-related factors and 
variables characterizing the economic development of countries tend to show the 
greatest impacts, both directly and indirectly. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
Capital structure theories have been mostly developed and tested in the single-
country context. Researchers have identified several firm-specific determinants of 
a firm’s leverage, based on the three most accepted theoretical models of capital 
structure, i.e. the static trade-off theory, the agency theory and the pecking-order 
theory. A large number of studies have been conducted to date investigating to 
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what extent firm-specific factors influence capital structures of firms operating 
within a specific country. In this chapter, we examine the role of these factors in a 
large sample of 42 countries, divided equally between developed and developing 
countries. Our main objective is to analyze the role of various country-specific 
factors in determining corporate capital structure. We distinguish two types of 
effects: the direct effect of country factors on corporate leverage and the indirect 
effect through their influence on firm-specific factors. 
We find that the impact of several firm-specific factors like tangibility, firm 
size, risk, growth and profitability on cross-country capital structure is significant 
and consistent with the prediction of conventional capital structure theories. On the 
other hand, we also observe that in each country one or more firm-specific factors 
are not significantly related to leverage. For a very small number of countries, we 
find results that are inconsistent with theoretical predictions. 
Several studies analyzing international capital structure assume cross-
country equality of firm-level determinants. We show that this assumption is 
unfounded. Rather, it is necessary to avoid a specification using a pooled 
regression method and instead conduct an analysis of country-specific factors by 
including countries as observations. Utilizing appropriate estimations we perform 
regressions using country-specific factors to explain coefficients of country 
dummies as well as firm-specific determinants. 
Analyzing the direct impact of country-specific factors on leverage, the 
evidence suggests that creditor right protection, bond market development, and 
GDP growth rate have a significant influence on corporate capital structure. In 
measuring the impact indirectly, we find evidence for the importance of legal 
enforcement, creditor/shareholder right protection, and macro-economic measures 
such as capital formation and GDP growth rate. The finding implies that in 
countries with a better legal environment and more stable and healthier economic 
conditions, firms are not only likely to take more debt, but the effects of firm-level 
determinants of leverage are also reinforced. Overall, the evidence provided here 
highlights the importance of country-specific factors in corporate capital structure 
decisions. Our conclusion is that country-specific factors do matter in determining 
and affecting the leverage choice around the world, and it is useful to take into 
account these factors appropriately in the analysis of corporate capital structure. If 
the limitations of data, especially the number of countries, can be overcome, one 
might find even more significant results with respect to the direct as well as 
indirect impact of country-specific factors. 
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Chapter 5: Corruption, growth, and 
governance: Private vs. state-owned 
firms in Vietnam34 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A large body of literature studies the causes and consequences of corruption.35 As 
for causes of corruption, the studies to date investigate several channels, such as 
the availability of rents due to the government intervention (e.g., trade restriction, 
price controls, provision of credit, etc.) as opportunities for public officials to 
misconduct and the low pay for civil servants that induces their need to collect 
bribes. From the perspective of consequences of corruption, authors have analyzed 
the impact of corruption on economic growth, income distribution, and the 
composition of government expenditure. 
One prominent observation is that the focus of the literature is almost 
exclusively on the country-level36. In this chapter, we investigate the effects of 
corruption on firm growth, and the roles of public governance in determining the 
corruption severity in Vietnam. Our study is one of a very limited number of 
within-country studies on corruption. This branch of the literature, to the best of 
our knowledge, consists of Del Monte and Papagni (2001), Glaeser and Saks 
(2006), and Fisman and Svensson (2007) for corruption effects, and Svensson 
(2003) and Del Monte and Papagni (2007) for corruption causes. 
There are a number of advantages of within-country studies on corruption 
compared to cross-country studies. First, corruption exhibits substantial variations 
within countries.37 Macro-economic factors such as inflation and economic 
development, which have been examined in cross-country studies, are unable to 
explain within-country variations in corruption. To understand why the level of 
corruption and the impact of corruption vary across firms, a firm-level analysis is 
                                                          
34
 This chapter is based on Nguyen, T.T., van Dijk, M.A., 2008, Corruption and growth: Private vs. state-
owned firms in Vietnam, ERIM Working Paper Series. 
35
 For a review and summary, refer for example to Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), and Aidt (2003). 
36
 See, for example, Mauro (1995), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Li et al. (2000), Treisman (2000), Paldam 
(2002), Herzfeld and Weiss (2003), Persson et al. (2003), Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006), and Ahlin and 
Pang (2007). 
37
 We document significant variations of corruption severity across provinces and industries in Vietnam. 
There are also significant differences in bribery payments among Ugandan firms and industries (Svensson, 
2003; Fisman and Svensson, 2007), and in the level of corruption across U.S. states (Glaeser and Saks, 
2006). 
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needed. In particular, the effects of corruption on individual firms are likely to 
differ due to the unequal treatments of public officials of firms in different 
sectors38. Furthermore, within-country studies can provide specific countries with a 
high level of corruption with policy advice on which local institutions matter for 
the prevalence and impact of corruption.  
 Corruption in Vietnam is severe. Vietnam is ranked 118 out of 163 
countries39 in the 2007 Global Corruption Report.40 According to Transparency 
International (2007), Vietnam is one of the countries, whose government 
commitment to ensure adequate support for courts and their personnel has 
weakened, inviting corruption and undermining the rule of law.41 Therefore, the 
deteriorating public governance mechanisms are potentially the factors that lead to 
higher level of corruption.  
Vietnam is interesting as a single country setting because of two reasons. 
First, although there are studies that investigate the role of the overall national 
legal effectiveness42 and the legal origins in affecting corruption (e.g., Herzfeld 
and Weiss, 2003; Treisman, 2000), the role of within-country governance 
structures is not discussed in the literature, partly due to the unavailability of data. 
Provinces and cities under the central governance are important administrative 
units in Vietnam. Our data on Vietnam’s provincial governance indices, therefore, 
offer an opportunity to examine how the public governance structure and quality 
impact corruption practice and corporate sector.  
Second, corruption effects in Vietnam are likely to work differently across 
economic sectors, due to the potentially unequal treatments of public authorities 
towards firms in those sectors. We study a distinctive form of entrepreneurship in 
Vietnam that operates in the absence of well-established market institutions: state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Vietnam keeps the tradition to favor SOEs which used 
to be the only major driving force of the economy. Many researchers consider 
corruption to be bad for economic growth (e.g., North, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993; Romer, 1994). However, due to the close relationships and the mutual 
benefits between SOEs and public officials (Tenev et al., 2003; Nguyen, 2006), 
SOEs in Vietnam may incur less adverse effects of corruption compared to non-
                                                          
38
 This issue is especially non-trivial in socialism-oriented and post-socialist countries with historically 
high priorities towards their state sector.  
39
 Vietnam scores 2.6 in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranges between 10 (highly clean) 
and 0 (highly corrupt). This score is similar to those in 2000-2005 period, but the country’s ranking is 
getting worse.  
40
 The within-country studies on corruption until now are conducted for only three countries, namely the 
U.S, Italy and Uganda, which have the 2006 CPI scores of 7.3, 4.9 and 2.7, and country ranks of 22, 45, 
and 110, respectively. 
41
 Corruption has become a serious issue in the country. It was particularly pressing when in 2006 a 
number of major corruption cases were discovered, such as the case of Project Management Unit 18 
(PMU18), land corruption in Hai Phong, the corruption case in purchasing equipments by 38 provincial 
and municipal post offices (CIEM, 2007). 
42
 The legal effectiveness in Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) is defined as the citizens’ willingness to accept the 
established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. 
121
Corruption, growth, and governance:  Private vs. state-owned firms in Vietnam 
 
 
111 
state firms. Our study provides a comparative analysis of the relation of corruption, 
growth, and governance across state and private sectors.  
We measure corruption from two different perspectives: (i) the level of 
corruption severity in the local business environment43 as perceived by firms; and 
(ii) corruption as the choice to pay and the amount of informal payments in 
accordance with industry practice as perceived by firms. Previous firm-level 
studies measure corruption as the bribery payments made by individual firms 
(Svensson, 2003; Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Such a variable potentially has an 
endogenous relation with firm growth, because growth affects a firm’s ability to 
pay informal charges (Svensson, 2003). Given the construction of our corruption 
measures, an important advantage of our study is that it does not suffer from this 
endogeneity problem.  
Our study adds to the scarce literature on corruption at firm-level within 
individual country contexts. We provide new evidence on corruption effects on 
growth, and governance effects on corruption across economic sectors in Vietnam. 
Using information from the World Bank’s Productivity and Investment Climate 
Enterprise Survey and the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index Survey in 
2005, we show that corruption has a negative impact on the growth of private 
firms’ growth, while corruption puts no harm on the growth of SOEs. Our findings 
suggest that the priorities and treatments from the government in favor of the state 
sector likely generate distortions in a market economy mechanism. We also find 
that local public governance structures play a significant role in determining the 
severity of corruption. The governance factors that significantly affect corruption 
severity are regulatory entry costs, land access, the implementation and 
consistency in policies, and the provincial policies for private sector development. 
Our study suggests that improvements in governance quality, including the 
leveling of the playing field for firms in all economic sectors, are necessary for 
curbing down corruption, and its adverse effects on firm growth and development. 
 
5.2 Corruption effect literature 
 
Corruption is widely understood as “the acts in which the power of public office is 
used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game” (Jain, 
2001, p. 73). People involved with corruption are often public officials and 
politicians, who control the power of public office. The empirical investigation on 
corruption causes has been conducted in large samples of countries. The major 
determinants of corruption that have received attention include rent-seeking 
                                                          
43
 Corruption in the local business environment is the judgment of firms about how corrupt the local 
authorities are. The local authorities include the provincial departments of taxes, customs, land 
administration, and business registration and licensing. 
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opportunities and corporate competition (e.g., Ades and Di Tella, 1999)44, legal 
effectiveness (e.g., Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003)45, legal origins, religions, status of 
economic development (e.g., Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2002)46. Also on a cross-
country level, a wide recognition of corruption consequences is established. 
Authors generally find negative impact of corruption on national economic growth 
and investment, although the negative effects in a few cases are weak and/or 
inclusive (e.g., Mauro, 1995; Li, Xu, and Zou, 2000; Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006; 
Ahlin and Pang, 2007). The literature documents a few other consequences of 
corruption, for example its negative impact on level of human capital (Mo, 2001).  
With regards to corruption effects, corruption may influence a society in a 
variety of ways. Theoretically, there are two broad viewpoints on the impact of 
corruption on growth. First, many authors highlight the possibility that economic 
growth and/or development are negatively influenced by corruption. According to 
North (1990), cumbersome and dishonest bureaucracies may delay the distribution 
of permits and licenses, thereby slowing down the process by which technological 
advances become embodied in new equipment or new productive processes. On 
the other hand, bureaucrats may distort investment toward projects offering better 
opportunities for secret corruption, such as defense and infrastructure (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993). The distortion in the composition of the modern sector raises the 
relative return to rent-seeking activity and, as a result, growth rates and income 
levels drop. Corruption is also viewed as a tax on the profits from the productive 
sector. Romer (1994) suggests that corruption as a tax may in general stifle the 
entry of new goods or technology which requires an initial fixed cost investment. 
An increase in corruption, in addition, amounts to a tax hike, pulling talented 
entrepreneurs toward the rent-seeking sector, and growth rates, in turn, drop. 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) provide evidence that countries where 
talented people are allocated to rent-seeking activities tend to grow more slowly. 
 Second, however, there is another strand in the literature suggesting that 
corruption may actually improve efficiency and help growth, especially in the 
context of pervasive and cumbersome regulations in developing countries. Several 
authors (e.g., Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985) suggest that corruption 
might raise economic growth through two types of mechanisms: (i) corrupt 
practices such as “speed money” would enable individuals to avoid bureaucratic 
delay47; and (ii) government employees who are allowed to levy bribes have 
                                                          
44
 Ades and Di Tella (1999) provide evidence that countries where firms enjoy higher rents tend to have 
higher corruption levels. In addition, the study shows that corruption is higher in countries where domestic 
firms are sheltered from foreign competition, with economies dominated by a few number of firms, or 
where antitrust regulations are not effective. 
45
 Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) find a negative association between corruption levels and the national legal 
effectiveness. 
46
 Treisman (2000) shows that countries with Protestant traditions, common law legal systems, and more 
developed economies are less corrupt. 
47
 This argument may face potential criticism, for example, “corrupt officials may, instead of speeding up, 
actually cause administrative delays in order to attract more bribes” (Bardhan, 1997, p.1323). 
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incentives to work harder and more efficiently. While the first mechanism would 
increase the likelihood that corruption be beneficial to growth only in countries 
where bureaucratic regulations are cumbersome, the second one would operate 
regardless of the level of red tape (Mauro, 1995). 
 Most studies of the consequences of corruption are performed on a cross-
country scale. The empirical evidence generally supports the viewpoint of harmful 
effects of corruption. Mauro (1995) documents a significantly negative association 
between the corruption index and the rates of investment and economic growth in a 
sample of 67 countries. The effects hold in subsamples of countries which report 
cumbersome bureaucratic regulations. This suggests that bureaucracy acts as a 
catalyst for corruption to take place. Mo (2001), for a sample of 46 countries, finds 
that a 1% increase in the corruption level reduces the growth rate of a country by 
about 0.72%. Ahlin and Pang (2007) similarly show that across the sample of 71 
countries the control of corruption can help to promote countries’ economic 
growth. 
Some evidence, however, challenges the argument for the adverse effect of 
corruption. Li et al. (2000), for a sample of 46 countries, show that corruption 
reduces GDP growth rate, but only in some of the regression models. In addition, 
when interacting corruption with an Asia dummy, corruption appears to have a far 
less harmful effect on growth in Asia than elsewhere. This may raise questions 
whether corruption indeed reduces growth. From the perspective of long-term 
growth, Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) study the effects of corruption on countries’ 
economic growth in the long run. Unlike other papers, they find evidence of a non-
monotonic relation between corruption and growth when restricting the sample to 
those countries considered being politically free. The results indicate that the 
growth-maximizing level of corruption is significantly greater than zero, with 
corruption beneficial for economic growth at low levels of corruption, and 
detrimental at high levels of corruption. 
 Empirical evidence about corruption consequences within individual 
countries is scarce, especially at firm-level. The only example of a firm-level 
analysis, to our knowledge, is Fisman and Svensson (2007) who study the relation 
between bribery payments and firm growth in Ugandan firms. The authors find that 
bribery payment acts similarly as taxes on firms, and a one-percentage point 
increase in the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in firm growth of three 
percentage points. A few other papers analyze countries’ regional data. Del Monte 
and Papagni (2001) investigate whether corruption is one of the causes of the 
limited success of the policies addressed to the development of Southern Italy. The 
results basically show that corruption has a negative effect on economic growth, 
private investment, and the efficiency of expenditures on public investment in 
Italian regions. Glaeser and Saks (2006) use information on corruption severity in 
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the states of the U.S. to examine the impact of corruption on economic 
development, and find a weak negative relationship between them.  
 
5.3 Private sector vs. state sector in Vietnam 
 
5.3.1 Overview of the private and state sectors  
After the national reunification in 1975 until 1986, Vietnam followed a centrally 
planned economic regime, in which the only major driving force of the entire 
economy was the state sector. SOEs exclusively generated the national industrial 
production, and cooperatives were mostly in charge of agricultural production. The 
country experienced a post-war period of poor economic conditions. The economic 
reform (“Doimoi”) took place in 1986, aiming to renovate the socio-economic 
system toward higher productivity and efficiency, and better national living 
standards. Doimoi process has led to the decentralization of state economic 
management, the replacement of administrative measures in a command economy 
by economic ones in a socialism-oriented market economy. Vietnam’s private 
sector was officially born and has now become an important engine of economic 
growth.  
The private sector is the driving force of growth and development in many 
economies. In Vietnam, on the contrary, the dominance of the public sector 
represented by SOEs has been emphasized for several decades until now.48 
However, Vietnamese private firms have been accelerating their contribution to the 
economic growth and national wealth. From nearly nothing before 1989, 
Vietnamese private sector, including foreign invested firms, produces 50% of total 
industrial output in 1996, 66% in 2000 and nearly 73% in 2004 (GSO, 2005). The 
private sector has also created most of the new jobs and has become the most 
dynamic component of the Vietnamese economy (Tenev et al., 2003). After the 
revision of Enterprise Law in 2000, the number of private companies rapidly 
increased. During 1995-1999 around 8,000 companies were established (GSO, 
2002). Afterwards, this number roared from approximately 35,000 private 
companies that were registered in 2000 to around 84,000 in 2004 (GSO, 2005). 
Until 2005, Vietnamese private firms accounted for nearly 90% of total number of 
enterprises, and attracted about 44% of total employees. However, nearly 90% of 
the registered private companies are small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Private SMEs have difficulties in getting access to resources such as land and 
financing for further development (JBIC, 2003; Tenev et al., 2003). 
With regards to Vietnam’s state sector, there were about 5,900 SOEs in the 
country during the 1990s (JBIC, 2003). The number decreased to slightly more 
                                                          
48
 Vietnamese SOEs have been exclusively dominating in many industries such as utilities, aviation, 
national defense, oil and gas exploration and production, and all heavy industries. In addition, SOEs enjoy 
priorities in government investments, occupying 60% of national capital resources (Nguyen, 2006). 
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than 4,500 in 2004 (GSO, 2005) due to the process of equitization and 
privatization, and the policy of restructure and/or dissolution of SOEs toward 
business efficiency. The equitization, however, accounted for only 9% of total state 
capital in SOEs until 2005 (Nguyen, 2006). The figures imply that after nearly 20 
years of transition from a planned economy towards a socialist-oriented market 
economy, Vietnam’s government still maintains their large state sector. 
There are problematic issues inherent in Vietnam’s state sector. SOEs’ bad 
debts are large but finally ignored or deleted by the state banking system. Although 
the fraction of bad debt in Vietnam’s SOEs is kept confidential, the SOEs’ losses 
are partially known by the public. It was reported that 11 State Civil Engineering 
Construction Corporations (CIENCO) suffered huge losses: one of these firms lost 
VND 2 trillion, roughly equivalent to USD 130 million. Similarly, subsidiaries of 
Vietnam State Paper Corporation totally made a loss of more than USD 2 million 
in 2004 (Nguyen, 2006). Moreover, the losses and squandering in state budget 
investments are estimated to account for 20 to 40 percent of the total investment. 
At the local level, more than 2,000 projects were inspected in 2003 and almost all 
were discovered to commit violations of state financial regulations, thus required 
to revoke VND 136 billion for state budget (CIEM, 2006). 
In general, there is not yet a level playing field for firms in Vietnam. With 
regard to access to both land and finance, SOEs continue to crowd out the private 
sector. For example, banks regularly offer loans for SOEs under pressures from 
governmental authorities regardless of the risks of the proposed projects (Nguyen, 
2006). Private firms, to a greater extent, depend on social networks for access to 
market, capital and business services, but their business networks are weaker than 
it is the case for SOEs (ANU and CIEM, 2002; Tenev et al., 2003). In general, 
government’s preferential treatment of SOEs remains a major obstacle to the 
development of private firms. Evidence is the slow pace of implementation of 
recent reform measures, including SOE reform (ANU and CIEM, 2002). 
 
5.3.2 Corruption and growth in the private and state sectors 
The two alternative views of corruption effect on growth are interesting to verify, 
especially since empirical evidence is limited. Vietnam offers a good setting for 
this purpose: due to the country’s history, private and state sectors in Vietnam face 
different government interventions, receive different endowments and treatments. 
Moreover, managers in private firms and SOEs are generally believed to have 
different incentives and targets. Agency theorists argue that managers of state 
companies seek to maximize their own benefits rather than those of the state or the 
firm itself due to the coherent problem of principal-agent relationship (e.g., Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1983). Managers in SOEs are not 
constrained by the threat of bankruptcy and takeover through market operations as 
it is the case in private sector (Nguyen, 2006). Managers of private firms, on the 
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other hand, are correctly disciplined by a number of external control mechanisms 
such as the labor market for managers, and by internal control mechanisms such as 
compensation and rewards incentives (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000).  
Politicians, the representatives of state ownership, often exert insufficient 
effort into monitoring SOEs’ managers. The reasons, among others, include: (i) 
politicians tend to be concerned about the chances of re-election or promotion, 
rather than monitoring SOEs’ activities; (ii) there is generally a close relationship 
between SOEs’ managers and governmental authorities (Nguyen, 2006). The 
public authorities, as the owner of SOEs, are likely to give regulatory privileges in 
resource allocation to SOEs. Moreover, many politicians gain their power in the 
political system after having taken the top executive positions in SOEs. The 
previous working relationship also plays a role when public officials tend to deal 
with SOEs in a more favorable way. Based on such a relationship, the SOEs’ 
management likely has more chance to approach and lobby the public officials in 
order to obtain favorable conditions for their growth and development. 
The especially close relationship (including the lobby activities) between 
SOEs and public officials, which is usually perceived as corruption by non-state 
firms, tends to be beneficial for SOEs’ performance. The benefits can be very 
large, especially in case of high bureaucracy in developing countries like Vietnam. 
The private firms, under the relative discrimination by regulatory bodies, do not 
enjoy a level playing field in doing business. We, therefore, expect that the effects 
of perceived corruption levels on firm growth differ across SOEs and private firms 
in Vietnam. 
The major causes of corruption in Vietnam include: (i) abuse of power from 
positions of public officials; (ii) arbitrary decisions related to policies and 
administration; (iii) weak accountability of officials and government agencies; and 
(iv) weak state implementation and monitoring (CIEM, 2005). The Transparency 
International reports, in the meantime, emphasize that the court system 
effectiveness, the rule of law, and the public governance personnel are among the 
factors that influence cross-country corruption. We, therefore, expect that the 
within-country governance mechanisms can also explain the occurrence and 
severity of corruption in the business environment. We generally expect that better 
governance mechanisms narrow down the chance of corruption incidence. 
Specifically, the local policies that improve, for example, the transparency and 
information access, and the implementation and consistency of policies are likely 
to mitigate corruption. On the contrary, the increases in regulatory entry costs, the 
time costs of regulatory compliance, and the bias towards SOEs or firm 
discrimination in general may enhance corruption.  
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5.4 Data and methodology 
 
We analyze the corruption impact on growth in Vietnam for both sectors: private 
firms and SOEs, and then investigate the roles of governance variables on 
corruption severity in Vietnam’s business environment.  
We use data from two sources of information, both of which were based on 
surveys implemented in 2005. The first is firm-level data obtained from the 
Productivity and Investment Climate Enterprise Survey conducted by the World 
Bank. This data set includes firm characteristics, firm financial information and 
firms’ assessments on various aspects of the local business environment. The 
second data source consists of province-level indicators of public governance 
quality which are constructed based on the 2005 Vietnam Provincial 
Competitiveness Index survey. This survey was supported by Vietnam 
Competitive Initiative (VNCI) and Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(VCCI).  
 
Dependent variables – growth and corruption 
One of the dependent variables in our analysis is firm growth. We follow Allen et 
al. (2007) to define firm growth (GROWTH) as the ratio of book value of total 
assets at the year end of 2004 relative to the total assets of 2003. The data items are 
obtained from the World Bank’s survey.  
Next, we examine two measures of corruption. The first one is the 
respondents’ perception about the corruption level in their local business 
environment – CORRUPTION. This measure is the sum of scores of corruption 
ranks indicated by the firms in the World Bank survey. The firms are asked to rank 
the corruption extent of various agencies, using a scale ranging from 0 = no 
corruption to 4 = widespread corruption. The agencies to be ranked are tax 
department officials, officials in business registration and licensing, import/export 
license authorities, customs department, construction permit authorities, traffic 
police, municipal and other police market controller, land administration agency, 
and  district peoples’ committee.49 Our measure CORRUPTION, thus, represents 
the general corruption seriousness in the local business environment as perceived 
by the firm.50 
                                                          
49
 We calculate Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for our measure CORRUPTION. The alphas for our different 
samples range from 0.79 to 0.83, meaning that we have high reliability in constructing the measure. In 
addition, we run a factor analysis for the sub-scores of CORRUPTION, and find that there is only one 
factor that has an Eigen value greater than 1. For this factor, the factor loadings of the sub-scores are 
highly comparable (results are available upon request). The procedures indicate a reliable construction of 
our measure of CORRUPTION. 
50
 We perform our empirical analysis for sub-scores of CORRUPTION, instead of this measure itself. The 
results show that our findings are not driven by any particular sub-score, and the sub-scores separately do 
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The second measure is the corruption practice in the industry where firms 
are operating. We use two proxies as firms’ perception at the level of their active 
industry: (i) PAYMENTDUM is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
perceives that there are informal payments to public officials in the industry, and 
the value of zero otherwise; and (ii) PAYMENTAMOUNT is the ratio of informal 
payments over annual sales that the industry, as estimated by the firms, pays. 
 
Determinants of growth 
We use the following determinants of growth in our baseline model. Firstly, firm 
age (AGE) is a growth determinant. In general, younger firms have high growth 
rates, while in a later stage of development, firms tend to slow down in growth to 
reach their maturity. We expect that AGE has a negative impact on firms’ growth. 
Second, firm size (SIZE) serves as another determinant of growth. Smaller firms 
are more likely to grow faster since they have more flexibility and a neat 
management team, thus incurring lower monitoring and agency costs. We expect 
that SIZE has a negative effect on firm growth. 
Next, the application and innovation in technology (TECH) is a driving 
force for firms to grow. In our study, TECH is the dummy for any new 
technological application that the firms take during the period 2003-2004. In 
addition, we consider the utilization of production capacity (CAPACITY). The 
better use of machinery and equipment is likely to bring about a higher growth 
rate. CAPACITY is defined as the capacity utilization, measured by the amount of 
output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that could be produced 
with existing machinery and equipment and regular shifts in 2004. 
Financing is another determinant of firm growth. We follow Ayyagari et al. 
(2008) to use financing dummies in the model to explain growth. A dummy for 
bank financing (BANKDUM) takes the value of one if the firm has a strictly 
positive amount of bank financing for working capital or new investments, and the 
value of zero otherwise. Bank financing is defined as loans provided by private 
commercial banks, state-owned commercial banks, international commercial 
banks, leasing arrangements, development assistance funds and state budget.51 A 
dummy for informal financing (INFORMALDUM) takes the value of one if the 
firm has a strictly positive amount of informal financing for working capital or new 
investments, and the value of zero otherwise. Informal financing is defined as 
coming from family, friends and informal sources such as money lenders.  
Besides all above explanatory variables, we use 16 industry dummies in 
robustness checks to represent the following industries: food and beverage, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
not yield many informative regression coefficients. This explains why we do not focus on analyzing the 
roles of corruption sub-scores. 
51
 The World Bank’s survey provides percentages of firms’ financing that come from different sources 
used for working capital and new investments. 
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textiles, apparel, leather products, wood and wood products, paper, chemical and 
chemical products, rubber and plastic products, non-metallic mineral products, 
basic metals, metal products, machinery and equipment, electrical machinery, 
electronics, construction materials, and vehicles and other transport equipment. In 
addition, we introduce province dummies in our robustness checks. 
 
Governance variables as determinants of corruption 
We examine how the quality of the local public governance affects the corruption 
severity in the business environment and industries in Vietnam. We use provincial 
governance indicators provided by VNCI and VCCI, which are all standardized to 
a ten-point scale. The indicators are: (i) ENTRYCOST (entry costs): a measure of 
the time it takes firms to register, acquire land and receive all the necessary 
licenses to start business; (ii) LANDACCESS (access to land): a measure of 
whether firms possess their official land-use-right certificate, whether they have 
enough land for their business expansion requirements and the effective price of 
land in the province, taking into account demand and supply in the provinces, and 
the quality of industrial zone policies; (iii) TRANSPARENCY (transparency and 
access to information): a measure of whether firms have access to the proper 
planning and legal documents necessary to run their business, whether those 
documents are equitably available, whether new policies and laws are 
communicated to firms and predictably implemented, and the business utility of 
the provincial web page; (iv) TIMECOST (time costs of regulatory compliance): a 
measure of how much time firms waste on bureaucratic compliance as well as how 
often and for how long firms must shut down their operations for inspections by 
local regulatory agencies; (v) INFORMALCHARGE (informal charges)52: a 
measure of how much firms pay in informal charges and how much of an obstacle 
those extra fees pose for their business operations; (vi) IMPLEMENTATION 
(implementation and consistency of policies): a measure of the coordination 
between central and provincial governments, as well as the consistent application 
of central policies across provincial sub-agencies; (vii) STATEBIAS (state sector 
bias): a measure of the bias of provincial governments toward SOEs in terms of 
incentives, policy and access to capital; (viii) PROACTIVE (proactivity of 
provincial leadership): a measure of the creativity and cleverness of provinces in 
both implementing central policy and designing their own initiatives for private 
sector development; (ix) PRIVSECDEV (private sector development policies): a 
measure of provincial policies for private sector trade promotion, provision of 
regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking and capacity 
training to improve the quality of labor in the province. Finally, PCI (provincial 
competitiveness index) is the weighted combination of the nine above mentioned 
                                                          
52
 This specific indicator is ultimately not used in the analysis of corruption determinants due to the fact 
that this measure is, by construction, highly similar to our corruption proxies. 
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sub-indices, taking into account the importance of the sub-indices in explaining 
cross-provincial performance. PCI indicates the overall governance quality across 
provinces in Vietnam. 
 
Sample 
We start the sample with all firm observations in the World Bank’s survey. The 
surveyed firms come from 24 provinces in Vietnam. We then exclude firms that do 
not have information on total assets, sales, or after-tax profits. We discard the 
observations with firm age equal to zero, and production capacity greater than one. 
We leave out the outliers, which are firms with asset growth above 5 or below -5. 
Next, we incorporate the data of provincial governance variables from the VNCI 
and VCCI’s survey into our sample. Our final data sample consists of 741 private 
firms and 133 SOEs. Private firms are limited liability corporations, companies 
with foreign direct investment, one member limited liability companies, joint stock 
companies, partnerships, and sole proprietorships.53 
 
Methodology 
We use OLS regressions with robust standard errors to examine the effect of 
corruption on firms’ growth while controlling for other growth determinants. The 
baseline model is constructed as follows. 
++++++= BANKDUMCAPACITYTECHSIZEAGEGROWTH 543210 λγγγγγ
 
 
vCORRUPTMINFORMALDU +++ 76 γγ    (5.1) 
in which CORRUPT is a corruption measure (CORRUPTION, PAYMENTDUM or 
PAYMENTAMOUNT), and other variables’ definitions are presented in Appendix 
1. In the regression analysis, we especially highlight the potential differences of 
effects between private firms and SOEs by interacting a SOE dummy with all 
explanatory variables. For robustness checks, we introduce governance variables, 
industry and/or province dummies into the baseline model (5.1). 
One may argue that the problem of endogeneity may incur between the two 
variables of corruption and growth because growth affects the firms’ ability to pay 
bribery or other informal charges. In this study, the endogeneity problem is far less 
likely to play a role due to the construction of our measures of corruption. 
Corruption is defined as firms’ perception and judgment about how corrupt the 
local business and industrial environments are, rather than the level of corruption 
that the individual firms commit. Consequently, we argue that the corruption 
severity in our study is independent of firm characteristics, but dependent on public 
                                                          
53
 The information is obtained from the firms’ responses about their legal status in World Bank’s survey. 
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governance quality in the local environments. We, therefore, estimate the 
following equation: 
uGOVERNANCECORRUPT
k
kk ++= ¦
=
8
1
0 ββ    (5.2) 
in which CORRUPT is a corruption measure (CORRUPTION, PAYMENTDUM or 
PAYMENTAMOUNT); GOVERNANCEk are the sub-indices of Vietnam’s 
Provincial Competitiveness Index, namely ENTRYCOST, LANDACCESS, 
TRANSPARENCY, TIMECOST, IMPLEMENTATION, STATEBIAS, PROACTIVE, 
and PRIVSECDEV. These governance variables are defined earlier and 
summarized in Appendix 5.1. For Equation (5.2), we use OLS regressions for 
explaining the level of corruption in local business environment (CORRUPTION) 
and the amount of informal payments as industry practice (PAYMENTAMOUNT), 
and use logit regressions for investigating the probability that a firm within a 
particular industry pays informal charges (PAYMENTDUM). All regressions are 
with robust standard errors. 
 
5.5 Firm growth and the effect of corruption 
 
We, in Table 5.1, present the summary statistics54 of corruption measures and other 
variables in our full sample, as well as the sub-samples of private firms and SOEs. 
The sub-samples show similar patterns of corruption measures. The only exception 
is the marginally significant difference in PAYMENTDUM, meaning that private 
firms pay informal charges to public officials with a lower frequency. In general, 
corruption levels in Vietnam are pretty high. More than 60% of firms think that 
their industry counterparts pay informal charges as a common industry practice. 
The sampled firms acknowledge that the firms operating within their industry pay 
0.7%, on average, out of their revenues to corrupt public officials. In our sample, 
the average return on sales55 is 1.74% and 0.5% for private firms and SOEs, 
respectively. Therefore, the informal payments that firms pay are really large. The 
perception of private firms and SOEs about corruption level is likely to be 
consistent, which is a good signal indicating that there is no bias in firms’ 
judgments on local and industry business environments.  
 
                                                          
54
 For brevity, the medians are not presented for the sub-samples. In addition, the medians are very close to 
the means.  
55
 The return on sales is measured as the ratio of after-tax profits over sales. 
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Table 5.1 shows that the SOEs in our data sample are significantly older, 
and bigger in terms of sales. With data from the World Bank’s survey, we also find 
that SOEs use auditing services more frequently, but have lower profitability 
compared to the sampled private firms56. This is consistent with the newly emerged 
private sector in Vietnam. Private firms, on the other hand, depend more heavily 
on the informal sources of financing, while SOEs get better access to bank 
financing. Despite the differences in firm characteristics, both sub-samples show 
similar patterns of corruption measures and asset growth. In addition, firms’ 
growth is not significantly different across provinces57. 
Estimating the variations of Equation (5.1), we present 12 regression models 
for the full sample in Table 5.2 that explain the asset growth in the cross-section of 
Vietnamese firms. Our regressions are checked for robustness by incorporating 
industry and/or province dummies. We do not include corruption measures in the 
first 3 models. For the next sets of 3 models, we introduce the presence of 
corruption measures, one by one: CORRUPTION, PAYMENTDUM, and 
PAYMENTAMOUNT. We additionally interact the SOE dummy with all 
explanatory variables in order to find possibly different effects in state sector. In 
general, the regression R2 values in Table 5.2 are comparable to studies on firm-
level economic growth, e.g., Allen et al. (2007) and Ayyagai et al. (2007). 
We find different pictures of corruption effect on firm growth in Vietnam, 
across private firms and SOEs. Our full sample consists of 741 private firms and 
133 SOEs. Therefore, private firms are dominating our sample, and the key results 
of estimated coefficients in Table 5.2 are mostly driven by private firms. By 
estimating the regressions separately for the sub-samples, we find that the effects 
in private firms are the same as those in the full sample. The interactions with SOE 
dummy indeed highlight the significant differences in estimated effects between 
SOEs and the full sample dominated by private firms.  
The negative coefficients of CORRUPTION and PAYMENTAMOUNT, 
which are robustly significant, are found for full sample (and the sub-sample of 
private firms58) in all related regressions in Table 5.2. Conversely, none of 
corruption measures matters for the sub-sample of SOEs. The interaction terms 
between all three measures of corruption and the SOE dummy show significantly 
positive coefficients in most of regression models in Table 5.2. The results indicate 
that corruption negatively impacts Vietnamese private firms only. Vietnamese 
SOEs, on the other hand, are not influenced by corruption and this effect is 
statistically different from what found in private firms. Most of the coefficients of 
corruption measures in SOEs’ regressions even have positive signs, although not 
                                                          
56
 Data on firms’ profitability and usage of auditing services are not used in our regression analysis, 
therefore not specifically reported here. The information is available upon request. 
57
 The statistics and tests for growth differences across provinces are available upon request. 
58
 The estimation results for the sub-samples of the private firms and SOEs are available upon request. 
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statistically significant. The impact of corruption on SOEs’ growth, therefore, is 
significantly less negative than for private firms’ growth. 
Our robust results suggest that corruption in Vietnam is distorting the 
overall business environment for firms. Corruption adversely affects the 
development of private firms, while it is statistically harmless for SOEs’ growth. 
Note that Vietnam’s state sector has been underperforming non-state sector, 
despite of enjoying huge investments from the government.59 Corruption in 
Vietnam may play a role in keeping relatively inefficient SOEs in operation. The 
close relationship between SOEs and public officials induces corruption that may 
benefit both parties, compensating the usual negative effect of corruption on firm 
growth. The private sector, the most dynamic sector in Vietnam at the moment, has 
to suffer. In general, our results suggest that corruption in Vietnam is imposing 
adverse effects on the free market mechanism that the country has been following.  
Another interesting finding in our growth models concerns the roles of 
formal and informal financing. Small and medium-sized enterprises (or private 
firms in the case of Vietnam) generally have a harder time finding access to formal 
sources of capital than larger and more established firms (see, e.g., Ang, 1992; 
Berger and Udell, 1998). As a consequence, they more often rely on informal 
sources of funding, such as loans from family, friends, or money lenders, rather 
than banks and other financial institutions. In our sample, 71.4% private firms have 
access to bank financing for their working capital and/or new investments, while 
96.2% of SOEs do (Table 5.1). In general, private firms get bank credit in the form 
of short-term credit, primarily for day-to-day working capital or trading needs, 
rather than for more long-term fixed capital investment needs. On the other hand, 
private firms (36.6%) have to rely more heavily on informal financing sources 
compared to SOEs (21.8%).  
  
                                                          
59
 In 2006, Vietnamese SOEs borrowed VND 48.5 trillion for investments in business expansion, while in 
total they created a value of VND 42 trillion of production (source: public media news about Vietnam’s 
Nation Assembly congress, 2008). Although the SOEs have been given with priorities in receiving 
government investments and thus occupy 60% of national capital resources, for the past ten years they 
generated about 40% of total profit before taxes only (Nguyen, 2006). 
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Table 5.2 shows that the reliance on informal financing is deterring the 
growth of not only private firms but also SOEs. Firms may choose the resort to 
informal financing, but this appears unfavorable for further development and 
growth. Surprisingly, the reliance on bank financing does not significantly help to 
promote firm growth in Vietnam. However, the interaction between SOE dummy 
and BANKDUM is significantly positive in most of the cases. It seems that SOEs’ 
advantage in accessing to bank financing partly helps them improve their 
performance in terms of asset growth, compared to the general situation of 
corporate sector in Vietnam. 
Besides the story of corruption and the roles of informal versus formal 
financing, we find a number of significant results for the control variables. 
Regressions show that firms’ growth is negatively associated with firm age, and 
positively associated with technology application and capacity utilization. The 
findings are robust and do support the expectations about the roles of those control 
factors. Younger firms tend to grow faster as they have higher flexibility; the firms 
with more efforts in technology investment and better capacity utilization obtain 
the capability to accelerate their performance and growth. We find that the results 
for control variables are mostly driven by the sub-sample of private firms (see 
Table 5.4). For the sub-sample of SOEs, we do not find any particular control 
factor that plays a role in their growth rates. 
We, in addition, add the provincial governance variables into the baseline 
models as potential explanatory variables. However, the estimation shows that 
none of the governance variables is significant and/or consistent across various 
model specifications. In addition, the values of R2 are not remarkably improved 
when including provincial public governance. We also run a simple test for the 
potential effects of provincial factors by including province dummies, in addition 
to firm-level variables, into Equation (5.1). However, the results indeed indicate a 
negligible role of those province dummies in explaining firms’ growth, for both 
private firms and SOEs. 
 
5.6 Corruption and governance  
 
5.6.1 Corruption across provinces and industries 
During October 2006 till September 2007, 400 corruption cases in Vietnam were 
brought to court, with the involvement of 820 persons. The total estimated 
damages in these cases were estimated to be up to VND 290 billion. The cases 
took place with high frequencies in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh city, Nghe An, Thanh 
Hoa, Long An, Binh Thuan.60 
                                                          
60
 News released on Vnexpress.net by Hoang Khue (17 December, 2007). 
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In our study, we have data available for 24 provinces61 and 17 industries in 
the full sample. We, in Table 5.3, present the means of corruption measures across 
provinces, for full sample and sub-samples of private firms and SOEs, and perform 
an ANOVA to test the mean differences of the variables.62 Similarly, we also 
compute the means of corruption measures across industries, and perform an 
ANOVA to test the mean differences of the related variables.63  
In Table 5.3, the highest levels of corruption in local business environment 
are found in the provinces of Hai Duong, Hai Phong, Thanh Hoa, Hanoi, Ho Chi 
Minh city, and Thua Thien Hue. The least corrupt environments are in Dong Thap, 
Quang Nam, An Giang, Quang Ngai, Nghe An, and Can Tho.64 ANOVA tests 
confirm that there are significant variations of corruption measures across 
provinces. 
 The statistics on corruption measures are confirmed by anecdotal evidence 
obtained from the official public media. In Hai Phong, for example, in December 
2007 the vice president of the municipal people’s committee was brought to 
criminal court due to his involvement in two big corruption cases of land 
allocation. Hai Phong also dismissed the general secretary of the communist party 
in one municipal district and the director of municipal department of natural 
resources and environment, who were convicted of land corruption. In Thanh Hoa 
province, many local leaders at commune level were arrested also due to land 
corruption and sentenced for even 10 years. Similarly, in Ho Chi Minh city in July 
2007, the president of Go Vap district’s people’s committee, the general secretary 
of the communist party, and many other officials were caught and sentenced for 11 
to 25 years due to bribery and land corruption.65 The cases of land corruption were 
mostly due to the illegal allocation of land for private usage or for unauthorized 
groups of people.  
                                                          
61
 For the convenient referring to the governance quality across 24 provinces, we provide in Appendix 5.2 
the PCI and other provincial governance indices in 2005 as constructed by VNCI and VCCI. The scores of 
the indices represent the governance quality in the local business environment.  
62
 Note that in Table 5.2, the means of PAYMENTAMOUNT in Dong Thap province shown in Panels A 
and B are actually greater than zero (0.00000276 and 0.00000331, respectively), but the numbers are too 
small to appear properly in the table. 
63
 For brevity, we do not present industry means of corruption measures and the related ANOVA tests. The 
results are available upon request. 
64
 Appendix 5.2 shows that Hai Duong and Thanh Hoa, among those provinces having the highest scores 
of corruption measures, are generally reported with the lowest PCI. For the other provinces, there are 
unclear patterns of corruption associated with PCI.  
65
 The information is extracted from articles in Vietnam’s officially authorized electronic newspapers, e.g., 
Vnexpress, Tienphong, and Thanhnien. 
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Table 5.3 
Corruption across provinces 
This table presents the cross-province means of the corruption severity of local business environment 
(CORRUPTION), the choice of firms’ paying informal charges as industry practice (PAYMENTDUM), and 
the level of informal charges paid as industry practice (PAYMENTAMOUNT), for the full samples, and 
sub-samples of private firms and SOEs. Definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 5.1. 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 CORRUPTION  PAYMENTDUM  PAYMENTAMOUNT 
Province Mean Obs.  Mean Obs.  Mean Obs. 
Hanoi 9.156 109  0.583 97  0.011 108 
Hai Phong 11.119 67  0.955 56  0.012 67 
Ha Tay 4.231 26  0.500 24  0.007 26 
Bac Ninh 7.476 21  0.714 15  0.007 21 
Hai Duong 11.700 10  1.000 7  0.002 10 
Nam Dinh 7.423 26  0.731 26  0.009 26 
Thanh Hoa 9.434 53  0.830 49  0.006 53 
Nghe An 3.222 27  0.259 22  0.001 27 
Ha Tinh 2.840 25  0.458 23  0.004 24 
Thua Thien Hue 7.786 14  1.000 12  0.028 14 
Da Nang 4.719 32  0.531 30  0.003 32 
Quang Nam 1.786 14  0.357 13  0.005 14 
Quang Ngai 2.167 6  0.400 4  0.005 5 
Binh Dinh 6.882 34  0.412 33  0.003 34 
Khanh Hoa 6.676 34  0.588 33  0.012 34 
Ho Chi Minh city 7.983 181  0.692 151  0.006 172 
Binh Duong 6.552 58  0.569 47  0.008 58 
Dong Nai 5.563 32  0.469 30  0.002 32 
Ba Ria-Vung Tau 4.714 14  0.500 12  0.001 14 
Long An 5.286 28  0.679 24  0.006 28 
Dong Thap 0.000 6  0.167 6  0.000 6 
An Giang 1.933 15  0.333 14  0.000 15 
Tien Giang 4.063 16  0.188 13  0.000 16 
Can Tho 3.615 26  0.308 24  0.000 26 
ANOVA (F test) of mean differences of the variable across provinces 
p-value 0.000     0.029     0.000   
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Table 5.3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Sample of private firms 
 CORRUPTION  PAYMENTDUM  PAYMENTAMOUNT 
Province Mean Obs.  Mean Obs.  Mean Obs. 
Hanoi 8.931 87  0.540 78  0.010 87 
Hai Phong 11.731 52  0.942 45  0.012 52 
Ha Tay 4.348 23  0.478 21  0.005 23 
Bac Ninh 7.476 21  0.714 15  0.007 21 
Hai Duong 11.000 9  1.000 6  0.002 9 
Nam Dinh 7.818 22  0.727 22  0.009 22 
Thanh Hoa 9.620 50  0.840 46  0.007 50 
Nghe An 3.056 18  0.278 14  0.001 18 
Ha Tinh 2.905 21  0.400 19  0.004 20 
Thua Thien Hue 8.077 13  1.000 12  0.028 13 
Da Nang 4.250 24  0.500 24  0.003 24 
Quang Nam 1.667 9  0.333 9  0.002 9 
Quang Ngai 2.000 3  0.333 3  0.007 3 
Binh Dinh 6.968 31  0.387 30  0.003 31 
Khanh Hoa 6.613 31  0.581 30  0.010 31 
Ho Chi Minh city 7.704 152  0.660 129  0.006 144 
Binh Duong 6.833 54  0.593 44  0.008 54 
Dong Nai 5.821 28  0.500 26  0.002 28 
Ba Ria-Vung Tau 5.000 12  0.500 10  0.001 12 
Long An 5.407 27  0.667 23  0.007 27 
Dong Thap 0.000 5  0.200 5  0.000 5 
An Giang 1.917 12  0.333 11  0.000 12 
Tien Giang 4.357 14  0.214 11  0.000 14 
Can Tho 3.565 23  0.261 21  0.000 23 
ANOVA (F test) of mean differences of the variable across provinces  
p-value 0.000     0.185     0.000   
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Table 5.3 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Sample of SOEs 
 CORRUPTION  PAYMENTDUM  PAYMENTAMOUNT 
Province Mean Obs.  Mean Obs.  Mean Obs. 
Hanoi 10.045 22  0.762 19  0.015 21 
Hai Phong 9.000 15  1.000 11  0.008 15 
Ha Tay 3.333 3  0.667 3  0.024 3 
Bac Ninh     0   0 
Hai Duong 18.000 1  1.000 1  0.005 1 
Nam Dinh 5.250 4  0.750 4  0.010 4 
Thanh Hoa 6.333 3  0.667 3  0.002 3 
Nghe An 3.556 9  0.222 8  0.000 9 
Ha Tinh 2.500 4  0.750 4  0.003 4 
Thua Thien Hue 4.000 1  1.000 0   1 
Da Nang 6.125 8  0.625 6  0.000 8 
Quang Nam 2.000 5  0.400 4  0.013 5 
Quang Ngai 2.333 3  0.500 1  0.000 2 
Binh Dinh 6.000 3  0.667 3  0.004 3 
Khanh Hoa 7.333 3  0.667 3  0.034 3 
Ho Chi Minh city 9.448 29  0.857 22  0.002 28 
Binh Duong 2.750 4  0.250 3  0.000 4 
Dong Nai 3.750 4  0.250 4  0.001 4 
Ba Ria-Vung Tau 3.000 2  0.500 2  0.001 2 
Long An 2.000 1  1.000 1  0.001 1 
Dong Thap 0.000 1  0.000 1  0.000 1 
An Giang 2.000 3  0.333 3  0.000 3 
Tien Giang 2.000 2  0.000 2  0.000 2 
Can Tho 4.000 3  0.667 3  0.001 3 
ANOVA (F test) of mean differences of the variable across provinces  
p-value 0.004     0.106     0.007   
 
In addition, we find variations of corruption across industries for the full 
sample and the sub-sample of private firms. However, the corruption levels are not 
statistically different for the SOEs sub-sample. The most corrupt industries include 
electrical machinery, non-metallic mineral products, vehicles and transport 
equipment, and basic metal. Those heavy industries have been historically 
dominated by SOEs. The least corrupt ones are found to be construction materials, 
food and beverage. For the SOEs sub-sample, ANOVA tests show insignificant 
variations of corruption, perhaps there are not enough observations of SOEs for 
several industries to generate a more meaningful test.  
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5.6.2 Public governance effects on corruption 
The previous section shows that there are variations of corruption across Vietnam’s 
provinces. Provincial governance variables may play a role in explaining those 
variations. In Table 5.4, we present the regression results of Equation (5.2) to 
examine the governance factors that explain corruption severity in Vietnam. Our 
measures of corruption do not have unusually high correlations66: CORRUPTION 
is across provinces or local business environments; PAYMENTDUM and 
PAYMENTAMOUNT are across industries. 
We present the OLS regression results explaining the corruption level in 
local business environment (CORRUPTION) in Panel A of Table 5.4. We 
interacting a SOE dummy with all explanatory variables to capture the effect 
differences, if any, for SOEs. The estimation shows that indeed governance 
variables significantly determine the level of corruption severity in local business 
environment. We find that better land access (LANDACCESS) can significantly 
help reducing the corruption level as generally perceived by firms. Good land 
access means that firms have legal land-use rights and enough land for business 
expansion at reasonable prices. Because land corruption mostly involves land 
distribution, as shown in previous examples, when the firms have better land 
access, public officials would have less control over land and thus less chance to 
extract payments. However, for SOEs the effect of land access on corruption turns 
out to be positive, although only marginally significant67. Surprisingly, when 
provinces provide better access to land resource, corruption seems to be more 
severe for SOEs. The result suggests that the SOEs may informally pay more (or 
be more willing to pay) to influence public officials in the competition for land 
resource with private firms.  
Similarly, we find that when provinces take more policies for promoting 
private sector development (PRIVSECDEV), private firms (SOEs) observe lower 
(higher) levels of corruption. The reason may be that the SOEs face the risk of 
being taken away from their previous “monopolistic” privileges and hence are 
willing to induce more corruption in favor of their own benefits.  
Also in Panel A of Table 5.4, we find further evidence in our full sample for 
the roles of governance variables. The implementation and consistency of policies 
(IMPLEMENTATION) significantly mitigate firms’ perception about corruption in 
the business environment. The coefficients for this governance variable are 
consistently significant and negative, and show no difference between private firms 
                                                          
66
 The correlations between CORRUPTION, PAYMENTDUM, and PAYMENTAMOUNT range from 10% 
to 47% depending on the full sample or sub-samples. 
67
 The coefficients and significance levels for SOEs sub-sample are not reported for brevity (available 
upon request). 
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and SOEs. The results generally suggest that better quality in public governance 
would help to mitigate corruption, especially in the perception of private firms. 
 In Panel B of Table 5.4, we present a logit regression analysis of the firms’ 
choice of paying informal charges or not in accordance with industry practice 
(PAYMENTDUM). The results once again highlight the roles of provincial 
governance factors, providing similar findings as the analysis of corruption in local 
business environment. IMPLEMENTATION and PRIVSECDEV help to cope with 
corruption across industries by reducing the chance that firms have to pay corrupt 
public officials. LANDACCESS, although having no effect among private firms, 
stimulates corruption SOEs’ perception. The coefficient of LANDACCESS is 
significantly positive at the 10% level for SOEs, and significantly different from 
the effect in the full sample. Besides, the analysis yields additional results, in 
which TRANSPARENCY tends to enlarge the perception of firms about the chance 
of informal payment. This results seems to counter-intuitive as we expect 
transparency of information should curb corruption down, but we do not find a 
plausible explanation. 
For the determinants of the amount of informal charges that firms have to 
pay (PAYMENTAMOUNT), we present the related OLS regression models in Panel 
C of Table 5.4. We find only one governance variable, IMPLEMENTATION, 
consistent with previous results. We, in addition, observe that higher regulatory 
entry costs for firms (ENTRYCOST) create an environment for informal payment to 
grow. The high entry costs force firms to approach public officials and become 
more willing to pay informally in order to accelerate the speed of fulfilling all 
required procedures for start-ups. The results we find in Panel C of Table 5.4 are 
not significantly different across private firms and SOEs. 
Our analysis, in general, shows that provincial governance variables play 
significant roles in determining the corruption levels as perceived by firms. Among 
the sub-indices of provincial governance quality, land access, the implementation 
and consistency of policies, and the promotion measures for private sector 
development appear to be the most important. Although some of the effects are 
different across SOEs and private firms, our results suggest that improvements in 
governance quality are necessary for curbing down corruption, and thus its adverse 
effects on firm growth and development. In addition, to level the playing fields for 
firms in all economic sectors should help to improve the business efficiency, and is 
crucial for Vietnam’s economic growth and development. 
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Table 5.4 
Determinants of corruption – the role of public governance 
This table presents the regressions that highlight the roles of governance variables in determining the 
corruption severity of local business environment (CORRUPTION), the probability of firms’ paying 
informal charges as industry practice (PAYMENTDUM), and the level of informal charges paid as industry 
practice (PAYMENTAMOUNT). Definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 5.1. The significant 
coefficients are printed in bold. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are used. Intercepts are not reported.  
 
Panel A: Determinants of corruption in business environment (OLS regression)  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
PCI -0.01 0.83       
ENTRYCOST   0.08 0.78     
LANDACCESS   -0.59b 0.02 -0.60b 0.02 -0.59b 0.02 
TRANSPARENCY   0.37 0.18 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.16 
STATEBIAS   0.17 0.62 0.18 0.58   
TIMECOST   -0.56 0.14 -0.53 0.13 -0.61c 0.06 
IMPLEMENTATION   -1.65a 0.00 -1.66a 0.00 -1.69a 0.00 
PRIVSECDEV   -0.35b 0.05 -0.33b 0.04 -0.34b 0.03 
PROACTIVE   0.80a 0.01 0.82a 0.00 0.90a 0.00 
SOE -3.27 0.42 0.06 0.99 1.12 0.90 -7.91 0.24 
SOE*PCI 0.05 0.46       
SOE*ENTRYCOST   0.65 0.28     
SOE*LANDACCESS   1.43a 0.01 1.31b 0.02 1.41a 0.01 
SOE*TRANSPARENCY   -0.20 0.75 -0.06 0.92 -0.14 0.83 
SOESTATEBIAS   -1.20 0.14 -1.23 0.13   
SOETIMECOST   -0.49 0.55 -0.24 0.76 0.08 0.92 
SOE*IMPLEMETATION   -0.49 0.42 -0.52 0.41 -0.23 0.69 
SOE*PRIVSECDEV   0.55 0.16 0.69c 0.09 0.98a 0.01 
SOE*PROACTIVE   -0.53 0.44 -0.34 0.64 -0.98 0.09 
         
Obs. 874  874  874  874  
R2 0.001   0.096   0.095   0.093   
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Logit regression of firms' choice of paying informal charges  
Model (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
PCI -0.01 0.15       
ENTRYCOST   0.17 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.19 
LANDACCESS   -0.09 0.36 -0.08 0.35 -0.07 0.39 
TRANSPARENCY   0.18c 0.09 0.19c 0.08 0.15 0.11 
STATEBIAS   0.13 0.36 0.14 0.27 0.16 0.17 
TIMECOST   -0.11 0.47 -0.10 0.49   
IMPLEMENTATION   -0.37a 0.00 -0.36a 0.00 -0.34a 0.00 
PRIVSECDEV   -0.23a 0.00 -0.22a 0.00 -0.21a 0.00 
PROACTIVE   0.02 0.85     
SOE 1.12 0.57 4.35 0.38 7.62b 0.03 3.45 0.17 
SOE*PCI -0.01 0.69       
SOE*ENTRYCOST   -0.13 0.72 -0.21 0.54 -0.40 0.22 
SOE*LANDACCESS   0.56b 0.05 0.42c 0.06 0.42b 0.05 
SOE*TRANSPARENCY   0.38 0.24 0.39 0.24 0.12 0.69 
SOESTATEBIAS   -0.51 0.30 -0.79b 0.05 -0.64c 0.09 
SOETIMECOST   -0.64 0.14 -0.73c 0.07   
SOE*IMPLEMETATION   -0.40 0.17 -0.57a 0.01 -0.33c 0.08 
SOE*PRIVSECDEV   0.49c 0.07 0.37c 0.08 0.34 0.11 
SOE*PROACTIVE   -0.36 0.42     
         
Obs. 862  862  862  862  
Pseudo-R2 0.005   0.061   0.060   0.056   
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Determinants of how much informal charge firms pay (OLS regression)  
Model (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
PCI 0.00 0.99       
ENTRYCOST   0.001c 0.07 0.001b 0.05 0.001b 0.05 
LANDACCESS   -0.001 0.21 -0.001 0.24 -0.001 0.25 
TRANSPARENCY   0.000 0.80 0.000 0.80   
STATEBIAS   0.000 0.86 0.000 0.85   
TIMECOST   -0.002b 0.05 -0.002b 0.04 -0.002b 0.02 
IMPLEMENTATION   -0.002a 0.01 -0.002a 0.01 -0.002a 0.00 
PRIVSECDEV   0.000 0.94     
PROACTIVE   0.001 0.47 0.001 0.54 0.001 0.39 
SOE 0.02 0.21 0.035 0.19 0.045c 0.08 0.032c 0.07 
SOE*PCI 0.00 0.19       
SOE*ENTRYCOST   0.000 0.95 0.000 0.84 0.000 0.92 
SOE*LANDACCESS   0.000 0.94 0.000 0.82 -0.001 0.38 
SOE*TRANSPARENCY   -0.004 0.13 -0.004c 0.09   
SOESTATEBIAS   -0.002 0.48 -0.003 0.32   
SOETIMECOST   -0.001 0.55 -0.002 0.44 -0.003 0.21 
SOE*IMPLEMETATION   0.000 0.93 -0.001 0.70 -0.001 0.64 
SOE*PRIVSECDEV   0.001 0.48     
SOE*PROACTIVE   0.000 0.88 0.001 0.66 0.000 0.84 
         
Obs. 765  765  765  765  
R2 0.002   0.023   0.023   0.018   
 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter contributes to the limited literature that investigates the linkages 
between corruption, growth, and public governance within an individual country 
context. We highlight the importance of distinguishing private and state sectors in 
doing such an analysis. The different priorities and treatments from the 
government, as well as public governance structures may lead to variations in the 
corruption effects on the growth of firms in these two different sectors.  
By using a sample of nearly 900 Vietnamese firms across 24 provinces, we 
show that corruption has different effects on private and state sectors. Specifically, 
corruption in Vietnam, which may arise from the special relationship between 
SOEs and public officials, imposes no harm for the low-efficiency state sector. The 
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private sector, on the other hand, suffers from corrupt business environments, 
although they are more dynamic and profitable compared to state-owned firms. We 
suggest that the government’s discriminated treatments to firms in different sectors 
distort the business environment, and are harmful for the development of the 
economy as a whole. With regards to other growth determinants, we find that 
informal financing negatively affects all firms’ growth, while better access to bank 
financing tends to provide the state sector with advantages in growth compared to 
non-state sector. 
We document that corruption widely differs across provinces and industries 
in Vietnam. We show evidence for the significant roles of public governance 
factors in determining levels of corruption, such as regulatory entry costs, land 
access, the implementation and consistency in policies, and the provincial policies 
for private sector development. Our results indicate the necessity of studying the 
variations in public governance mechanism and quality within countries. Within-
country research is crucial for understanding why and how corruption takes place, 
and thus essential for central and local governments’ policy-making process. We 
suggest that improvements in public governance quality, including the leveling of 
the playing fields for firms in all economic sectors, are necessary for curbing down 
corruption and its harmful effects for economic growth. 
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Appendix 5.1 
Definitions of variables 
 
Variables Definitions 
CORRUPTION Sum of all the sub-scores of corruption ranks indicated by the firms (scale: 
from 0 = no corruption to 4 = widespread corruption). The sub-scores are 
corruption levels for tax department officials, officials in business 
registration and licensing, import/export license authorities, customs 
department, construction permit authorities, traffic police, municipal and 
other police market controller, land administration agency, and  district 
peoples’ committee. 
PAYMENTDUM  Dummy for the presence of informal payments to public officials in the 
industry 
PAYMENTAMOUNT Ratio of informal payments over annual sales that the industry pays 
GROWTH Growth rate of total assets 
SIZE Logarithm of total sales (sales are in million VND) 
AGE Firm age (in years) 
TECH Dummy for new technological application 
CAPACITY Design capacity utilization as the amount of output actually produced 
relative to the maximum amount that could be produced  
BANKDUM Dummy of bank financing for working capital or new investments. Banking 
financing comes from private commercial banks, state-owned commercial 
banks, international commercial banks, leasing arrangements, development 
assistance funds and state budget 
INFORMALDUM Dummy of informal financing for working capital or new investments. 
Informal financing comes from family, friends and informal sources such as 
money lenders  
ENTRYCOST A provincial score that measures the time that takes firms to register, 
acquire land and receive all the necessary licenses to start business 
LANDACCESS A provincial score that measures the access of firms to land resources, i.e., 
whether firms possess their official land-use-right certificate, whether they 
have enough land for their business expansion requirements. 
TRANSPARENCY A provincial score that measures transparency and access to information. 
TIMECOST A provincial score that measures time costs of regulatory compliance. 
INFORMALCHARGE A provincial score that measures how much firms pay in informal charges 
and how much of an obstacle those extra fees pose for their business 
IMPLEMENTATION  A provincial score that measures the implementation and consistency of 
policies 
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Appendix 5.1 (continued) 
 
Variables Definitions 
STATEBIAS A provincial score that measures the bias toward SOEs in terms of incentives, 
policy and access to capital 
PROACTIVE A provincial score that measures the proactivity of provincial leadership 
PRIVSECDEV  A provincial score that measures the local policies for promoting private sector 
development 
PCI Provincial competitiveness index: the weighted combination of the nine sub-
indices (ENTRYCOST, LANDACCESS, TRANSPARENCY, TIMECOST, 
INFORMALCHARGE, IMPLEMENTATION, STATEBIAS, PROACTIVE, and 
PRIVSECDEV) 
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Chapter 6: Summary and 
recommendations 
 
Capital structure, competition and governance in firms has fascinated and inspired 
researchers. This dissertation continues those streams of research. It bundles four 
empirical studies, which can basically grouped in two parts: one on the interactions 
of capital structure and product market competition; and the other on several 
aspects of governance and its connections with firm financing and growth.  
In this concluding chapter we will summarize the key conclusions of the 
preceding chapters and suggest several topics for further research. We, in this 
dissertation, provide several key conclusions as follows. 
1. Firms choose their capital structures and indeed use strategic debt in 
correspondence with their competitive behavior in the product markets (Chapters 2 
and 3). One cannot neglect the roles of competitive behavior in studying the 
interactions between financial structure and product market decisions. 
2. Cournot and Bertrand types of competitive behavior determine the way in which 
demand and cost uncertainties in the product markets influence leverage choice of 
firms. Specifically, demand uncertainty is positively related to leverage for firms 
under both Cournot and Bertrand. On the other hand, cost uncertainty has a 
positive impact on the leverage of Cournot firms, but plays a negligible role for 
Bertrand firms. (Chapter 2). 
3. The joint determination of leverage and market share shows that in Cournot 
(Bertrand) competition, leverage negatively (positively) affects market share. 
Conversely, market share has a negative impact on leverage for Cournot firms, but 
no impact for Bertrand firms. The positive effect of leverage on market share for 
Bertrand firms invites further theoretical investigation. (Chapter 3).  
4. Firm-specific determinants of leverage vary and work differently across 
countries, meaning that the implicit assumption of previous studies about their 
equal impact is possibly misleading (Chapter 4).  
5. Country-specific factors significantly influence not only the capital structure 
choice of firms, but also the way that firm-specific variables affect that choice. The 
important country characteristics include legal enforcement, bond market 
development, GDP growth, capital formation, creditor right protection. (Chapter 
4). 
6. Within-country research on corruption is crucial for explaining the variations of 
corruption and its effects on corporate sector. Public governance factors show 
significant roles in determining the corruption severity in local business 
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environment and industry practice. The important governance factors include 
regulatory entry costs, land access, the implementation and consistency of policies, 
and the private sector development policies. Improvements in public governance 
measures are necessary for curbing down corruption and its adverse effects for 
economic growth. (Chapter 5). 
7. The effects of corruption on firm growth differ across economic sectors in 
Vietnam. Corruption hinders private firms’ growth but has no harm for state-
owned enterprises’ growth. This can be explained by the close relationship and 
mutual benefits between public officials and SOEs’ managers. (Chapter 5). 
 Overall, the essays in this dissertation have made an attempt to close several 
gaps in the literature of corporate finance. Although our work is neither complete 
nor comprehensive, it continues to reveal exciting paths for academic research.  
Chapters 2 and 3 have not touched upon the roles of long-term vs. short-
term debts in firms’ capital structure. Glazer (1994) mentions that when rival firms 
issue long-term debt, their product market behavior is driven by strategic 
considerations that would not be present if they did not have debt or if the debt was 
short term. The choice of debt, in addition, involves firms’ decisions of investing 
in new or existing projects. Investment decisions, in turn, affect firms’ output and 
market share. The linkages of leverage, investment and competition should be paid 
attention to in future studies.  
Our empirical findings provide the inspiration for further theoretical 
research. Chapter 3 points out that Bertrand levered firms behave less aggressively 
by increasing prices and gains market share, while their rivals – as strategic 
complements – also raise prices accordingly. Although the story can be plausibly 
explained by the partial price reaction of the rivals, there is no theoretical 
background to back it up. Prices are very often easily observed and therefore 
should be imitated by Bertrand rivals. 
Generally, there is plenty of room for further research on the field of 
interactions between capital structure and product market competition, which has 
not been discussed yet in this dissertation. Different markets, product lines, 
competitive structures and/or other industry characteristics may influence the 
firms’ joint decisions of financing and their entry, exit, or competition in the 
market. 
In addition, the roles of public governance and institutional factors in firm 
financing and growth constitute another challenging area which certainly needs to 
be further explored. Chapter 4 indicates that country-specific or institutional 
variables affect firms’ choice of financing in both direct and indirect ways. 
However, due to the limited data availability, especially the number of country 
observations, we have not been able to generalize our findings to all continents, 
and may have missed important institutional factors. The study in Chapter 4 only 
looks at public listed firms with available information, while small unlisted firms 
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face different constraints that affect their capital structures. Moreover, the local 
public governance factors in individual countries should also be important in 
explaining the variations in corporate leverage choice.  
Corruption is a specific issue related to public governance mechanism. We, 
in Chapter 5, have shown that within-country studies on corruption are necessary 
to provide meaningful insights of corruption causes and consequences. There are a 
number of issues open for firm-level analysis in this strand of literature. 
Corruption, especially in the local business environment, may have non-trivial 
impacts on the access to financing and other resources for firm growth. We suggest 
firm-level research be necessary for understanding the corruption effects of on 
different types of financing (e.g., formal and informal financing), and on capital 
structure choices of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
Vermogensstructuur, concurrentie en governance 
 De vermogensstructuur, de concurrentiepositie en de governance-structuur van 
ondernemingen hebben onderzoekers gefascineerd en geïnspireerd. In deze 
dissertatie worden deze thema’s verder onderzocht. Het is een bundeling van vier 
empirische studies, die in twee onderdelen verdeeld kan worden: onderzoek naar 
de interactie tussen de vermogensstructuur en competitie op productmarkten; en 
onderzoek naar verschillende governance-aspecten in relatie tot vermogens-
structuur en groei.  
De eerste twee studies vormen de hoofdstukken 2 en 3, waarin we 
verschillende theorieën en de implicaties voor de relatie tussen de 
vermogensstructuur en productmarkt concurrentie testen. We onderscheiden 
ondernemingen die concurreren binnen een Cournot of Bertrand competatieve 
omgeving, en onderzoeken vervolgens mogelijke interacties tussen 
vermogensstructuur en de industriekenmerken en -structuren.  
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt hoe concurrentie de vermogensstructuur van een 
onderneming beïnvloedt. De financieel-economische theorie voorspelt dat het 
effect van verschillende soorten onzekerheid binnen afzetmarkten (in het bijzonder 
ten aanzien van onvoorziene veranderingen in de vraag en productiekosten) op de 
vermogensstructuur van ondernemingen afhankelijk is van het soort concurrentie 
binnen de industrie. We toetsen de theoretische voorspellingen voor een steekproef 
van Amerikaanse ondernemingen, door deze ondernemingen te classificeren 
volgens een empirische maatstaf als Cournot-concurrentie (strategische 
substituten) en Bertrand-concurrentie (strategische complementen). We tonen aan 
dat de onzekerheid met betrekking tot de vraag een positieve relatie heeft met de 
ratio van de boekwaarde van het vreemd vermogen en de boekwaarde van de totale 
activa (hierna genoemd: schuldratio). We testen deze relatie separaat voor 
ondernemingen van het type Cournot-concurrentie en voor ondernemingen van het 
type Bertrand-concurrentie. De onzekerheid met betrekking tot de kosten heeft een 
significant positieve invloed op de schuldratio van ondernemingen van het type 
Cournot-concurrentie; deze invloed is echter verwaarloosbaar voor ondernemingen 
van het type Bertrand-concurrentie. Onze resultaten bevestigen het strategische 
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gebruik van vreemd vermogen, en benadrukken de rol van concurrentiegedrag van 
ondernemingen binnen een productmarkt ten aanzien van hun 
vermogensstructuurkeuze. 
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoeken wij de onderlinge relaties en determinanten van 
de vermogensstructuur en het marktaandeel van ondernemingen. De theorie 
voorspelt, dat de relaties tussen de schuldratio en het marktaandeel afhangen van 
de strategische concurrentie van ondernemingen. Het effect van deze relaties zou 
verschillend moeten zijn voor ondernemingen van het type Cournot-concurrentie 
en van het type Bertrand-concurrentie. We testen de voorspellingen voor een 
steekproef van Amerikaanse ondernemingen, door deze ondernemingen te 
classificeren gebaseerd op een empirische maatstaf als Cournot-concurrentie 
(strategische substituten) en Bertrand-concurrentie (strategische complementen). 
We verklaren gelijktijdig de schuldratio en het marktaandeel middels een 2SLS 
procedure met vertraagde verklarende en instrumentele variabelen. We tonen aan 
dat voor ondernemingen van het type Cournot-concurrentie respectievelijk 
Bertrand-concurrentie, de schuldratio een negatieve respectievelijk positieve relatie 
heeft met het marktaandeel. Het marktaandeel heeft een negatieve invloed op de 
schuldratio van ondernemingen van het type Cournot-concurrentie, maar heeft 
geen invloed voor ondernemingen van het type Bertrand-concurrentie. Onze 
bevindingen benadrukken de rol van concurrerend gedrag in de gezamenlijke 
bepaling van de vermogensstructuur en het marktaandeel.  
De laatste twee empirische studies vormen de hoofdstukken 4 en 5, waarin 
wij de rollen van institutionele en governance-factoren onderzoeken. Behalve 
algemeen geaccepteerde conventionele determinanten van de vermogensstructuur, 
tonen we aan dat landskenmerken en de nationale governance-systemen een niet 
onbeduidende rol spelen bij de bepaling van de financiële structuren van 
ondernemingen. De conventionele determinanten kunnen per land een andere 
invloed hebben.  
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert het belang van ondernemingspecifieke en 
landspecifieke factoren voor de vermogensstructuurkeuze van ondernemingen uit 
42 landen. Onze analyse levert twee nieuwe resultaten op. Ten eerste vinden wij in 
tegenstelling tot eerdere studies - die impliciet een gelijk effect voor deze 
determinanten veronderstellen - dat de ondernemingspecifieke determinanten van 
vermogensstructuur per land verschillen. Ten tweede, hoewel we overeenstemming 
vinden met het conventionele directe effect van landspecifieke factoren op de 
vermogensstructuur van ondernemingen, tonen wij tevens aan, dat er een indirect 
effect bestaat; de landspecifieke factoren beïnvloeden de ondernemingspecifieke 
determinanten van de vermogensstructuur.  
In hoofdstuk 5 presenteren we een analyse op bedrijfsniveau naar de relatie 
tussen corruptie, groei, en het openbaar bestuur van Vietnam. We onderzoeken hoe 
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corruptie de groei beïnvloedt in een vergelijkende analyse van particuliere 
ondernemingen en staatsondernemingen en hoe provinciale bestuursfactoren 
corruptie beïnvloeden. Onze resultaten wijzen erop, dat de corruptie de groei van 
de particuliere sector in Vietnam significant belemmert. Corruptie is echter niet 
schadelijk voor de groei van staatsondernemingen. Onze studie beklemtoont de rol 
van lokale instellingen en governance factoren in de beïnvloeding van corruptie. 
We presenteren bewijs, dat de verschillen per provincie met betrekking tot kosten 
gerelateerd aan wettelijke vestigingskosten, de toegankelijkheid van en 
mogelijkheid om gebruik te maken van grond, de implementatie en de consistentie 
van beleid, en het ontwikkelingsbeleid van de particuliere sector de hevigheid van 
provinciale corruptie kunnen verklaren. Onze bevindingen onderstrepen het belang 
van binnenlands_onderzoek voor een beter begrip waarom en hoe corruptie 
plaatsvindt, en dat verbeteringen van de kwaliteit van het openbaar bestuur zouden 
moeten leiden tot een reductie van corruptie en haar negatieve gevolgen.  
Samenvattend, de essays in deze dissertatie vormen een poging om enkele 
hiaten in de literatuur van de ondernemingsfinanciering te dichten. Deze studies 
brengen een aantal nieuwe inzichten voort in de relaties tussen de 
vermogensstructuur, de concurrentiepositie en de governance-structuur van 
ondernemingen. Bovendien openen zij nieuwe richtingen voor toekomstig 
academisch onderzoek. 
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Tóm tҳt luұn án  
(Summary in Vietnamese) 
 
Cѫ cҩu vӕn, cҥnh tranh chiӃn lѭӧc và quҧn trӏ 
Cѫ cҩu vӕn, cҥnh tranh chiӃn lѭӧc và công tác quҧn trӏ trong các doanh nghiӋp lâu 
nay ÿã thu hút sӵ quan tâm cӫa các nhà nghiên cӭu. Luұn án này tiӃp tөc theo ÿuәi 
các hѭӟng nghiên cӭu ÿó. Luұn án bao gӗm 4 nghiên cӭu thӵc nghiӋm có thӇ 
nhóm thành hai phҫn: mӝt phҫn ÿӅ cұp tӟi sӵ tѭѫng tác giӳa cѫ cҩu vӕn doanh 
nghiӋp và sӵ cҥnh tranh trên thӏ trѭӡng sҧn phҭm; và phҫn thӭ hai ÿӅ cұp tӟi mӝt 
sӕ khía cҥnh cӫa quҧn trӏ, quҧn lý công và các mӕi liên quan cӫa chúng ÿӃn tài 
chính và tăng trѭӣng cӫa các doanh nghiӋp. 
 Hai nghiên cӭu ÿҫu tiên là các chѭѫng 2 và 3 cӫa luұn án, trong ÿó chúng 
tôi kiӇm ÿӏnh các lý thuyӃt khác nhau vӅ mӕi liên hӋ giӳa cѫ cҩu vӕn doanh nghiӋp 
và loҥi hình cҥnh tranh trên thӏ trѭӡng. Ĉһc biӋt, chúng tôi phân biӋt các doanh 
nghiӋp cҥnh tranh theo mô hình Cournot và Bertrand, sau ÿó nghiên cӭu các tѭѫng 
tác có thӇ có giӳa cѫ cҩu vӕn và mӝt sӕ cҩu trúc và ÿһc ÿiӇm cӫa ngành. 
Chѭѫng 2 xem xét hành vi cҥnh tranh ҧnh hѭӣng nhѭ thӃ nào ÿӃn cѫ cҩu 
vӕn mӝt doanh nghiӋp. Lý thuyӃt dӵ ÿoán rҵng tác ÿӝng cӫa các biӃn bҩt ÿӏnh 
(uncertainty) khác nhau trên thӏ trѭӡng sҧn phҭm (cө thӇ là các ÿӝt biӃn không dӵ 
tính trѭӟc ÿѭӧc vӅ nhu cҫu và chi phí) ÿӕi vӟi cѫ cҩu vӕn cӫa doanh nghiӋp phө 
thuӝc vào cách thӭc cҥnh tranh trong ngành. Chúng tôi kiӇm ÿӏnh các dӵ ÿoán này 
trong mӝt mүu nghiên cӭu gӗm các doanh nghiӋp sҧn xuҩt cӫa Mӻ, bҵng cách phân 
loҥi các doanh nghiӋp thành loҥi cҥnh tranh kiӇu Cournot (hay thay thӃ chiӃn lѭӧc 
– strategic substitutes) và loҥi cҥnh tranh kiӇu Bertrand (hay bә sung chiӃn lѭӧc – 
strategic complements). Chúng tôi chӍ ra rҵng mӭc ÿӝ bҩt әn ÿӏnh vӅ nhu cҫu có 
quan hӋ tӍ lӋ thuұn vӟi tӍ lӋ nӧ trên tәng tài sҧn cӫa doanh nghiӋp trong cҧ hai mүu 
nghiên cӭu Cournot và Bertrand. Mӭc ÿӝ bҩt әn ÿӏnh vӅ chi phí có tác ÿӝng tӍ lӋ 
thuұn vӟi tӍ lӋ nӧ cӫa các doanh nghiӋp cҥnh tranh kiӇu Cournot, nhѭng lҥi không 
có vai trò gì trong các doanh nghiӋp cҥnh tranh kiӇu Bertrand. KӃt quҧ nghiên cӭu 
cӫa chúng tôi khҷng ÿӏnh sӱ dөng vay nӧ là mӝt công cө chiӃn lѭӧc và nhҩn mҥnh 
vai trò quan trӑng cӫa hành vi cҥnh tranh cӫa các doanh nghiӋp trên thӏ trѭӡng sҧn 
phҭm khi ra quyӃt ÿӏnh vӅ cѫ cҩu vӕn cӫa hӑ. 
Trong chѭѫng 3, chúng tôi nghiên cӭu mӕi tѭѫng tác ÿӗng thӡi giӳa cѫ cҩu 
vӕn và thӏ phҫn sҧn phҭm cӫa doanh nghiӋp. Lý thuyӃt dӵ ÿoán rҵng mӕi quan hӋ 
giӳa tӍ lӋ nӧ và thӏ phҫn phө thuӝc vào loҥi hình cҥnh tranh chiӃn lѭӧc cӫa các 
176
Tóm tҳt luұn án 
 
166 
doanh nghiӋp. Cө thӇ là tác ÿӝng cӫa tӍ lӋ nӧ lên thӏ phҫn sӁ phҧi khác nhau giӳa 
các doanh nghiӋp cҥnh tranh theo mô hình Cournot và Bertrand. Sӱ dөng mүu 
nghiên cӭu là các ngành công nghiӋp sҧn xuҩt cӫa Mӻ, chúng tôi phân biӋt giӳa 
các doanh nghiӋp cҥnh tranh Cournot và Bertrand dӵa trên mӝt công thӭc thӵc 
nghiӋm vӅ các hãng thay thӃ chiӃn lѭӧc và bә sung chiӃn lѭӧc. Chúng tôi ÿӗng 
thӡi xem xét các nhân tӕ quyӃt ÿӏnh cӫa cѫ cҩu vӕn và thӏ phҫn bҵng mô hình hӗi 
quy 2SLS vӟi các biӃn ÿӝc lұp và biӃn công cө trӉ (lagged explanatory and 
instrumental variables). Chúng tôi chӍ ra rҵng trong mô hình cҥnh tranh Cournot 
(Bertrand), tӍ lӋ nӧ tác ÿӝng tӍ lӋ nghӏch (tӍ lӋ thuұn) tӟi thӏ phҫn. Thӏ phҫn ngѭӧc 
lҥi có tác ÿӝng tӍ lӋ nghӏch tӟi tӍ lӋ nӧ cӫa các doanh nghiӋp cҥnh tranh Cournot, 
nhѭng không có tác ÿӝng gì tӟi tӍ lӋ nӧ cӫa các doanh nghiӋp Bertrand. KӃt quҧ 
cӫa chúng tôi nhҩn mҥnh vai trò cӫa hành vi cҥnh tranh khi cѫ cҩu vӕn và thӏ phҫn 
sҧn phҭm tác ÿӝng tӟi nhau ÿӗng thӡi. 
Hai nghiên cӭu tiӃp theo cҩu thành các chѭѫng 4 và 5 cӫa luұn án, trong ÿó 
chúng tôi xem xét vai trò cӫa các nhân tӕ thӇ chӃ và quҧn lý công (institutional and 
governance factors). Ngoài các nhân tӕ quyӃt ÿӏnh cѫ cҩu vӕn doanh nghiӋp ÿã 
ÿѭӧc chҩp nhұn rӝng rãi, các ÿһc ÿiӇm riêng biӋt cӫa các nѭӟc cǊng nhѭ các hӋ 
thӕng quҧn lý quӕc gia ÿѭӧc cho thҩy là cǊng ÿóng nhӳng vai trò không nhӓ trong 
viӋc quyӃt ÿӏnh cѫ cҩu vӕn doanh nghiӋp. Ngoài ra, các nhân tӕ quyӃt ÿӏnh truyӅn 
thӕng cǊng hoҥt ÿӝng khác nhau ӣ các quӕc gia khác nhau. 
Chѭѫng 4 phân tích tҫm quan trӑng cӫa các yӃu tӕ ÿһc trѭng cӫa doanh 
nghiӋp và ÿһc trѭng cӫa quӕc gia ҧnh hѭӣng ÿӃn quyӃt ÿӏnh lӵa chӑn cѫ cҩu vӕn 
trong các doanh nghiӋp cӫa 42 nѭӟc khác nhau trên khҳp thӃ giӟi. Nghiên cӭu cӫa 
chúng tôi ÿѭa ra hai kӃt quҧ mӟi. Thӭ nhҩt, chúng tôi thҩy rҵng các nhân tӕ ÿһc 
trѭng cӫa doanh nghiӋp ҧnh hѭӣng ÿӃn tӍ lӋ nӧ có tác ÿӝng khác nhau giӳa các 
quӕc gia, trong khi ÿó các nghiên cӭu trѭӟc ÿây ÿӅu ngҫm giҧ ÿӏnh rҵng các nhân 
tӕ này có tác ÿӝng bҵng nhau. Thӭ hai, mһc dù chúng tôi nhҩt trí vӅ sӵ tác ÿӝng 
trӵc tiӃp cӫa các nhân tӕ ÿһc trѭng cӫa quӕc gia ÿӕi vӟi cѫ cҩu vӕn doanh nghiӋp, 
chúng tôi cǊng ÿӗng thӡi chӍ ra rҵng chúng còn có mӝt tác ÿӝng gián tiӃp bӣi vì 
các yӃu tӕ mang tính quӕc gia cǊng ҧnh hѭӣng ÿӃn vai trò cӫa các nhân tӕ quyӃt 
ÿӏnh tӍ lӋ nӧ mà mang tính ÿһc trѭng cӫa doanh nghiӋp. 
Trong chѭѫng 5, chúng tôi tiӃn hành mӝt phân tích vӟi sӕ liӋu ӣ tҫm doanh 
nghiӋp (firm-level analysis) vӅ mӕi quan hӋ giӳa tham nhǊng, tăng trѭӣng, và quҧn 
lý công ӣ ViӋt Nam. Chúng tôi xem xét tham nhǊng ҧnh hѭӣng nhѭ thӃ nào ÿӃn 
tăng trѭӣng thông qua mӝt nghiên cӭu so sánh giӳa các doanh nghiӋp tѭ nhân và 
doanh nghiӋp nhà nѭӟc. KӃt quҧ nghiên cӭu cӫa chúng tôi cho thҩy tham nhǊng 
cҧn trӣ ÿáng kӇ mӭc ÿӝ tăng trѭӣng cӫa khu vӵc tѭ nhân ӣ ViӋt Nam. Tuy nhiên, 
tham nhǊng lҥi không có hҥi cho sӵ tăng trѭӣng cӫa khu vӵc nhà nѭӟc. Nghiên 
cӭu cӫa chúng tôi làm nәi bұt vai trò cӫa các thӇ chӃ ӣ ÿӏa phѭѫng và các nhân tӕ 
quҧn lý công có tác ÿӝng tӟi mӭc ÿӝ tham nhǊng. Chúng tôi cung cҩp bҵng chӭng 
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cho thҩy sӵ khác biӋt giӳa các tӍnh/thành phӕ vӅ các chi phí hành chính gia nhұp 
thӏ trѭӡng (regulatory entry costs), vӅ tiӃp cұn nguӗn lӵc ÿҩt ÿai (land access), vӅ 
viӋc thӵc thi và sӵ nhҩt quán trong chính sách (implementation and consistency of 
policies), và vӅ các chính sách phát triӇn khu vӵc tѭ nhân, có thӇ giҧi thích ÿѭӧc 
mӭc ÿӝ nghiêm trӑng vӅ tham nhǊng ӣ các tӍnh thành. KӃt quҧ cӫa chúng tôi nhҩn 
mҥnh tҫm quan trӑng cӫa các nghiên cӭu trong phҥm vi tӯng quӕc gia ÿӇ hiӇu 
ÿѭӧc tҥi sao có tham nhǊng và nó diӉn ra nhѭ thӃ nào, và ÿӗng thӡi ÿӅ xuҩt rҵng 
viӋc cҧi thiӋn chҩt lѭӧng quҧn lý công sӁ giúp hҥn chӃ tham nhǊng cǊng nhѭ các 
tác hҥi cӫa nó. 
Nhìn chung, các nghiên cӭu trong luұn án này ÿã nӛ lӵc làm rõ mӝt sӕ vҩn 
ÿӅ còn bӓ ngӓ trong lƭnh vӵc nghiên cӭu vӅ tài chính và quҧn trӏ doanh nghiӋp. 
Mһc dù nghiên cӭu cӫa chúng tôi chѭa hҷn ÿã ÿҫy ÿӫ và hoàn chӍnh, nhѭng ÿã 
phҫn nào ÿóng góp vào nghiên cӭu hӑc thuұt, cǊng nhѭ tiӃp tөc chӍ ra các hѭӟng 
nghiên cӭu mӟi ÿҫy thú vӏ. 
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This thesis consists of four studies on the interactions of capital structure and product
market competition, and on several aspects of governance, firm financing and growth. The
first study investigates how competitive behavior and market uncertainty affect the
capital structure of a firm in the U.S. manufacturing. We show that demand uncertainty is
positively related to leverage for firms in both the Cournot and the Bertrand samples. Cost
uncertainty has a significantly positive impact on the leverage of Cournot firms, but plays a
negligible role for Bertrand firms. In the second study, we examine the joint determination
of capital structure and market share in U.S. manufacturing firms. We provide evidence
that in Cournot competition, leverage negatively affects market share, while in Bertrand
competition this effect is positive. Market share is shown to have a negative impact on
leverage in Cournot firms, but no impact on leverage in Bertrand firms. Both studies
highlight the role of firms’ competitive behavior in the product market in their capital
structure decisions. The third study analyzes the importance of firm-specific and country-
specific factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. We find
that firm-specific determinants of leverage differ across countries, while prior studies
implicitly assume equal impact of these determinants. Although we concur with the
conventional direct impact of country-specific factors on the capital structure of firms, we
show that there is an indirect impact because country-specific factors also influence the
roles of firm-specific determinants of leverage. Finally, in the forth study, we provide a
firm-level analysis of the relation between corruption, growth, and public governance in
Vietnam. Our results indicate that corruption significantly hinders the growth of Vietnam’s
private sector. However, corruption is not detrimental for the growth in state sector. Our
study emphasizes the role of local institutions and governance factors in affecting
corruption.
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Erasmus School of Econo mics. ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
advanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research
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is united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
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